

THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY



EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VOL. IX

APRIL, 1946

No. 2

PEACE AND THE FAMILY



PEACE is a sentiment marked by the deepest intimacy. It is within ourselves; it penetrates to the innermost recesses of the soul; it permeates the spirit in its nether reaches as well as in its loftier heights. Peace spreads its subtle perfume through the soul's entire being. All this is self-evident to him who knows the prime origin of peace. It feeds itself at the very roots of the soul's most immaterial manifestations; it is like an emanation, as it were, of the soul's most virtuous impulses, like the aroma of its most perfect action, which is charity. Indeed, Saint Thomas in developing the thought of Saint Augustine on this point considers it not only the spiritual aureole of order, *tranquillitas ordinis*,¹ but "an internal effect" of the act of charity,² an effect which proceeds from that act as a natural result, in the manner of a property, of a blossoming out, of a fruit; *ponitur etiam inter fructus*.³

Peace is related to joy. It is the healthy tension, the fullness

¹ *De Civ. Dei*, XIX, C. 13.

² "Deinde considerandum est de effectibus consequentibus actum caritatis principalem, qui est dilectio. Et primo de effectibus interioribus." *IIaIIae*, Q. 28, prol.

³ *Ibid.*, Q. 29, a. 4, ad 1.

and the perfection of joy; *perfectio gaudii est pax*.⁴ Like joy it makes its presence felt as an experience of serenity, of a repose which issues forth from a deep feeling of achievement.⁵ It is the overflow of perfection; and it even has the power to produce, on the affective level, an impression of beatitude.⁶

This unfolding, however, and these affective harmonies are not peace in the strong and root sense of the word. It is only through an analogy of attribution that we are able to extend this idea to appetite, to the delectable sensation to be gathered from it. In fact even though peace flows radically from the will, or even though it has repercussions on the will, it is, nonetheless, in its first acceptance, the silent radiation of order, its spontaneous manifestation. Above all it signifies the proper object which causes the satisfaction of the affective part. And it is only when we consider the results, on the moral plane, of the will's righteousness—peace on earth to men of good will—that we can regard it as a fruit of the will, as the object of its impulses and the cause of its delights.⁷

Within the family, as everywhere else, peace is as the secret respiration of unity and order, the restful atmosphere which emanates from them.⁸ Its cause is deeply rooted in the rectitude of wills, and, in a more proximate manner, in the unity, the order, and the harmony which flow from this rectitude. It presupposes recognition and acceptance on the part of the persons involved of the conditions required for the internal and external order of the institution of which they are members. It presupposes the submission of their desires to the conditions inherent in the nature of the society of the family as well as to the conditions required for the fulfillment of its social and

⁴ *Iallae*, Q. 70, a. 3.

⁵ “. . . quiescit appetitus ejus, in qua quiete consistit quies et ratio pacis.” *De Div. Nom.*, C. 11, lec. 1.

⁶ *Iallae*, Q. 69, aa. 1 et 3; Q. 70, a. 3; *IIallae*, Q. 29, a. 4, ad 1.

⁷ *IIallae*, Q. 29, aa. 2, 3, 4.

⁸ Following Dionysius, St. Thomas links up peace with unity rather than with order, he pictures it as flowing from the latter to the extent that order is a mode of unity. “Duplex unio est de ratione pacis . . .” *IIallae*, Q. 29, a. 3; *De Div. Nom.*, C. II, lec. 1, 2, 3.

religious destinies. And when the wills of men adhere to order, they are doubly united: besides being joined together in the observance of its injunctions, they enjoy together the good which it is the purpose of order to promote.

I. THE FAMILY IN COMMUNITY LIFE

But before we consider the existence *de jure* of an order and a peace which are in the proper domain of the family, we should like to show briefly and in outline that it would be illogical to think of establishing a regime of peace in civil society and in the whole human universe without undertaking to establish it in the first place within the society of the family.

We know that beyond a doubt the family is the mother-cell of the whole social organism; we know, too, that when there is disorder in the basic cell, it is radical and pernicious; but it often happens that we give to such observations as these a purely verbal or figurative application. Conceiving as we do the social and political orders as if they were autonomous and superimposed realities, it becomes difficult for us to see their inner relations with order in the family. Of course we all admit that they rest on the latter, but we are not sufficiently aware of the degree of interdependence and compenetration which exists among them all. Since we know that social order and political order are transcendental, we consider them independent too. A transcendental order is not necessarily independent. It is independent, rather, because it covers several particular kinds of order; it extends beyond them, one and all, both in scope and in loftiness. Such a kind of order is transcendent because it is fashioned for superior purposes, for purposes which, being situated beyond particular ends, allow it to encompass them all, to subordinate them all to itself.⁹ But from that fact, we repeat,

⁹ "Sicut homo est pars domus, ita domus est pars civitatis . . . Et ideo, sicut bonum unius hominis non est ultimus finis . . . , ita etiam bonum unius domus ordinatur ad bonum unius civitatis, quae est communitas perfecta." *IaIIae*, Q. 90, a. 3, ad 3.

"Domus medio modo se habet inter unam singularem personam et civitatem vel

it does not necessarily follow that a transcendental order must be independent of the elementary orders which it embraces and crowns. On the contrary, it is indebted to them for its substance and its organs. In its proper being, it is the result of their union and their organization with a view to accomplishing a purpose which is beyond their scope. Thus without them it could not exist. Exactly as a whole is disintegrated when it is deprived of its parts, supreme order falls into pieces when the elemental orders which it encompasses and orients toward goals are disunited. A social or political order, without organic matter for it to unify and coordinate, degenerates into a fiction of the mind.

It is thus a manifest error to imagine the order of the community as did the philosophers of the French Revolution and the partisans of liberal democratism. It is an error to suppose that it is immediately based on individuals and that it exercises on them a univocal and uniform rule. It is, on the contrary, essentially hierarchical, analogous, and diverse. Consisting in the ordaining of a multitude of elemental orders, of orders each provided with its own economy, it is obliged to embrace them and to direct them in the manner of their nature and of their respective finalities.¹⁰ Moreover, while it must seek its own ends, it must try to obtain for all the subordinate kinds of order a better internal well-being and the full enjoyment of the external welfare to which they are ordained.

According to this conception—which reposes on the very nature of social realities—order in the family is intrinsic; it is to be found within that type of order which gives life and being to the community. It is implied in the very texture of the

regnum; nam sicut una singularis persona est pars domus, ita una domus est pars civitatis vel regni." *Hallae*, Q. 50, a. 3; *Comm. Eth.*, L. 1, lect., 1; *Comm. Pol.*, L. 1, lec. 1.

¹⁰ "Non autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine diversi ordines non essent. Ipsa ergo ratio hierarchiae requirit ordinum diversitatem. Quae quidem diversitas ordinum secundum diversa officia, et actus consideratur, sicut patet quod in una civitate sunt diversi ordines secundum diversos actus . . ." *Ia*, Q. 108, a. 2.

latter. It is as the atomic unit, the basic element of all individual types of order, the unification and stratification of which are the supreme functions of political organizations. This means that it is utterly fantastic to think of being able to secure peace in the community without making it rule first in the society of the home. Disorder in the family literally means a cause of disease and of disintegration lodged in the very heart of society. On the other hand, if peace in the family does not necessarily mean peace for the social whole, it nevertheless has a great chance to influence the entire social unit toward peace. Order and welfare are not introduced into such a basic and universal element without good effects on the whole, which is materially composed of such elements. This is a case of necessary solidarity. The slightest disorder of the parts is enough to trouble the harmony of the whole, while their judicious disposition calls forth and facilitates a fortunate economy.

II. THE INTERNAL SOURCES OF PEACE

Is there *de jure* an order which is specifically of the family? Is the family susceptible to true dispositions wholly in conformity with an unvarying rule? Can we find criteria which allow us to judge whether the state of things which resides in the family is wholesome or anarchical? Is it capable of peace and of discord? In other words, is the family to be considered as an institution which has natural foundations or does it owe its structure to contingent factors, such, for example, as a simple agreement among men?

a) *Positive norms*

Among the means which allow us to judge whether a social fact is natural, there are first of all the positive disciplines like history, ethnology, and sociology. They seek to set forth the laws, the ideas which have brought about concrete facts, since there is generally the incarnation of a belief or of a theory at the core of a generalized mode of conduct. And, as the saying goes: what is found in all or in the majority seems to have

found its origin in a tendency of nature.¹¹ The constancy and the universality of a phenomenon have always been regarded as irrefragable signs of its natural character. Then too, we have employed all the erudition and science at our command in order to discover the original forms of the family as well as those forms which, in the course of evolution, were imposed on it by social and economic conditions.

After much fanciful theorizing and many hasty generalizations (which were the result either of too limited information or of faulty methods of investigation), we have at length arrived at the historical justification of the saying of Christ: "In the beginning it was not thus."¹² In the beginning there were no polygamy, repudiation, divorce, or conception-preventing practices, but instead an individual, monogamous, stable family. We are hearing this proclaimed from many sources today, from studies of tribes found in the remotest corners of the world, whose material civilization still has so many archaic vestiges as to be justly considered *primitive*. This is what many investigations, carried out among these sources by ethnologists with definitely varying points of view, have revealed.¹³ All agree that at the beginning the organization of the family was of the type upheld later on by Christianity. The work of the Creator was cosymmetrical with that of the Savior.

An institution, however, in spite of its roots in nature, is not invariable in all its aspects.¹⁴ It suffers the conditioning of the economic, social, and cultural regimes in which it is incorporated. It responds to the pressure which is exerted upon it

¹¹ "Id quod invenitur in omnibus aut in pluribus videtur esse ex inclinatione naturae." *Comm. Eth.*, n. 1509. Again: nn. 466, 1018, 1511; *Iallae*, Q. 94, a. 4.

¹² Matthew, XIX, 8.

¹³ *Précis de Sociologie* par A. Lemonnyer, O.P., J. Tonneau, O.P., R. Troude, p. 35 and ff. where the reader will find a number of references to sustain the conclusion which has been reached in the text.

¹⁴ "Diversificantur ea quae sunt de jure naturali secundum diversos status et conditiones hominum." *Suppl.*, Q. 41, a. 1, ad 3. "Jus naturale . . . quandoque et alicubi potest variari . . . Semper enim et ubique dextera est melior quam sinistra secundum naturam; sed per aliquod accidens contingit aliquem esse ambidextrum, quia natura nostra variabilis est." *Ibid.*, Q. 65, a. 2.

from all sides. Then too, it is exposed to constant warping from the faulty impulses of man's will, which controls it in its exercise and its orientation. Fallen man is often deaf to the injunctions of nature and feels few scruples about deflecting from their original purposes the mechanisms of natural tendencies. Deprived of the help of grace and the light of faith, man soon degenerates. It has happened often enough that ignorance, superstition, passion, the propagation of false maxims, and the evil example of those in high places have set vice up as custom and have quite clouded the light of conscience.¹⁵ Thus it is not surprising that polygamy, among many other deformations, little by little became a custom even in the most highly evolved civilizations. Blame for this can be attributed to the pride and the concupiscence of some chieftains as uncultured as they were omnipotent and tyrannical. Still, never was family society considered as anything but an institution willed by the author of life and destined to the propagation of the human species. And the essential part of this tendency was kept safe. Thus we can say that ethnology gives the proof that a force which transcends all the forms of civilization, namely nature, asserted itself at every stage of the evolution of the family and has maintained if not all its characteristics, at least its essential purpose.¹⁶

b) *Rational norms*

There are other rules, other norms, which allow us to discern whether there exists *de jure* an order of the domestic community. They are represented by reason and faith, by philosophy and theology. The value and the certainty of these norms—for one who considers himself both rational and Christian—are incontestable. Moreover they are so well recognized that it amounts to the same thing to ask oneself whether an institution enjoys a *de jure* economy or whether it pursues objectives which are in the realm of faith and reason.¹⁷ It is especially in the

¹⁵ *IaIIae*, Q. 94, a. 6.

¹⁶ A. Lemonnyer, O. P., J. Tonneau, O. P., R. Troude, *loc. cit.*

¹⁷ "Quando intellectus est regula vel mensura rerum, veritas consistit in hoc

light of these two latter considerations that we would like to examine the institution of marriage.

c) *The subjects of the family*

The family is the result of the association of two persons: *communitatem personae ad personam*.¹⁸ It is required that the two associates be of different sexes, that is to say, of sexes that are opposite and correlative. Male does not marry male. Persons of the same sex can attain a great community of lives, thoughts, and sentiments; they can identify themselves one with another in the pursuit of a common ideal, but they do not get married. Only people whose sexes are different, only a man and a woman can found a home. Such observations as these would be foolish if they did not result in making us observe with evidence that the family society is founded on individuality, on an incommunicability which results from sex-differences. They teach us, moreover, that it is, if not solely at least principally, because of their animal nature that man and woman have, in the course of the centuries, felt the necessity of uniting in a society which has been named "conjugal."

Persons, strictly as persons, are neither male or female, and so are not designed for conjugal life. As persons, they have spirituality; they are endowed with intelligence and will; they commune in one another's profound intimacy in completely immaterial manifestations. Thus, angels, though persons, have no sex and do not enter into matrimony. Only human persons are apt for the conjugal union, since they alone are carnal, they alone have the animality and the sexuality which the union

quod adaequantur intellectui." *Ia*, Q. 21, a. 2. In all things that have to be done by the concurrence of free will, reason is the rule and measure—*gratia etsi sit efficacior quam natura, tamen natura est essentialior homini, et ideo magis permanens*—since it does not surrender its insights by the fact that it is restored and transformed by faith. It prescribes what must be accomplished. As St. Thomas teaches, it is the cause of the actual performance as well as of the rectitude of man's deeds. *De Ver.*, Q. 1, a. 3; *Comm. Perih.*, L. 1, lec. 3, n. 7; *Iallae*, Q. 17, a. 1 and ss; Q. 18, a. 4, c. and ad. 3.

¹⁸ *Comm. Pol.*, L. 1, lec. 1.

demands.¹⁹ It is well, thus, to reserve the words "marriage" or "family" to the society of beings which are characterized by the correlative opposition of the sexes, to the society of husband and wife.

It is evident that animality does not have in man the same rigidity and stability which it has among animals. Since it is assumed into a superior nature as a coessential principle, since it is spiritualized by the proximity and the constant irradiations of reason, and since it is impregnated by intelligence in the majority of its manifestations and its processes, it shows in man a suppleness and a variability which it does not have among animals. Animality is incorporated into a regime the economy of which surpasses it, and of which it enjoys, to a certain extent, the dignity and the privileges.²⁰ This does not mean that it is so far influenced by spirituality as to leave behind its intrinsic, structural, and essential needs. It remains corruptible; it is still subject to generation, to growth, and to decline. Thus it is that even in man, it is because of procreation, because of the preservation of the species, that sex exists.²¹ The generative functions undoubtedly can be subordinate to the superior purposes of reason and help in the perfection of the person, but they are not thereby deprived of their specificity or of their own teleology. On the contrary, it is by emphasizing this specificity and this characteristic finality that reason can obtain use and profit from these functions. Animality is able, in the being which is the center and the end of all the cosmos, to attain this degree of sublimation; it can tend to purposes which in other beings it cannot know, to purposes which are on a spiritual plane.

¹⁹ "Inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia secundum naturam, in qua communicat cum aliis animalibus; et secundum hoc dicuntur ea esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est commixtio maris et foeminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia." *IaIIae*, Q. 94, a. 2.

²⁰ "Anima autem intellectiva habet completissime virtutem sensitivam; quia quod est inferioris, praexistit perfectius in superiori . . ." *Ia*, Q. 76, a. 5. "Sensus est minus quam id quod est proprium homini, et convenit homini excellenter prae aliis animalibus." *Ibid.*, Q. 108, a. 5, ad 1 et 3.

²¹ "Est de intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata." *Ia*, Q. 92, a. 1, ad 1.

d) *The purposes of marriage*

We can marry for a multitude of reasons. Man has the privilege of superimposing on the essential ends of a given natural tendency a whole procession of accidental motives.²² He is able to graduate his perspectives; he can even abuse this power and substitute his own purposes for those of the Lord.

The explanation of this phenomenon resides in the fact that there is in man a double artisan, so to speak: nature and free will. He can act, in the first place, in virtue of mechanisms set up by nature and filled by her with energy adapted to their particular functioning. He can also act in virtue of the creative resources of his reason and his liberty: *homo est agens et per naturam et per intellectum*. Man is constituted as a source of activity at times through his reason and at other times through the activity of his nature. When he produces in virtue of the fecundity of nature, he begets his like in species; when he produces in virtue of the fertility of reason, he conceives and brings forth works of art. In the first case, he applies the energies of an instrument forged by the automatism of life and determined in its structure; in the second, he invents plans before executing them. The most marvelous part of this is that, as we have just noted, he has the power to combine these two sources of activity and to make the initiatives of nature serve the superior perspectives which he has as a human person, as a being derived directly as an image from the Holy Trinity, as a being destined to joys which outdo in purity anything that a carnal being can imagine.

But what is the intent of this distinction? What does this duality of nature and reason mean in us? What doctrine can possibly be taken from it regarding marriage?

In the first place, Nature, which is the work of the Creator, which has, in man, the mode of reason crystallized into an organism, and which is an anticipation, a sort of prefiguration,

²² "Quod habet unum finem per se et principalem, potest habere plures secundarios per se, et infinitos per accidens." *Suppl.*, Q. 48, a. 2, ad 1.

of eternal Wisdom—Nature is immanent finality. It is directive idea. It is self-oriented, automatically and independently of human reason and will, to determinate ends. The eye is intrinsically determined to color and the ear to sound. Liberty and reason play no part in the functioning of sensory organs. Their competency does not go beyond the regulation of the exercise of these organs. They cannot modify the structure nor the tendencies of the sensory organs. Moreover, Nature is not ordained only to precise ends, it is also actuated by energies the play of which, being regulated by physical laws, are not subject to reason and will either. The number and the frequency of light vibrations and sound vibrations are not in any way determined by the subject which sees and hears. This leads us to the conclusion that, in the realm in which he is an actor of nature, the human being has at his disposal activities the ends or the laws of which he cannot fix or formulate. Eternal Reason has taken it upon Itself to arrange all that for him.

One would have to be blind not to see that the sex-differentiation in the human species is not man-made. Likewise the forces of procreation are thrust upon him without his consent, sometimes without his knowledge. They are given him by another agent and for reasons with which his reasoning power has nothing to do. He is characterized by a sex and made capable of procreation by God Himself. It was always thus that, even in the dimmest dawn of history, this matter was considered. Man, when he exercises his functions as propagator of human existence, has always considered himself the instrument of nature and the cooperator with the supreme Master of life. He was always conscious that the forces put at his disposal and entrusted to his discretion had their operative virtues, as well as their ends and means, from Him Who, at the beginning, breathed into everything a soul and a spirit of life. It is only in our morally degenerate and depraved times that we have attributed to ourselves absolute domain over life and death. It is only in our age that we have been able to blind ourselves and to decay to the point of considering birth prevention, illegal

operations, abortion, and assassination of thousands of aspirants to life as perfectly licit and permissible.

It is thus only through its desire to be in agreement with both reason and common sense that Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy proclaims that marriage is an institution of nature.²³ It, as well as history, teaches that the union of persons of different sexes for the purpose of bringing into full play the procreative powers of both can have no other aim but those very ones which have motivated the existence of the sexes and human fecundity. It holds that liberty could not, without prevaricating, without slipping into disorder, assign any other primordial aim to it, since Divine Reason, which expresses its intentions and enjoins its orders through the interpreting of the inclinations of Nature, is definitely superior to our pale wisdom and has authority over it.²⁴

It is important to underline, in passing, that this aim is not of individual, but rather of common, character. In effect, the child is the fruit of conjugal love, which is sought after and obtained by the fecundity of husband and wife, by the active contribution of the properties peculiar to the sex of each of them. And this common effect, as we shall see, *is of such a*

²³ "Principaliter est in officium naturae." *Suppl.*, Q. 42, a. 2. "Quamvis matrimonium sit sacramentum, tamen aliud est matrimonio esse matrimonium, et aliud est ei esse sacramentum; quia non solum ad hoc est institutum ut sit in signum rei sacrae, sed etiam ut sit in officium naturae." *Suppl.*, Q. 49, a. 2, ad 7.

²⁴ "Ratio naturalis ad ipsum inclinat dupliciter: Primo, quantum ad principalem ejus finem, qui est bonum prolis. Non enim intendit natura solum generationem prolis, sed traductionem et promotionem usque ad perfectum statum hominis in quantum homo est, qui est status virtutis. Unde, secundum Philosophum, tria a parentibus habemus: scilicet ESSE, NUTRIMENTUM et DISCIPLINAM. Filius autem a parente educari et instrui non posset nisi determinatos et certos parentes haberet. Quod non esset nisi esset aliqua obligatio viri ad mulierem determinatam, quae matrimonium facit." *Suppl.*, Q. 41, a. 1.

"Natura hominis ad aliquid inclinat . . . , quia est conveniens naturae generis." *Ibid.*, ad 1.

"Bonum suum cuilibet rei potest accipi multipliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod est ejus proprium ratione individui . . . Alio modo, secundum quod est ejus *ratione speciei*. Et sic appetit proprium bonum animal in quantum appetit generationem et ejus nutritionem . . ." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 24.

"Necessarium fuit feminam fieri . . . in adjutorium viri; non quidem in adju-

nature that it postulates not only a common action, but a common cause, a complete community.

This is the reason why Saint Thomas attributes to marriage, but as a secondary end, as one derived from the first, the daily association of the spouses as well. And when he notes that this aim is suited to man inasmuch as man is filled to overflowing with animality, and inasmuch as he is a rational creature, this is said not only in relation to the spouses, but also and more particularly to the progeny, without which the secondary end would not flow from the first. The dignity of the child, and the peculiar demands which his education makes, necessitate the parents' uniting their resources.

The human essence is manifested in different ways in man and woman. Their temperaments are different and tend to complement each other. Of their union there results a more complete man, a human capable of being responsible for the demands of the *rationality of the children*. Their intellectual and moral gifts, their sentimental resources, their tastes, and their aptitudes produce a balanced and fertile whole. The support which they give each other is of such a nature as no other type of community could provide. The result is that by completing each other and by making their union ever more intimate, husband and wife succeed not only in perfecting each other, but in bringing about the conditions required by the spiritual character of the offspring.²⁵

torium alicujus alterius operis, ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius juvari possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem; sed in adiutorium generationis." *Ia*, Q. 92, a. 1.

²⁵ "Non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi." *Gen. II*, 18.

"Ratio naturalis ad ipsum inclinatur . . . Secundo, quantum ad secundarium finem matrimonii, qui est mutuum obsequium sibi a conjugibus in rebus domesticis impensum. Sicut enim naturalis ratio dictat ut homines simul cohabitent, ratione cujus dicitur homo *naturaliter politicus*; ita etiam eorum quibus indiget ad humanam vitam, quaedam opera sunt competentia viris, quaedam mulieribus. Unde natura monet ut sit quaedam associatio viri ad mulierem in qua est matrimonium." *Suppl.*, Q. 41, a. 1.

"Quod est conveniens naturae differentiae, qua species humana abundat a genere, inquantum est rationalis . . ." *Ibid.*, ad 1.

Since it pursues a common good—namely, the survival of the family and the nation, the very perpetuation of the race—marriage cannot have as its principal object such a limited thing as the contentment of the senses or mere carnal pleasure. Delectation is never an object, but a stimulant necessary for the sustaining and intensifying of action; and it draws, as does the latter, its justification from the honesty of the end in view.²⁶ Nevertheless, since the initial original fall, conjugal relations can be considered as a “remedy” to the weakness of the spouses. And, still under this light, it becomes a factor of moral progress between the spouses.²⁷ Yet the personal perfection of the spouses is not, as Dr. Doms pretends, the principal aim of the institution of marriage.²⁸

In the first place, the requirements of the person are not coextensive with the family circle. The spouses are capable of material and spiritual development which surpasses considerably the means at the disposal of the ordinary home. Only the cultural and religious environment is suitable to the satisfaction of their lofty and vast aspirations.²⁹ By reason of his superior spiritual faculties, man has a personal end which is situated beyond the horizons of the family as such, even though he may find in the obligations which it entails a rich abundance of moral virtues and charity.³⁰

“Pro fine secundario (matrimonium) habet in hominibus solum communicationem operum quae sunt necessaria in vita. Et secundum hoc *fidem* sibi invicem debent, quae est unum de bonis matrimonii.” *Suppl.*, Q. 65, a. 1.

“Zelus viri ad uxorem, et uxoris ad virum, naturalis est.” *Suppl.*, Q. 65, a. 1, sed contra.

²⁶ *Suppl.*, Q. 42, a. 2.

²⁷ *Suppl.*, q. 42, a. 2.

²⁸ Dr. Herbert Doms, *Du sens et de la fin du mariage*. Paris, 1937.

²⁹ “Homo autem adhuc ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere. Et ideo adhuc in homine debuit esse majori ratione distinctio utriusque virtutis vel sexus, ut seorsum produceretur femina a mare, et tamen carnaliter conjungerentur in unum ad generationis opus. Et ideo statim post formationem mulieris, dicitur Gen. II, 24: *Erunt duo in carne una.*” *Ia*, Q. 92, a. 1.

³⁰ “Omnis actus in quo impletur praeceptum est meritorium si ex caritate fiat. Sed actus matrimonialis est hujusmodi . . .” *Suppl.*, Q. 41, a. 4, sed contra.

In the second place, family society, in order to be able to bring about personal perfection, must be good, must itself be constituted in conformity with the exigencies of its nature. It cannot make its members better unless it proposes to them a good which they cannot find outside it, a better good than that which their individual actions themselves bring about. And this good, superior to that of each of the individual contractants, is without a doubt to be found in the good of the species, which constitutes a more universal objective, an objective which claims, on the part of those who pursue it, more spiritual fertility and less self-interest. Consequently, the spiritual fecundity of the family is conditioned by the pursuit of its essential ends, and the personal rectitude of the spouses is conditioned by their conjugal righteousness.³¹

"Omnis actus virtutis est meritorius. Sed actus praedictus est actus iustitiae . . ." *Ibid.*

"Si enim ad actum matrimonialem virtus inducat vel iustitiae, ut debitum reddat, vel religionis, ut proles ad cultum Dei procreatur, est meritorius." *Ibid.*, c.

"Si vir et uxor sint . . . virtuosus, poterit eorum amicitia esse propter virtutem. Est enim aliqua virtus propria utriusque, scilicet viri et uxoris, propter quam amicitia redditur jucunda utrique. Et sic patet quod hujusmodi amicitia potest esse et propter virtutem, et propter utile et propter delectabile." *Comm. Eth.*, n. 1723.

"Secundum rationem boni quod est objectum dilectionis, magis sunt diligendi parentes quam uxores: quia diliguntur sub ratione principii et eminentioris cujusdam boni. Secundum autem rationem conjunctionis magis diligenda est uxor: quia uxor conjungitur viro ut una caro existens, secundum illud Matth., XIX, 6: *Itaque jam non sunt duo, sed una caro*. Et ideo intensius diligitur uxor . . ." *IIaIIae*, Q. 26, a. 11.

"Cum membra corporis sint quaedam animae instrumenta, cujuslibet membri finis est usus ejus: sicut et cujuslibet alterius instrumenti. Quorundam autem membrorum corporis usus est carnalis commixtio. Carnalis igitur commixtio, est finis quorundam membrorum corporis. Illud autem quod est finis aliquarum naturalium rerum, non potest esse secundum se malum . . ." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 126.

³¹ "Sicut autem est vere bonum quod conservetur corporalis natura unius hominis, ita etiam est quoddam *bonum excellens* quod conservetur natura speciei humanae." *IIaIIae*, Q. 153, a. 2.

"Usus autem venereorum . . . , est valde necessarius ad bonum commune, quod est conservatio humani generis. Et ideo circa hoc maxime attendi debet rationis ordo." *IIaIIae*, Q. 153, a. 3.

Finally, if most people cannot attain individual perfection except in the state of matrimony, it does not follow that perfection can be found only in this state. Perfection, therefore, cannot represent the exclusive and distinctive end of marriage. On the contrary, it is the *common effect* of all forms of association and of all the walks of life.³²

The friendship of husband and wife, founded either on an imaginary or a really lived common life, is not the principal aim of marriage. It constitutes in itself an honest and desirable good, but marriage remains oriented to the procreation and the education of children.

Conjugal love, in effect, is necessarily related to parental love. The former depends on the latter and is subordinate to it. The one does not bring about the other by way of natural extension, but by way of an internal end.

Conjugal love is not a pure and simple friendship, a communion and a commerce founded on the equality of souls and ideals. It is more than that. It is an intimacy, of spiritual character, but indispensably founded on the difference between the sexes. This is the basis of the specialization of marriage, this is what gives it its peculiar characteristics, which makes it different from all other kinds of friendship. Without this particular character, it would be companionship, a rather nondescript intercourse of souls, but not conjugal love.

And we can see the consequences. The conjugal friendship of persons, because it is founded on the correlativity of the two

"Et quodlibet singulare naturaliter diligit plus bonum suae speciei quam bonum suum singulare." *Ia*, Q. 60, a. 5, ad 1.

"Natura reflectitur in seipsam non solum quantum ad id quod est ei singulare, sed multo magis quantum ad commune: inclinatur enim unumquodque ad conservandum non solum suum individuum, sed etiam suam speciem. Et multo magis habet naturalem inclinationem unumquodque in id quod est bonum universale simpliciter." *Ibid.*, ad 3.

"Id enim per se videtur esse de intentione naturae, quod est semper et perpetuum . . . Quia igitur in rebus corruptibilibus nihil est perpetuum et semper manens nisi species, bonum speciei est de principali intentione naturae, ad cujus conservationem naturalis generatio ordinatur." *Ia*, Q. 98, a. 1.

³² *IaIIae*, Q. 92, a. 1.

sexes, is oriented toward a good which is related to both sexes. Like them, it has intrinsic aspirations to generation and its fruit; like them, it finds in offspring its real *raison d'être*. Thus if we wish to introduce a type of order between conjugal and parental love, we must first say that the former has its fulfillment in the latter. Conjugal love has not been inculcated in the heart of man for its own sake, but as a necessary disposition for the conservation of the human species, as an appropriate atmosphere for the generation and the education of the offspring.

A mysterious law wants love to be at the origin of all creation and of every impulse to good. It allows of no exception. It is to be found asserted in God, in artists and in parents. In the latter, however, love is not only the ecstatic contemplation of a half-glimpsed beauty, but a psychological blending of the authors themselves, in order to accomplish the work to be done. A single and unified creation cannot but be the product of causes previously united by love.

Moreover, not only does conjugal love tend to blossom out into parental love, but it is in this parental love that it finds its perfection, that it finds the character of immutability which makes it similar to divine love.

Our nature is strangely mobile and changeable. That much can be understood without our having to enter into long and subtle analyses. Here on this earth, the best things of all grow pale and wane by themselves, *assueta vilescent*. Besides the disillusion and the deceptions which often follow upon an assiduous relationship, we know by experience that even the most intense and the sincerest sentiments wither and die through the very fact of their expression and duration. We get tired of everything. Conjugal love, likewise, would be a fragile and precarious thing if it did not find a constant renewal and consolidation in another love. Indeed, each child which springs from it renews and reaffirms it. A really new bond, a bond founded on the common action of generation, and therefore an ontological bond, is added to the moral bond of the conjugal union and strengthens it. Each child is the concrete fruit of the

identification which was dreamed about by the spouses. At each birth, they find themselves truly commingled in one same blood, one same flesh, one same soul. It is the union carried to its ultimate perfection, to its utmost degree of intimacy. And this is self-evident, since the child is the object of conjugal love and since everything finds in its end its integral accomplishment.^{32a}

e) *Marriage is free*

The family is an institution with a natural foundation, that is, an institution the destiny and the laws of which have been determined by the Author of nature. Nevertheless nature does not force any man to enter into the state of matrimony and to found a family. It only tends toward that. It incites individuals to perpetuate themselves, to survive through the procreation of similar beings, of beings united to them, of beings who will be a continuation of themselves. In all times, all well-born men have understood that the spirit, the traditions, and the patrimony of the family and the nation were a good which was not their own, but which had been bequeathed to them with life and which had to be passed on. Personal survival, the perpetuation of the family, and the enduring of the nation have always been considered as things naturally desirable.

Nevertheless a tendency, even a natural one, always takes on the mode of the subject in which it is inscribed. If it is in a rigid nature, it takes on the nature of a determining impulse; if, on the other hand, it is found in a free nature, it always falls in some way under the rule of liberty.³³ It is thus, too, with the natural inclination of man toward conjugal life. If it is deter-

^{32a} "Causa stabilis et firmæ conjunctionis videntur esse filii . . . Et hujusmodi ratio est, quia filii sunt commune bonum amborum, scilicet viri et uxoris, quorum conjunctio est propter prolem. Illud autem quod est commune continet et conservat amicitiam quæ . . . in communicatione consistit." *Comm. Eth.*, n. 1724.

³³ "Aliquid dicitur esse naturale dupliciter: Uno modo, sicut ex principiis naturæ ex necessitate causatum: ut moveri sursum est naturale igni . . . Et sic matrimonium non est naturale: nec aliquid eorum quæ mediante libero arbitrio complentur. Alio modo dicitur naturale ad quod natura inclinatur, sed mediante libero arbitrio completur: sicut actus virtutum dicuntur naturales. Et hoc modo matrimonium est naturale." *Suppl.*, Q. 41, a. 1.

mined as to its finality, that is, from the point of view of its final specification, it remains free from the point of view of its *exercise*. Anyone who wants to can marry. Every man is inclined to it, but no one in particular is obliged to marry solely because of the impulse of nature. Duties do not all bind to the same extent; they can give precedence to one another, depending upon the case. Of all the functions which can contribute to the common good, each man chooses the ones which are most convenient to him, and whatever offers some manner of incompatibility with the selected mode of contribution is by that very fact eliminated. This is the way that Saint Thomas, who holds that the inclination is common to all, teaches that the duty of begetting concerns only the human race considered as a whole. Inclination is a physical force, whereas duty is a moral thing, a thing which is considered in the light of objective and subjective circumstances. Thus it is that, if entrance into the state of matrimony always represents a possible obligation, it does not constitute for every individual in particular a real and actual obligation. From the point of view of its exercise, it is submitted to the choice of *freedom*, albeit that this choice must be rationally motivated. And everything that is related to the common good, which is so complex in its essence, is derived only from the entire collectivity of men, and this latter, as we know, is essentially different from its individual members.³⁴

³⁴ "Diversificantur ea quae sunt de jure naturali secundum diversos status et conditiones hominum." *Suppl.*, Q. 41, a. 1, ad 3.

"Natura inclinatur ad aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ad id quod est necessarium ad perfectionem unius. Et talis inclinatio quamlibet obligat: quia naturales perfectiones omnibus sunt communes. Alio modo inclinatur ad aliquid quod est necessarium multitudini. Et cum multa sint hujusmodi, quorum unum impedit aliud, ex tali obligatione non obligatur quilibet homo per modum praecepti, alias quilibet homo obligaretur ad agriculturam et ad aedificationem et ad hujusmodi officia quae sunt necessaria communitati humanae; sed inclinationi naturae satisficit cum per diversos diversa complentur de praedictis." *Suppl.*, Q. 41, a. 2; *IIa IIae*, Q. 152, a. 2, ad 1; Q. 154, a. 2.

"Natura humana communiter ad diversa officia et actus inclinatur . . . sed quia est diversimode in diversis, secundum quod individuatur in hoc vel in illo, unum magis inclinatur ad unum illorum officiorum, aliud ad aliud . . ." *Suppl.*, Q. 41, a. 2, ad 4.

This voids the arguments of those who consider marriage, in view of its being ordained to the common good, as obligatory for each and every one.

f) *The family is a society*

It will be easy to admit, therefore, that the society of the family, like all other types of society, is the result of the union of souls, the result of an agreement of spirits and of the acquiescence of wills. Two free persons become united to each other, two persons in whom animality is sublimated by a spiritual force and purified by a divine fire. It is thus from the most deliberate, the most mature, and the most profound choice imaginable that the family springs. It is the fruit of a mutual consent, that is, of a reciprocal impetus of wills and a mutual embrace of souls.

This union, unlike that of the body, proceeds entirely from intimacy and is designed to endure. The consent given by husband and wife signifies that they bestow themselves upon each other with a view to entering upon the *institution* of marriage. And since it is institutional in character, this consent has a double effect. It is the source of a right: it brings about the equality of the contractants and makes it understood that they owe themselves to each other. Then, it confers upon them the prerogatives which are consequent upon their union.

To be more exact, let us note that it constitutes the persons first of all as persons in a society. It unites them with a view to the fulfillment of a common purpose, but in such a way that the juridical relationship which ensues draws its nature and its properties from the common aim which is sought.³⁵ And since this aim is common, it will result in a *hierarchical* relationship.

³⁵ "Cum matrimonium sit quaedam relatio." *Suppl.*, Q. 47, a. 4.

"Relatio quae est matrimonium, ex una parte habet unitatem in utroque extremorum, scilicet ex parte causae, quia ad eandem numero generationem ordinatur; sed ex parte subjecti habet diversitatem secundum numerum. Et ideo haec relatio est una et multiplex. Et secundum quod est multiplex ex parte subjecti, significatur his nominibus, *uxor et maritus*; secundum autem quod est una, significatur hac nomine, *matrimonium*." *Ibid.*, Q. 44, a. 1, ad 3.

It will produce an order, which, though still rudimentary, is ordained to its completion in the birth of children. It is the peculiar quality of institutions to project themselves over individuals, to provide them with a *juridical statute* which grants them, as a whole, a situation which connotes prerogatives and duties. And from this point of view, man is created the head and woman his collaborator and his companion.³⁶ It would be counter to the human dignity of parents and children to leave generation to the haphazardness of chance meetings, to the whims of desire and the fantasy of passion. Man—and this is to his honor—is a responsible being, a being capable of right and of justice. When he treats with a person, he is capable of understanding the loftiness demanded by the nature of such relations and to conform to it. He knows that the person is capable of foresight and seeks security, and he has the power of satisfying these needs by engagements and promises. He can even, if the matter call for it, bind himself by a contract or form, by an association. It is easily understood that such a noble and important thing as the procreation and the education of human beings needs the foundation of a true society. As Saint Thomas notes in several places, care for the offspring is greater in man than in the other animals, whereas, on the other hand, the very nature of the child requires that the parents be known.³⁷ And how can these reciprocal needs be satisfied except in the stability of a union?

³⁶ Man and woman are equal but with an equality that is proportional to the nature of each: "sicut tenetur vir uxori in actu conjungali et dispensatione domus ad id quod viri est, ita uxor viro ad id quod uxoris est." *Suppl. Q. 64, a. 3.*

"Erunt duo in carne una." *Gen. II, 24; Matt. XIX, 4.*

"Conueniens fuit mulierem formari de costa viri. Primo quidem, ad significandum quod inter virum et mulierem debet esse socialis conjunctio. Neque enim mulier debet dominari in virum; et ideo non est formata de capite. Neque debet a viro despici, tanquam serviliter subjecta: et ideo non est formata de pedibus." *Ia, Q. 92, a. 3.*

"Feminis maxime incumbit educandae prolis officium." *Suppl., Q. 44, a. 2.*

"Quamvis pater sit dignior quam mater, tamen circa prolem mater magis est officiosa quam pater." *Ibid., ad 1.*

³⁷ "Sicut parentibus indidit natura sollicitudinem filii providendi, ita indidit

If the consent causes juridical statutes to arise, as well as rights, unequal with relation to the general welfare of the family or with relation to the aim of the contract, this is not true with relation to the *object* of the contract. The two persons in question surrender themselves spontaneously and equally to each other. The domain which one acquires over the body of the other is at once whole and reciprocal; the two cede and acquire exclusive title and power in conjugal matters, *cor unum et caro una*. Everything which tends to divide or break up this power is not only perversity and infidelity, but injustice and breach of contract.

So here we have a notion of the family, with a notion of the internal order which governs it, an order upon which its peace depends entirely. It consists in the society of man and woman, a society established jointly by nature and by liberty, with a view to the procreation of children or the welfare of the species.⁸⁸

reverentiam filiis ad parentes. Nulli autem generi animalium indidit sollicitudinem filiorum aut reverentiam parentum omni tempore." *Suppl.*, Q. 54, a. 3, ad 3.

"Hominibus naturalis quaedam sollicitudo inest de certitudine prolis: quod propter hoc necessarium est, quia filius diuturna patris gubernatione indiget. Quaecumque igitur certitudinem prolis impediunt, sunt contra naturalem instinctum humanae speciei." *Contra Gent.*, L. 3, c. 123.

"Videmus enim in omnibus animalibus in quibus ad educationem prolis requiritur cura maris et feminae, quod in eis non est vagus concubitus, sed maris ad certam feminam, unam vel plures: sicut patet in omnibus avibus. Secus autem est in animalibus in quibus sola femina sufficit ad educationem fetus, in quibus est vagus concubitus: ut patet in canibus et aliis hujusmodi animalibus. Manifestum est autem quod ad educationem hominis non solum requiritur cura matris, a qua nutritur, sed multo magis cura patris, a quo est instruendus et defendendus, et in bonis tam interioribus quam exterioribus promovendus. Et ideo contra naturam hominis est quod utatur vago concubitu, sed oportet quod sit maris ad determinatam feminam, cum qua permaneat, non per modicum tempus, sed diu, vel etiam per totam vitam. Et inde est quod *naturaliter est maribus in specie humana sollicitudo de certitudine prolis*, quia eis imminet educatio prolis. Haec autem certitudo tolleretur si esset vagus concubitus. Haec autem determinatio certae feminae *matrimonium* vocatur. Et ideo dicitur esse de jure naturale." *IIaIIae*, Q. 154, a. 2.

⁸⁸ "Ea quae ordinantur ad aliquid unum, dicuntur in ordine ad illud adunari . . . Et ideo, cum per matrimonium ordinentur aliqui ad unam generationem et educationem prolis, et iterum ad unam vitam domesticam, constat quod in matrimonio est aliqua conjunctio secundum quam dicitur maritus et uxor. Et talis conjunctio ex hoc quod ordinatur ad aliquid unum, est matrimonium." *Suppl.*, Q. 44, a. 1. "Essentiam ejus, quae est conjunctio." *Ibid.*, a. 2.

g) *The family is indissoluble*

The family has its essence and its existence from its primordial end. The family finds in this end its *raison d'être*, if not totally, at least primarily. Without generation, there would be no need for the sexes; and without the sexes, there would be no marriage, no society of man and woman. As a logical consequence, it also takes its properties—the principal of which are unity and indissolubility—from its ends.

From the very establishment of Christianity, marriage has been constantly recognized and safeguarded in its unity. There may have been difficulties, there may have been infidelity and adultery, but there was never any public consecration of such disorders. We cannot say as much about its indissolubility. Not only has divorce, in the course of this century, made frightening gains, but it has received almost everywhere official recognition, legal investiture, and sanction from the community. The number of dissolutions and of infidelities brought about by this attitude has grown unceasingly. People speak of peace and still cooperate everywhere with disorder and anarchy. Public powers everywhere, yielding to the increasing pressure of vice, incorporate divorce into their legislation, legitimize it officially and thus sabotage the institution which is most essential to the security, the order, and the peace of societies.

The dignity of the spouses, their mutual security, the consideration and the respect which they owe each other no less than the edification and the welfare of their children—all these factors not only demand that they live in society, but that society itself be endowed with indissolubility. Otherwise, except for purely accidental cases, the children could not be brought up as they should. Then too, a sworn trust could be revocable, friendship would be deprived of its essential characteristics, and injustice would be regarded as licit.

The family becomes, considered in its essence, liberated from the will of the contractants. The same thing happens with regard to its laws and, in particular, to its indissolubility. This indissolubility does not flow from the whim and the arbitrariness

of the spouses, but from the very institution itself, and in a proximate manner; in a more remote fashion, it flows from the end which was imposed upon it by its divine Author. The matrimonial bond is indissoluble because it is ordained to a function which is not temporary, but durable and permanent. Even in certain animals, where the female cannot go about the business of maintaining the life of her offspring, we see touching examples of fidelity and help. Nature, which is never in default in cases of necessity, *natura numquam deficit in necessariis*, inculcates in the male an instinct of solidarity and care which lasts until the offspring can test their own powers. And the difference between man and animals is that the former can judge to what extent necessities are imposed upon him and what responsibilities flow from them. Thus it is clear that he can, if he be endowed with an equitable and judicious spirit, be perfectly aware that woman is incapable of suffering alone for the welfare of the family, for the maintaining and the fitting education of the offspring. Outside the purely material needs, which it is beyond her reach to satisfy, it is quite a task to bring all the members of an average family to their majority and to adapt them, bringing into play their native resources, to the multiple necessities of life and society. The education of a child is not an easy thing. It begins late, it is pursued a long time, it is complex. The gentleness and firmness of the father and the mother together cannot easily be dispensed with if success is to be reached. Consequently, whoever assumes the responsibility of marriage automatically assumes the responsibility for a union which, intrinsically, must needs endure. The very end of this union is what motivates it and demands that it be stable and permanent. In other words, the aim of marriage is that which reveals its nature and its properties.³⁰ And if, in moral or politi-

³⁰ "Manifestum est autem quod in specie humana femina minime sufficeret sola ad proles educationem, cum necessitas humanae vitae multa requirat quae per unum solum parari non possunt. Est igitur conveniens secundum naturam humanam ut homo post coitum mulieri commaneat, et non statim abscedat, indifferenter ad quamcumque accedens . . .

"Rursus, considerandum est quod in specie humana proles non indiget solum

cal matters, right reason is the criterion of order, who is unable to see that fidelity is in the right order of things whereas divorce makes a breach of order and peace?

Divorce is also a threat against sworn faith. The true meaning of honor teaches the well-born person that one cannot give oneself several times, since the total gift of oneself takes away the right of taking oneself back. Moreover, it seems to us a question of right reason to understand that an obligation solemnly assumed before God and men should be kept at all

nutritione quantum ad corpus, ut in aliis animalibus, sed etiam instructione quantum ad animam. Nam alia animalia naturaliter habent suas prudentias, quibus sibi providere possent: homo autem ratione vivit, quam per longi temporis experimentum ad prudentiam pervenire oportet; unde necesse est ut filii a parentibus, quasi jam experti, instruantur. Nec hujus instructionis sunt capaces mox geniti, sed post longum tempus, et praecipue cum ad annos discretionis perveniunt. Ad hanc etiam instructionem longum tempus requiritur. Et tunc etiam, propter impetus passionum quibus corrumpitur aestimatio prudentiae, indigent non solum instructione sed etiam repressione. Ad haec autem mulier sola non sufficit, sed magis in hoc requiritur opus maris, in quo est et ratio perfectior ad instruendum et virtus potior ad castigandum. Oportet igitur in specie humana non per parvum tempus insistere promotioni prolis, sicut in avibus, sed per magnum spatium vitae. Unde, cum necessarium sit marem feminae commanere in omnibus animalibus quousque opus patris necessarium est proli, naturale est homini quod non ad modicum tempus, sed diurnam societatem habeat viri ad determinatam mulierem. Hanc autem societatem *matrimonium* vocamus. Est igitur matrimonium homini naturale . . ." *Contra Gent.*, L. 3, c. 122; *IIallae*, Q. 159, a. 2.

"Inseparabilitas, quamvis sit de secunda intentione matrimonii prout est in officium naturae, tamen est de prima intentione ejus prout est sacramentum Ecclesiae." *Suppl.*, Q. 67, a. 2, ad 3.

"Omnibus rebus naturalibus insunt quaedam principia quibus non solum operationes proprias efficere possunt, sed quibus etiam eas convenientes fini suo reddant: sive sint actiones quae consequantur rem aliquam ex natura sui generis, sive consequantur ex natura speciei: ut magneti competit ferri deorsum ex natura sui generis, et attrahere ferrum ex natura speciei. Sicut autem in rebus agentibus ex necessitate naturae sunt principia actionum ipsae formae, a quibus operationes propriae prodeunt convenientes fini; ita in his quae cognitionem participant, principia agendi sunt cognitio et appetitus. Unde oportet quod in vi cognitiva sit naturalis conceptio, et in vi appetitiva naturalis inclinatio, quibus operatio conveniens generi sive speciei reddatur competens fini. Sed quia homo inter cetera animalia rationem finis cognoscit et proportionem operationis ad finem, ideo naturalis conceptio ei indita, qua dirigitur ad operandum, convenienter *lex naturalis* et *jus naturale* dicitur. In ceteris autem *aestimatio naturalis* vocatur: bruta enim ex vi naturae impelluntur ad operandum convenientes actiones, magis quam regulentur, quasi proprio arbitrio agentia." *Suppl.*, Q. 65, a. 1.

cost. Circumstances cannot prevail against it, since the obligation has been contracted because of an imperious good, a good which is well above the fluctuations of life and human liberty.

Now, the sentiment which is at the root of the family society and which must constantly animate it is friendship. The friendship which exists between man and woman, says Saint Thomas, seems to be the greatest that can possibly exist.⁴⁰ Man seems to be willing to abandon even beings as dear to him as his own father and mother in order to deepen the friendship he has with his wife.⁴¹ Now, if the least of friendships is considered in terms of eternity, what must be said of one which is so strong as to bring about such breaks in sentimental ties and so deep as to be bound by a vow? Does this friendship, considered in its very essence, not connote indissolubility? Could it be brought about if there were possibilities of infidelity and of eventual breaking-off? Would it be compatible with such fears and suspicions? Would the spouses have the forethought and the care they have for each other if they saw that possibly some day they would have to part? Would they have the same forbearance in tolerating each other's defects and infirmities? Would they so diligently maintain the relations which spring from affinity? Would family spirit, fidelity and good morals exist to the same degree in society? Would not the edification of the children be irrevocably compromised? If we look at it from this point of view, as from several others as well, we would have to be blind not to see that it imperiously demands indissolubility.⁴²

⁴⁰ "Amicitia, quanto major, tanto est firmior et diuturnior. Inter virum autem et uxorem maxima amicitia esse videtur: adunantur enim non solum in actu carnalis copulae, quae etiam inter bestias quamdam suavem societatem facit, sed etiam ad totius domesticæ conversationis consortium; unde, in signum hujus, homo propter uxorem etiam patrem et matrem dimittit, ut dicitur Gen. II, 24. Conveniens igitur est quod matrimonium sit omnino indissolubile." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 123.

"Inter virum et uxorem videtur esse quaedam amicitia naturalis . . . Homo enim est animal naturaliter politicum; et multo magis in natura hominis quod sit animal conjugale." *Comm. Eth.*, n. 1719.

⁴¹ *Gen.* II, 24.

⁴² "Quia vero necesse est ad id quod optimum in homine, alia omnia ordinari, conjunctio maris et feminae non solum sic ordinata est legibus secundum quod ad

There also exists in all this a question of justice. Besides the injustice implied in the repudiation of a sworn trust, divorce also connotes several other types of injustice. If it is the man who takes the first step, then, after having enjoyed her youth, her fertility, her beauty, her enthusiasms and her total gift of herself, he leaves the person who was his chosen partner in life as if she had become a valueless piece of rubbish. How can the slightest indication of honesty and of human dignity be found in this? If, on the other hand, it is the woman who takes the first step, she fails in her duty of submission, she arises against the order established by God for the good of the home and of all society.⁴³

In both cases, serious harm is done to the children. The spouses have been constituted as trustees of a patrimony which they are bound to preserve and to enrich before passing it on to their children. As Saint Thomas says, it is a law rooted in nature that parents must amass treasures for their children and make them the heirs of those treasures. That is why he does not

prolem generandum pertinet, ut est in aliis animalibus, sed etiam secundum quod convenit ad bonos mores, quos ratio recta disponit vel quantum ad hominem secundum se, vel secundum quod homo est pars domesticæ familiae, aut civilis societatis. Ad quos quidem bonos mores pertinet individua conjunctio maris et feminae. Sic enim erit fidelior amor unius ad alterum, dum cognoscunt se indivisibiliter conjunctos. Erit etiam utrique sollicitior cura in rebus domesticis, dum se perpetuo commansuros in earumdem rerum possessione existimant. Subtrahuntur etiam ex hoc discordiarum origines, quas oporteret accidere, si vir uxorem dimitteret, inter eum et propinquos uxoris: et fit firmior inter affines dilectio. Tolluntur etiam adulteriorum occasiones, quae darentur si vir uxorem dimittere posset, aut e converso: per hoc enim daretur via facilior sollicitandi matrimonia aliena." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 123.

⁴³ "Videtur etiam aequitati repugnare si praedicta societas dissolvatur . . . Mulier vero ad viri societatem assumitur propter necessitatem generationis. Cessante igitur fecunditate mulieris et decore, impeditur ne ab alio assumatur. Si quis igitur, mulierem assumens tempore juventutis, quo et decor et fecunditas ei adsunt, eam dimittere possit postquam aetate provecta fuerit, damnum inferet mulieri contra naturalem aequitatem. Item. Manifeste apparet inconveniens esse si mulier virum dimittere possit: cum mulier naturaliter viro subjecta sit tanquam gubernatori; non est autem in potestate ejus qui alteri subjicitur, ut ab ejus regimine discedat. Contra naturalem igitur ordinem esset si mulier virum deserere posset." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 123.

hesitate to declare that it is in the very demands of nature that conjugal life be perpetuated until death, since a common aim demands a common life and a common action.⁴⁴ The safeguarding of the material and the spiritual interests of the children is the business of both spouses during their whole life.

h) *Christians must be against divorce*

Christians have the satisfaction and the comfort of noting that on this point as well as on many others, faith extends reason and confers upon reason the overflow of certitude and clarity. In the first place, Christ Himself answered the Pharisees who wished to tempt Him with the question: "Is it allowed a man to put away his wife for any reason?" with, "Have ye not read that the Creator, at the beginning, made them man and woman and that He said: 'Because of this, man will leave his father and his mother and *they two shall become one flesh. What God has brought together, let no man put asunder.*'" As they insisted that Moses had authorized the putting away of the unfaithful woman, He replied: "It is because of the hardness of your hearts that Moses allowed you to put away your wives. At the beginning it was not thus."⁴⁵

Saint Paul is the faithful echo of the teachings of his Master on the point when he writes: "A married woman is bound by law to her husband for as long as he lives; but if the husband die, she is free from the law that bound her to her husband.

"*"De lege naturae est quod parentes filiis thesaurizent (II ad Cor., XII, 14) et filii parentum heredes sint. Et ideo, cum proles sit commune bonum viri et uxoris, oportet eorum societatem perpetuo permanere indivisam secundum legis naturae dictamen."* *Suppl.*, Q. 67, a. 1.

"Possessiones enim ad conservationem naturalis vitae ordinantur: et quia naturalis vita, quae conservari non potest in patre perpetuo, quasi quadam successionem, secundum speciei similitudinem, conservatur in filio, secundum naturam est conveniens ut in his quae sunt patris, succedat et filius. Naturale est igitur ut sollicitudo patris ad filium maneat usque ad finem vitae suae. Si igitur sollicitudo patris de filio causat etiam in avibus commanentiam maris et feminae, ordo naturalis requirit quod usque ad finem vitae in humana specie pater et mater simul comaneant." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 123.

⁴⁵ *Matt.*, XIX, 3-8; *Gen.*, II, 24; *Mark*, X, 2-12; *Luke* XVI, 14-18.

If, thus, while her husband lives, she weds another man, she will be an adulteress; but if her husband die, she is freed from the law, so that she is no longer an adulteress in becoming the wife of another husband.”⁴⁶ And again, “Regarding married people, I enjoin, not I but the Lord, that the woman leave not her husband; if she is separated from him, let her not remarry, or let her be reconciled with her husband; likewise, let not the husband repudiate his wife.”⁴⁷

Rising to the loftiest heights of mystical consideration and attempting to reveal to us the mystery of the integration of marriage into the sublime economy of the Redemption, the Apostle writes, again: “Let women be submitted to their husbands, as to the Lord; for the husband is the head of the woman, just as Christ is the head of the Church, His Body, of which He is the Savior. Thus, just as the Church is in submission to Christ, so must women be in submission to their husbands in all things.

“Husbands, love your wives just as Christ has loved the Church, has sacrificed Himself for her, so that He might sanctify her after having purified her in baptismal waters. . . . Thus it is that husbands must love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For never has anyone detested his own flesh; but rather he nourishes it and covers it with care, as Christ does for the Church That is why man shall leave his father and his mother to attach himself to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh. This mystery is great; I mean to say, with regard to Christ and the Church.”⁴⁸

We can without doubt deduce from this text that marriage is the sign, the symbol of the union of Christ and His Church.⁴⁹ Just as the Divine Word and the flesh taken on by Him, just as Christ and His mystical body are one, so do man and woman become one in the conjugal union, “one flesh.” Similarly, just as the Word will never abandon humanity to which He once

⁴⁶ *Rom.*, VII, 2-3.

⁴⁷ *I Cor.*, VII, 10-11, 39.

⁴⁸ *Eph.*, V, 22-23.

⁴⁹ Lusseau et Colomb, *Manuel d'Etudes Bibliques*. T. V, 2e partie, p. 56-57.

joined Himself, just as Christ shall never be unfaithful to His Church "unto the consummation of the world," so the bond which unites the souls of the spouses must be considered indissoluble. Without this, marriage would not be the symbol of the eternal embrace of the Word and the humanity of Christ and the souls. It would be prevented, on a supernatural plane, from attaining one of its essential ends.

It would be idle to try to explain teachings so clear and made more precise by the testimony of the Fathers and the Councils. Up until the time of Luther, the inflexible attitude of Christendom with regard to the indissolubility of marriage was known and admitted by all. It is with difficulty that the adversaries have been able to find signs of silence or toleration motivated by very special circumstances. Consequently, every Christian, if he believes in God and in His Word, has to admit that divorce is, in the bosom of our societies, a cause of disorder and of perturbation, and that he must root it out at all costs if he wishes to recover a true peace.

III. THE EXTERNAL SOURCES OF PEACE

The family is subject to an internal order. When this order is recognized and actually lived, an element of peace is the result. A total peace could be the result if it were not perturbed by external cause. If the family were a perfect, autonomous society, closed upon itself, independent of all power outside itself, it would find in its own life the exclusive source of its production of peace. But such is not the case. Since its real aim has to do with children, it ends by coming into contact with both Church and State. It must maintain with both these institutions relations which are necessarily subordinate.

Indeed, in both cases, the conditions required for the existence of this subordination are quite clearly defined. The child, who is the real aim and purpose of the family, becomes the object of spiritual and temporal powers, constitutes the immediate matter on which both institutions will start to work,

and which both will try to perfect in the light of the exigencies of their respective missions. Without the child, there is no Church, there is no State. Without the ministering of the family, there can be no sanctification and no civilization. It follows, therefore, that the life of superior societies as well as the achievement of their ends is materially conditioned by welfare and order within the family. It also follows that the Church and the State hold, from the primacy of their mission, a certain right of guardianship and control over the family. "We must consider," says Saint Thomas, "that of all the natural actions, only generation is ordained to the common good. Thus, if nutrition and elimination concern the individual, generation, on the other hand, concerns the conservation of the species. And it follows that all things which are related to generation must above all else be ordained by divine and human law, since law was instituted to promote the common good."⁵⁰

From these considerations, we can see that the family is in submission to several external forces, to several forces which can result in effects either harmful or beneficial to the family's internal equilibrium. Thus, if the public power, instead of protecting the family, instead of helping it achieve its own ends, oversteps its bounds and creates difficulties for it, the family becomes dislocated, as it were: it is exhausted, it is subject to internal weaknesses that have a repercussion on the whole social order. Or again, if the State takes upon itself rights and powers which are of the Church, if it mixes into matters which clearly belong to the spiritual domain, if it favors birth-prevention practices and the dishonest limitation of families, there result disorders even worse, more prejudicial to and even more incompatible with peace. Thus we see that there are external conditions to the peace of the family institution, conditions which cannot be brought about unless one has set forth beforehand the *de jure* relations which must obtain between the family on the one hand and civil and religious society on the other.

⁵⁰ *Cont. Gent.*, I. 3, c. 123.

a) *The family is integrated, as elemental nucleus, into the Church*

In the first place, we said a moment ago that the family is subordinate to religious society, but we must confess that such a formula is rather inadequate. Strictly speaking, it can be applied to the pagan family and to certain functions of the Christian family, such as the generation of children, and to their profane education; but when applied to the contract which founds the family, that is to say, to Christian marriage, it is completely false. We shall therefore divide this question, considering briefly what are the relations of both Christian marriage and the children who are born of it to the Church and Christ.

On the Christian plane, the union of the spouses constitutes an association which is not only subordinated to the Church, but is integrated into it. After Christ's transfiguration of the natural institution into a sacrament, the fusion of souls is brought about by grace and with a view to the attaining of ends of a supernatural order. From this point of view, the family is brought at once into the Church's own sphere and subordinated to it in an exclusive manner.

b) *The union of the spouses is sacramental*

The words which express the consent and bring forth the reciprocal rights are assumed to the level of religious rites. They keep their power and their proper meaning; they express the profound willingness of the spouses to offer mutually the enjoyment of each other's person; but they also become instrumental bearers, moreover, of a divine virtue which incorporates them into the order of grace and makes them capable of producing an effect of supernatural quality.⁵¹

There arises, as we have said, a juridical or moral relationship from the contract which is the concretization of a right and

⁵¹ "Cum in matrimonio sit quaedam spiritualis conjunctio, inquantum matrimonium est sacramentum; et aliqua materialis, secundum quod est in officium naturae et civilis vitae: oportet quod mediante materiali fiat spiritualis virtute divina." *Suppl.*, Q. 45, a. 1.

which establishes the spouses as a society forever. And as an immediate consequence of this relationship, there follows the faculty or the power which they have, the one over the other. From this there arises the question as to whether this relation is twofold, whether it is simultaneously natural and supernatural, whether it is only supernatural, or rather formally supernatural and virtually natural? Would there not exist, between the two bonds which it brings about, merely a virtual distinction, a distinction of rational reason?

We can clarify this point by determining the proper mode of the causality of the sacramental words. We know, in the first place, that union can only be instrumental, since God alone can be responsible for the infusion of grace in the soul. Besides, the notion of instrumental causality is not constant, uniform and univocal; it is, on the contrary, capable of being brought about in polymorphous and analogical ways. When transferred from the realm of nature to that of grace, it varies considerably. Thus, for instance, since there is a primordial incommensurability between nature and grace, the power of the words themselves does not bring about the effect in an immediate, but rather in a mediate, fashion. All it can do is to modulate the spiritual influx of grace, impose a mode upon it and, through a sort of repercussion, confer upon the produced effect a configuration in conformity with the type of causality involved. Thus water produces a grace which is an *ablution* of the soul and the words of the contract bring forth a supernatural entity which takes the form of a union, of an inseparable bond between two souls. Lastly—and this is peculiar to marriage—since the consent of the wills expressed by the words already possesses *in a natural way* the power of creating a fusion of souls, it follows that the bond concretized by marriage, even though it be intrinsically and substantially supernatural, remains virtually natural. Nature is not deprived of her efficacy. This allows us to maintain that the institution of nature, although incorporated into the economy of grace, remains intact and produces, more or less in the manner of sensitive life within us, all its

effects. It produces them all with more plenitude, since the inferior becomes, through its very assumption into the nobler, considerably ennobled and strengthened.

c) *Symbolic and mystical meaning*

Nevertheless it is self-evident that the union of the spouses, by the very fact that it has been transformed from an institution of nature into a sacramental institution, acquires new dimensions and an aim superimposed upon those of nature. The bond of grace, signified by the words and brought about by their efficacy, becomes in itself, as we have already noted, the sign, the symbol of the union of Christ and His Church. That is its first and primary end, its essential end as a sacrament.⁵² This figure is no doubt deficient, a figure that is heavily subordinated to the mystery that is evoked; it is a figure which is hardly analogical to the sublime reality of the assumption of humanity by the Divine Word; but it is a figure which gives us an inkling, however small, of the grandeur of the union of man and woman—*hoc sacramentum est magnum*—a figure of speech which reveals the divine intent of making life sound at its fountain-head and which also reveals the supreme orientation, given to the mystery of the transmission and the propagation of life, by Him who is its Master. Just as the Word indissolubly took on human nature, so man takes unto himself a spouse; just as Christ is the Head of the Church, so man presides over the destiny of the family;⁵³ just as Christ united Himself to His Church to guide it to perfection, so must man promote the welfare of his wife and of his children; just as the union of the two natures of Christ gave birth to a new life of grace, so the Christian union of man and woman gives rise to beings predestined to

⁵² "In hoc sacramento sunt illa tria. Quia sacramentum tantum sunt actus exterius appretentes; sed *res et sacramentum* est obligatio quae innascitur viri ad mulierem ex talibus actibus; sed *res ultima contenta* est effectus huius sacramenti; non *contenta* autem est res quam Magister determinat (scilicet unio Christi ad Ecclesiam)." *Suppl.*, Q. 42, a. 1, ad 5.

⁵³ *Ia*, Q. 92, a. 1, and 2.

become "children of God." There are hosts of such analogies that one might use.⁵⁴

d) *The child is virtually a "Son of God"*

Looked at from the point of view of the moral bond which unites husband and wife, the Christian family is, as it were, taken away from civil life and integrated into the life of the Church. There are other aspects, however, in which it is not integrated, but rather subordinated to the divine reality of the Church. It is, in our opinion, with relation to the kind of agreement which takes place regarding the children, their profane education, and the atmosphere which must reign in the daily life of the home.

The child, as we know, does not proceed immediately from the moral union of the spouses, but rather from their carnal commerce and their natural fertility. He is the fruit of the simultaneous activity of liberty and nature, with the result that, absolutely speaking, he belongs to the order of things of time. Still, he is as though virtually transferred into the world of grace.⁵⁵ This much we can understand from the following: the internal economy of the family is reflected in the way it goes about attaining its ends; the relations which are discovered in its internal structure are reproduced when we seek to find out the order of its various aims. Just as, indeed, the child has for its immediate cause the procreative forces of nature as well as

⁵⁴ "Et sicut aliis sacramentis per ea quae exterius aguntur, spirituale aliquid figuratur; sic et in hoc sacramento per conjunctionem maris et feminae conjunctio Christi et Ecclesiae figuratur: secundum illud Apostoli *Ad Ephes.*, v. 22: *Sacramentum hoc magnum est ego autem dico in Christo et Ecclesia.*" *Cont. Gent.*, L. 4, c. 78; I, q. 92, a. 2 and 3.

"Figuratur enim per hoc (quod scilicet mulier formatur de costa viri) quod Ecclesia a Christo sumit principium." *Ibid.*

"De latere Christi dormientis in cruce fluxerunt sacramenta, idest sanguis et aqua, quibus est Ecclesia instituta." *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ "Proles prout est bonum sacramenti, addit supra prolem prout est bonum intentum a natura. Natura enim intendit prolem prout in ipsa salvatur bonum speciei: sed in prole secundum quod est bonum sacramenti matrimonii, ultra hoc intelligitur ut proles suscepta ulterius ordinetur in Deum." *Suppl.*, Q. 49, a. 5, ad 1.

the free will of the parents, and as less proximate cause, the society of husband and wife (which is intrinsically supernatural), so indeed does he have as proximate end the conservation of the species and of civil society, and then, as less proximate end, the Church.⁵⁶ The symmetry is perfect. The offspring are definitely vouchsafed to spiritual regeneration. The Christian spouses are not wholly engaged in the cycle of generation. They are persons and the person, man or woman, has a spiritual mission to fulfill which allows it to emerge considerably over the sphere of the forces of material reproduction. The more loftiness there is in a life, the higher over the process of the procreation of bodies will be the principal interest of that life.

We could even say that, to a certain extent, the family accomplishes that which it signifies. It rebuilds unceasingly the Body of Christ; it gives life and being to children who, in the intention of Christian parents, already belong to Christ, are already virtually united to Him by baptismal grace.⁵⁷ The family in its own way accomplishes the union of Christ and the Church.

e) *Religious repercussion of profane education*

We must maintain that the family is still subordinate to the Church with relation to profane education. It is necessary that

⁵⁶ "Considerandum est autem quod, quando aliquid ad diversos fines ordinatur, indiget habere diversa dirigentia in finem; quia finis est proportionatus agenti. Generatio autem humana ordinatur ad multa: scilicet ad perpetuitatem speciei; et ad perpetuitatem alicujus boni politici, puta ad perpetuitatem in aliqua civitate; ordinatur ad perpetuitatem, Ecclesiae, quae in fidelium collectione consistit. Unde oportet quod hujusmodi generatio a diversis dirigatur. Inquantum igitur ordinatur ad bonum naturae quod est perpetuitas speciei, dirigitur in finem a natura inclinante in hunc finem: et sic dicitur esse naturae officium. Inquantum vero ordinatur ad bonum politicum, subjacet ordinationi civilis legis. Inquantum igitur ad bonum Ecclesiae, oportet quod subiaceat regimini ecclesiastico . . ." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 4, c. 78.

"Quamvis matrimonium sit sacramentum, tamen aliud est matrimonio esse matrimonium, et aliud est ei esse sacramentum: quia non solum ad hoc est institutum ut sit in signum rei sacrae, sed etiam ut sit in officium naturae." *Suppl.*, Q. 49, a. 2, ad 7.

⁵⁷ "Matrimonium . . . secundum quod consistit in conjunctione maris et feminae intendentium prolem ad cultum Dei generare et educare, est Ecclesiae sacramentum. . . ." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 4, c. 78.

education be one, that it be like the subject in whom it is to be inculcated. Thus there must be harmony between religious education, which comes from the Church, and profane education, which arises from the family, supported by the cultural institutions of the nation. And as a result of the former's having an incontestable primacy over the latter, and since the former presupposes the second and uses it as an indispensable base, the Church is armed with a power of eminent vigilance and of high domain over the family. She can enjoin its doing its duty and she can reprehend it if it accomplishes that duty unsatisfactorily.

f) *Family life and charity*

Finally, all the natural sentiments which arise from the union of husband and wife, from the intercourse of souls and bodies, and from the bonds which are the result of carnal generation, are definitely ordained to the fomenting of Christian charity, which is the soul of the Mystical Body, the soul diffused in all its members by the unceasing action of the Holy Ghost.

It was not the least of the many successes of Saint Thomas Aquinas to profess that even in the Christian family, grace is not substituted for nature; it stops up neither its wellsprings nor its motives, but it uses them and sublimates them by superimposing over them perspectives and imperatives of divine order.⁵⁸

The whole scale of relations of consanguinity and affinity is put to profit. The channels of natural friendship become the conduits of divine charity. The rudiments of cohesion brought about by sentiment become as the foundations of the superior unity which tends to promote divine love. The spiritual com-

⁵⁸ *IIaIIae*, Q. 26, aa. 7-11.

"Quamvis matrimonium non conformet passioni Christi quantum ad poenam, conformat tamen ei quantum ad caritatem, per quam pro Ecclesia sibi in sponsam conjungenda passus est." *Suppl.*, Q. 42, a. 1, ad 3.

"Matrimonium principaliter ordinatur ad bonum commune ratione principalis finis, qui est bonum prolis; quamvis etiam ratione finis secundarii ordinetur ad bonum matrimonii contrahentis." *Suppl.*, Q. 67, a. 1, ad 4.

munion of souls, which is effectively the unitive strength of the Church, thus is enriched in instinctivity, in spontaneity, in vigor, and in innerness. The native connaturality on which it is based gives it a deeper hold on souls and more stability. That is why the Church, whose principal role is to promote charity among souls, has always been preoccupied with the safeguarding of the unity and peace of the family. The nucleus of the sentiments created by nature constitutes, as it were, the foundations on which it erects the edifice of the Mystical Body. The friendship which Saint Thomas qualified as *major*, *firmior*, *intensa*, and *aequalitas* keeps, once it has been transfigured by grace, its eminently unitive character and contributes therefore to the cohesion and the intimacy of supernatural solidarity.

And here is another element of order which we must respect if we are to enjoy peace in Christian societies. By the will of God, expressed both by Christ in His Gospel and by the voice of the Apostle, Saint Paul, marriage is a divine institution, not subject to the rulings of civil society. The family itself, considered in all its extension, is definitely ordained to integration in, through subordination to, the Mystical Body of Christ. Consequently, no human power has any right to make it deviate from this sublime destiny. Everything which bears on the mystery of the propagation of life and on the moral well-being of this institution must be protected by civil laws in such a manner as to guarantee the reaching of this superior goal.

g) *Relation of the family to civil power*

Christian marriage is not subject to the hegemony of civil power. It has with civil power only a relation of virtual subordination. This is not, however, the case with the family. From the point of view of the procreation of children and of their profane education, it comes under the jurisdiction of the State. "It must be considered," says Saint Thomas, "that of all the natural operations, only generation is ordained to the common good; whereas, indeed, eating and the secretion of certain superfluous elements are related to the individual, gen-

eration is oriented to the conservation of the species." Consequently, since law has been instituted with a view to promoting the common good, it is fitting that the matters which have to do with generation be, before all others, the object of human and divine laws. Now, positive laws, if they would be truly human, must flow from natural instinct. It must be the same in the practical domain as in that of the demonstrative disciplines, where all discoveries are grouped about naturally known principles. But if they are divine, they not only make more explicit the instinct of nature, but they fill in the gaps which are to be found in it, since revealed truth is beyond the reach of natural reason. Consequently, if the instinct of nature, deeply inscribed in the human heart, demands that the union of man and woman be individual and one, it is necessary that this be enjoined also by human laws. Divine law, on the other hand, is apposed—by virtue of the signification of the union of Christ and His Church with which it clothes the natural institution—as a supernatural seal on the injunctions of reason.⁵⁹ Thus we see that, from many points of view, the family belongs to the domain of profane things.

This fact being established, we must define the limits of the power which civil society can exercise over the family, since it is from respect for jurisdictional bounds that order and peace arise.

In the first place, with regard to the essential properties of the conjugal union, such as unity and indissolubility, which have (as we can well imagine) immediate repercussions on the substance of the bond, and with regard to the celebration and the impediments of marriage, the interventions of the State can have the character only of preventions or of reinforcements external to ecclesiastic jurisdiction. In these cases we are face to face with matters which are in the province of religious

⁵⁹ *Cont. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 123; L. 4, c. 78.

"Sed quia concubitus ordinatur ad bonum totius humani generis; bona autem communia cadunt sub determinatione legis . . . consequens est quod ista conjunctio quae matrimonium dicitur, lege aliqua determinetur." *IIaIIae*, Q. 154, a. 2.

authority, although they may be, because of their effects on civil and social life, the objects of profane legislation as well. It is thus necessary that the laws which emanate from secular authority be perfectly compatible with the mandates of the Church. A strengthening force must exert a tension parallel to what it would strengthen. Any law which infringed upon these limits would be trespassing and would cause conflicts.

We can understand, notwithstanding this, that in countries where citizens are divided into several religious denominations, these rules are difficult to observe. The title of *Christian* represents a common ground of understanding which grows smaller day by day. Except for the Catholics, few people admit the sacramental and divine character of matrimony; few accept the recommendation of Christ, "Let no man put asunder what God hath joined together."⁶⁰

h) *The inviolability of the family sanctuary*

There are other matters which are in the domain of the family itself. Among the principal ones, we might mention the intimate relations of the spouses or the exercise of the functions of procreation, the profane education of the children, and the transmission of ancestral patrimonies. They are closely bound to the essential *raison d'être* of the family as an institution, to its specific end, to its natural objective. And according to the principle which must animate all politico-social philosophy, all these matters must be controlled by the family itself. Indeed, it is a fundamental rule that control over the means belongs to him who must attain the ends. It is he who proposes the end who has in the very first place the right to establish its most proper order.⁶¹ Consequently we must attribute to the family before all other agents the jurisdiction over these matters. Nature posits as a duty of the family the physical and spiritual procreation of the children; and, for nature to be logical to itself, it confers upon the family the inviolable right to control everything which has an immediate relation to this mission. This right and this

⁶⁰ *Matt.* XIX, 6.

⁶¹ "Ordinare in finem est ejus cujus est proprius ille finis." *IaIIae*, Q. 90, a. 3.

mission, without being strictly speaking the family's, are confided to it; the family is their guardian. It is the spouses who have been constituted as collaborators with the Prime Author of corporal and spiritual life, and the duty of transmitting this life has been imposed upon them. As a result of this attribution of responsibility, parents must enjoy the inalienable prerogatives which will allow them to acquit themselves of their duties well. When the ends are imprescriptible, so are the rights which guarantee their being pursued.

Still, the family can lose its dignity and its sense of responsibility. Or it may, while always keeping its ideal intact, be unable to make that ideal materialize in its plenitude. In other words, the family is an imperfect society, that is, a society which does not possess the power to attain that self-sufficiency with which Aristotle characterized the perfect organization. That is why its insertion into a larger plan of life, a more complete and fertile one in the State is in general indispensable.

i) *Compenetration and mutual conditioning*

Civil society is the natural background of the family, the place where it can find normal conditions for its fullest evolution. Indeed, the achieving of the common good demands the assistance of the State and, therefore, the subordination of all the individual activities which go on in the bosom of the nation. This law holds for the family as well as for all other forms of association. And it follows from this order of things that the State, in subordinating the family to itself, influences it, envelops it in its somewhat universal causality. The State furnishes a more highly organized *milieu*, one that is richer in opportunities, thus allowing it to exercise all the better its fundamental rights and to attain its aims more completely. It also furnishes the means of adapting education better to the variety of aptitudes and to the multiplicity of social demands. On the other hand, it is incumbent upon the State, as we have already mentioned, to protect life—an outstanding part of the capital of a nation—by combatting birth-prevention practices and infanticide. The State can also, with a view to assuring a

just distribution of wealth, exert a certain influence over all matters which have to do with public life, and the welfare of the nation.

We must note carefully, however, that if the power to make up judiciously for the deficiencies inherent in the organization of the family enters among the attributions of the State, if it is the duty of the State to make productive the efforts of the family and to facilitate the realization of the family's ideals, it would be wrong and an assault upon the natural order of justice to try to substitute itself for the family. It would even be, on the part of the State, a sin against itself, since it would amount to depriving itself of an organization which from many points of view it absolutely needs.

Without mentioning its contribution in human lives, the family, conceived in the light of reason and faith, furnishes civil society with elements and factors of cohesion with which it cannot dispense. It is the source of friendships. According to Saint Thomas' point of view, friendship is supremely necessary for social life, *maxime necessarius est ut sit amicitia*, since it is above all a unitive factor.⁶² Moreover, it is necessary to society. The reason he gives for this is that it assures, from bottom to top, the solidarity of all citizens. It begins its work inside the bosom of the family, in transforming husband and wife, the children, and all the relatives into islands of stability of great value and high consistency. We can have an idea of this value by representing to ourselves that, just as the natural groups which are formed within an agglomeration are definitely or-

⁶² "In societate humana hoc est maxime necessarium ut sit amicitia inter multos. Multiplicatur autem amicitia inter homines dum personae extraneae per matrimonia colligantur. Conveniens igitur fuit legibus ordinari quod matrimonia contraherentur cum extremis personis, et non cum propinquis." *Cont. Gent.*, L. 3, c. 125; *Comm. Eth.*, n. 1539.

"Dum enim homo uxorem extraneum accipit, junguntur sibi quadam speciali amicitia omnes consanguinei uxoris, ac si essent consanguinei sui." *Hallae*, Q. 154, a. 9.

"Per accidens finis matrimonii est confoederatio hominum et amicitiae multiplicatio, dum homo ad consanguinea uxoris sicut ad suos se habet." *Suppl.*, Q. 54, a. 3.

dained to supplying materials which an aggrandized national life needs, so indeed all the particular modalities of friendship, which are spontaneously brought about or are definitely the product of circumstances, are directed toward the integration and the stratification of the union of citizens.⁶³ Thus, on the natural level, political unity is found as the end-product of all friendships and the results from their coordination. Consequently, without the friendship which flourishes in the home and which is as the condition of all the others, the State would be deprived of its greatest source of unity, of its best conjunctive tissue. And thus again we have a few considerations which help us to see to what extent the Christian family, when it is organized according to the wishes of nature, contributes to unity and peace.

The pagans used to speak of justice, order and concord, but never of peace. That is because true peace is the fruit of a positive unity, of a unity which proceeds from the intimacy of the soul. It is founded not only on an external and negative agreement, but on a sentiment which brings about the adhesion of the whole being. It can, therefore, only flow from friendship. And what is friendship without grace? What could its duration and its sincerity be? What guarantees of unity, faithfulness and peace could it offer without first being transformed into Christian charity? Thus we conclude that without charity there would be no peace, either in the family or elsewhere. Peace is a plant which germinates and grows only in Christianity. And if we desire it, let us restore to their old prestige the institutions of marriage and the family.

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⁶³ "Omnes communicationes continentur sub politica, sicut quaedam partes ejus." *Comm. Eth.*, nn. 1665-1671.

PUBLIC OPINION, DETERMINISM, AND FREE WILL

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PUBLIC opinion is one of those ill-defined and glib concepts that we are wont to call upon to tide us over vague portions in our thought. In the popular mind it has a dozen more or less variegated uses: it is considered as the bulwark of democracy, the essential factor to be wooed in selling merchandise, and the content of a free press. We have no doubt about its functional value since we are all convinced that it has tremendous effect on the action of politicians and other persons in public places. After all, every four years in the presidential elections we have an unparalleled example of its power. In a sense it is an intangible factor, yet we know that its censure is fierce when turned on those who oppose its decisions—witness the German pogroms against minorities; or it can be a great power for good, as is shown in such endeavors as the public health program in this country. What then is this thing called Public Opinion? How can we specify this concept? The most fruitful approach to this question can be found, first, by distinguishing between the sociological group and the body politic, the state. Next, when this has been done, we shall ask which of these groups is the proper agent of public opinion. And finally, we shall inquire into the elements that go into the making of public opinion.

There is a relationship of a most intimate nature between the proper object of a science and the knowledge constituting that science, for the knowledge is after all only the subjective, noetic existence of the object. We cannot understand the nature of a science without constant reference to the nature of the object studied, nor can we hope to determine the extent of the validity of particular scientific principles unless we consider them in relation to the unique phase of being from which

they are drawn. The object of the sociologist is primarily and essentially the group, a product of the gregarious instinct. One distinctive type of group is that formed by human beings. The term "sociology" has come to apply solely to the discipline concerned with study of this unique type of group. As studied by the sociologist there is nothing to differentiate the human group essentially from other types of animal communal life. There is, however, a greater complexity and richness of institutions observable here, and a much larger variety of means employed in the functioning of the instinct of gregariousness. The duty of the sociologist is to examine and describe in detail the various phenomena observable in this human group. But in order to specify the nature of the sociological group to a greater degree we must examine the ends towards which the gregarious instinct is oriented. For, like all functional units, the group has unity, and consequently being, only by reference to the purpose for which it exists.

Group life springs from two different characteristics of the animal nature: its lack of self-sufficiency in certain lines of endeavor and its superiority of performance in other lines. As finite creatures we are not equally capable of performing all the necessary functions of preserving ourselves and propagating our species. Or, even supposing that we could manage to create by ourselves the necessary conditions for getting enough food and other essentials to maintain ourselves in existence and to procreate children, we would live but a minimal biological life. As members of a group, however, we are aided and protected against the many hazards threatening our life on a biological plane. For the work that one man is ill fitted to perform is taken care of by another member of the social group, who in turn is benefited in some other way by the work of the former. Thus our need in some fields of activity concerning biological life and our perfection in other fields give rise to the sociological group. This particular type of group, therefore, is not a substantial but rather a functional unit formed under the drive of the gregarious instinct. Its purpose

is the preservation and propagation of biological life in a better fashion by reason of a division of labor among the individuals composing this group.

The proper object of the sociologist is this functional biological group whose being and unity has been constituted by an instinctive process and which, consequently, is essentially a phenomenon on the plane of physical being. Thus sociology, since its field is of the same general nature as that of other natural sciences, is one of the physical sciences; and like all other physical sciences it is limited to investigation of causes of a physical nature. The sociological object, however, is differentiated from the objects of other physical sciences by the fact that it has the attribute of gregariousness. When once the group has been formed by instinctive gregariousness, whereby certain equally instinctive ends are better assured, there arise within the group functional relationships, institutions, and other phenomena found only in a human group. All of these group phenomena and relationships serve as means to the ends of preserving and propagating the physical life of the members of the group. The sociologist *qua* sociologist has as his duty an investigation and description of all the phenomena arising from groups formed by the gregarious instinct operating in the fashion unique to man. Consequently, the region in which sociological principles are valid is rigidly defined by the fact that its object is formed by an instinctive process; and these principles are intelligible only in terms of an equally instinctive, infra-rational, and determined end. This means that the "Gegeben" of the sociologist is the product of instinct, that the sociologist draws valid conclusions so long as they bear on a form of group life dependent for its intelligibility on the functioning of the instinct, so long as it describes social fact in terms of biological life. A concept can be sociological only if we find in it some reference to a biological teleology. Thus labor, economics, housing, health programs are all of a sociological nature for they contain reference to human actions that are ultimately significant because they

serve either to preserve or to propagate the biological life of the group, because they are intelligible in the final analysis only in the functioning of some form of group biological life. Consequently any concept that transcends the purposes of physical life ceases to be a sociological concept, for it has passed out of the field proper to that science.

Sociology can validly note and describe in group life the effects of many factors that it is not fitted to explain in ultimate terms. Examples of this are law, education, art, public opinion. These concepts cannot be specified and consequently made intelligible in terms of the instinctive ends of group animal life. They are significant only in terms of a form of activity other than biological. When the sociologist comes to deal with the social phenomenon of public opinion, he can do no more by use of purely sociological principles to explain this matter than describe its existence and note the effect it has on the purely sociological plane.

Public opinion is a difficult concept to handle on a purely sociological level for it immediately calls in concepts that rise above the instinctive ends specifying the sociological group. Explained sociologically, public opinion is a phenomenon peculiar to human groups. Its need is found in the fact that human groups are not as determined and limited in their choice of methods to be employed in maintaining the group physical life as are other animal groups: the forms through which the instinct of gregariousness expresses itself are more varied among men. For instance, there is a great variety of houses, mating is a more complex affair, and physical force does not necessarily determine who shall be leader of the group. In other words, the sociologist recognizes a certain realm of self-determination in the choice of means among human groups, a variegated method of seeking identical ends. Public opinion remains an inexplicable phenomenon as long as we remain on the purely sociological level where the principles are of a purely positivistic and descriptive nature. Formulating the nature of public opinion sociologically, we say that

there is a factor in human group life called public opinion having a decisive influence in determining the means adopted to carry on the life of that group, and that this factor is dependent for power upon its advocacy by the numerical majority. But this is not public opinion properly so called, this is but an inadequate description of its existence.

Public opinion cannot be explained on a sociological basis because the sociological group is an infra-moral, instinctive entity while public opinion is a function of a group seeking ends of moral significance through means that have been rationally predetermined. The sociological group is not the source of public opinion but rather the body politic. The body politic is a moral being having a moral unity resulting from the voluntary union of free beings in the pursuit of the Good Life, known in political terms as the Common Good.

Thus we have taken the first step in determining the nature of public opinion by specifying the functional unit in which alone public opinion can be found. The ends of the sociological group are fulfilled on an instinctive plane, but the specifying end of the state is a moral one, the Common Good. The state is not the product of instinctive knowledge and choice but presupposes that its members are capable of apprehending an abstract ideal or good, and of fashioning and choosing the means best suited to that end. It is a product of reason and free choice, two functions proper to human beings, and by which humans are differentiated from all other beings. Hence on the metaphysical plane of abstraction the state is given being, unity, and intelligibility by reason of its functional relationship to the Common Good as an end and purpose. But because political action takes place among contingent and finite beings, and because we deal with relative and not absolute values, the empirical form taken by the Common Good in the historic state will vary. It is in the constitutions of countries that we find the legalized and empirical interpretation of the metaphysical concept of the Common Good. Likewise the means thought best to realize the end proposed by

the Common Good will show differences in various countries—a fact attested to by the differences in laws and administrative apparatus found in nations.

Public opinion, therefore, is found to be a proper attribute of a society dependent for its being upon reason and seeking a moral purpose. What, then, is public opinion? I would define it most formally as an expression of a prudential judgment given by the body politic concerning the means to be used in realizing to a greater degree the Common Good. It differs from law in that it has not received the formalization that comes from enactment by a legal assembly. It has, therefore, to do with the choice of means to be used in gaining the ends for which the state exists. When we say that public opinion is a form of prudential knowledge we mean that it is a knowledge that is intimately affected by, and intimately affects, all voluntaristic action. Prudential knowledge is always concerned with action, it is not complete until its precepts have been realized in objective fact. When the mathematician knows the square root of two, his knowledge *per se* is complete, it is not essentially oriented towards further ends. But when the legislator decides that hourly wages should be raised, his knowledge has not reached its terminus until something has been done in accordance with his conclusions. Prudential knowledge, as evidenced in public opinion, is truly an act of knowledge, but it is ever concerned with what must be done here and now; always, however, in view ultimately of the ideal for which the state stands. Consequently, it is an interpretation of the Common Good in terms of the actual situation facing the state here and now.

It may be objected that this definition of public opinion as a manifestation of a trend in national policy is not all-inclusive. The question may be raised about such tabulations of public opinion as occur in certain daily papers. To answer this I would say that in the first place it is very doubtful if such tabulations are a fair expression of "public" views. Even such wide coverage of opinion as the Gallup polls is somewhat

questionable as a valid expression of public opinion. Of course, it all depends upon what one means by "public." For the purposes of my discussion, in which I am attempting to define the nature and discuss the role of public opinion in its most formal aspect, incidental and questionable manifestations of public opinion, such as appear through the channels referred to above, need not specifically be considered. The principles which we shall later attribute to public opinion considered most formally will apply in a modified form to these particular manifestations of public opinion.

Thus, in the broadest terms, we have described the nature of public opinion. But what actually occurs in the forming of *de facto* public opinion? Before a decision backed by popular approval is reached, a process of deliberation occurs. Essentially this is an intellectual act aimed at the final formulation of some course of action to be taken. Ideally this deliberation consists of a gathering of all possible information both from the present situation and from memory of past similar experiences, and in terms of the present unique and unrenovable circumstances, there follows a decision on the means best suited to further the Common Good. For instance, during an election we listen to speeches of the candidates, read journalistic interpretations of their platforms, and match the policies of one against the other, using as a criterion our interpretation of the Common Good as it appears to us in the present circumstances. On the basis of this deliberation we cast our vote, our act of prudential knowledge, our conclusion on what should be done here and now.

To assure the validity of this decision made by public opinion, it is essential that the public have available as many channels of information as possible. The truth of our eventual judgment depends upon how well we fathom the meaning of the situation with which we are faced. Deliberation based on partial, incomplete, or prejudiced facts cannot possibly come to a correct determination of a course of action that will benefit the entire body politic. Consequently, to aid sound delibera-

tion a free system of news agencies is essential. The newspapers, magazines, radio, and cinema serve in modern times as the prime channels through which we come to know all the various ramifications of an action concerning the common welfare. It is impossible for any one individual by himself to be aware of all the manifold repercussions of any measure of general public interest. Yet these all constitute elements of the objective context in which action must be taken. Therefore, for the soundness of a public decision, all facets of the question must be shown. Besides these great channels of news there is also the more restricted one of conversation which, however, because of its personal nature, has a profound influence on the crystallization of personal, and consequently public, opinion.

In order that the public may know completely and truly the meaning of a matter concerning the public weal, it is necessary that as much untrammelled expression as possible be given, for thus only the whole context can be comprehended. Public deliberation founded on the maximum of honest and freely expressed views is an essential step in the forming of public opinion. For it is only by means of a free expression of all the divergent views that we can thoroughly perceive what course of action will realize the Common Good most perfectly in the present context.

Deliberation, therefore, is an essential element in the formation of public opinion. But deliberation is not the act of a serene and detached intellect. When we as a public—or as an individual—deliberate, we are attempting to determine what course of action will realize most perfectly in a particular situation our ideal of the Common Good. Here, obviously, value considerations will have a tremendous impact. But having spoken of “values” and of “Common Good” it devolves upon me to explain these terms more fully.

Throughout this discussion I have attempted to begin each phase of the subject by specifying it in the most universal manner; thus the discussion would begin on the metaphysical

level of being and knowledge, and gradually descend to the consideration of these universal principles or natures in actual fact. As a consequence, the state was defined as that moral, functional being whose purpose is the Common Good of all its citizens. This is a metaphysical definition of the state, all-inclusive and applicable to every moral, functional unit of the same nature. Thus, on the metaphysical level, when we examine functional beings an explanation is given not in terms of the operative nature but rather in terms of the end or purpose sought by a nature in its operations. The operative being is unintelligible except in terms of the end result, for only when seeking this goal is its nature realized. For instance, intellect is meaningless except in terms of knowledge, and the power of choice has no significance except with reference to freedom. Consequently, on the metaphysical plane the emphasis is put upon the end sought, the end is the touchstone in explaining the functional unit, the emphasis is upon the object, not the subject.

When, on the contrary, we come to the actual existential level where moral functional units operate, we find that the universal forms of Good assume multifarious modes. These empirical modes of being assumed by the abstract Good are what we call values. How precisely does a value differ from the Good? Primarily, the difference consists in a shift of emphasis from the object to the subject. Here we no longer explain the action of a being in terms of an independent object, but rather seek to explain the object in terms of the subject. The concept of value stresses the fact that in large part the objective context is colored by the psychological affective attitude of the subject, that the object is a good only in terms of the unique psychological makeup of the subject. This is, obviously, a complete shift of viewpoint from the previously described position. To understand the nature of the being known as the state we must refer to the concept of the Common Good; but to explain why to one state the Common Good is a race superiority, to another a freedom of action under law, and to

still another a form of collective identification with a leader, for this we must look to the psychology of the people in the different states. They have chosen these means because thus they seem better to realize the ideal of state life as it appears to them. They have deliberated and passed a judgment on the means to be taken and in each case the means taken to realize the same abstract end—the Common Good—have differed widely. What more need is there to show the impact of value considerations on the intellectual act of deliberation?

This all-important sense of values that influences our decisions so greatly is the result of many factors. The social and political milieu into which we are born presents us with a hierarchy of values that we come to accept without too much questioning because upon these value postulates the whole fabric of the social, political, economic, and cultural life of the people is based. For instance, all phases of American life presuppose that men are born free and equal; every American accepts this as the supreme political value, the Common Good, though few could explain their position. Always and in every decision touching upon American life in general this postulate is operative, either consciously or subconsciously. It is the root of belief in an economy of free enterprise, of elections by secret ballot, of schooling for all; in short, America is unintelligible except in terms of the value of freedom and equality of all. Hence, any deliberation in American life is sure to bear in its final judgment the reflection of this predominant value accepted as the Common Good of the state by this country. But why is this a supreme value for Americans? Since we came into being at a time when political freedom was the consuming desire of the Western world, it is understandable that we adopted the principle of freedom in political life. And since this country, like all countries undeveloped economically, demanded that men work hard and enterprisingly if they would exist, and since the richness and largeness of the continent and the newness of the governmental machinery urged people to work independently with a minimum of dependence on the

Government, our ideal of economic free enterprise is certainly not hard to comprehend. Sociologically there were no artificial caste strata restricting associations and marriages, so here too freedom was possible and demanded. All of these factors contributed to the building up and general acceptance of freedom and equality as the supreme value in state life.

All forms of propaganda that are effective manage to affect this sense of values for thus they affect our prudential judgments. Values are not as a rule built up through a process of calm reasoning, but rather have a highly emotional content. Consequently, propaganda has as its end to associate pleasurable or painful emotional responses with certain courses of action to such an extent that we no longer question the validity of our action or the possibility of the worth of choosing some other way. An advertising campaign has as its goal to make the public so aware of the value of some product that this value completely precludes the possibility of deliberating about the worth of choosing that article. For instance, hardly anyone questions the habit of smoking, for the value of this habit has been completely accepted, though few can say why. So, too, in more important matters certain values have come to be wholly accepted by reason of fine propaganda campaigns. I have in mind the current prevalent acceptance of the doctrine of determinism that was first propagandized by the great achievements of natural science, interpreted politically by Marx, and given a psychological form by Freud.

No one except a fool could help standing in awe of the power that has gone into the technological advance of the modern world. Through the broadening of knowledge of the principles that rule the physical universe, we have been able to control physical forces for our own purposes until we have come to the advanced stage where we now are—and there is no sign of stopping. Applied physical science has completely revolutionized our entire mode of life and there is no one among us who has not benefited in some way from this advance. But this stupendous progress has been made possible because we

could predict what would happen to physical forces under given circumstances. We could always be sure that under given conditions the same results would occur, and with the occurrence of the result man's life on a physical plane progressed and became better and easier. The value of predictability, consequently, grew boundlessly in the public estimation.

The ability to predict had obviously solved numberless problems of physical life. What about applying the same technique in other fields of human activity? Freudianism and Marxism arose as doctrines of predictability in the fields of personal and political life in an attempt to solve the problems here as applied physical science had done in the domain of physical life. The deterministic interpretation that had fitted the physical world so well and that had reaped endless benefits for us was eagerly accepted as the key principle to all phases of human activity. Two causes brought about this acceptance: (1) The patent fact that while by means of the doctrine of determinism we could predict the results of applied physical science, thus allowing us to build up the material side of our civilization to a perfection surpassing the wildest dreams of past ages, we found ourselves as much entangled in the same confusion about the same problems of both personal and political life as people had been hundreds of years ago. (2) The instinctive fear arising from ignorance of future events and the resultant repugnance to take responsibility for action whose results we could not predict. Psychologically, therefore, we were perfectly prepared to accept the determinism of Marx and Freud. We had ample evidence in terms of physical well-being of the progress that could be made by being able to predict the future of a course of action; and we had the instinctive drive of fear of the unknown to make us eagerly grasp anything that could promise a panacea for human ignorance and difficulties.

When, therefore, Freudianism removed from us all responsibility for our actions by interpreting human beings as creatures determined by psychic forces that lay outside the realm

of conscious knowledge and by the instinctive drive of sex, the doctrine was accepted by and large as a key to the solution of personal human happiness. We now had a principle whereby we could predict the future course of action of a man, a principle of orientation for the multitudinous forces of human activity. Likewise, when Marxism explained political man wholly in terms of economic man, we again had a principle of prediction; we again had a sure principle of order. These two schools of thought clinched the argument for a deterministic concept of all forms of existence and activity. If anyone doubts the general acceptance of Freud and Marx, he has but to consider how prevalent is the use of Freudian and Marxist terminology, and how much of current political, educational, artistic, economic, and medical practice—to name just a few fields affected—is based upon the presupposed universal truth of these two doctrines.

The value of determinism, and subsequent predictability of results, has come to be accepted almost universally in the present civilization. We want to be as sure about personal human happiness and political well-being as we are about the facts of physics and chemistry. The idea of man as a free being has fallen into abeyance under the popularity of the doctrine of determinism. Efficiency, based upon the ability to predict end results, appears as the most desirable element in all fields of activity. Thus our hierarchy of values is undergoing a subtle but sure change. Our concept of the supreme value for political man is being measured in terms of predictability, in terms of principles drawn from the instinctive activities of procreation and acquisition. Above we noted that our concept of the supreme value for political man is freedom, that deliberation and judgment constituting public opinion have been carried on under the hegemony of freedom as the supreme political value. Such a concept presupposes that the ideal of man is to live as a member of a moral unit, the state, formed by the rational and voluntary activity of the members, a freedom under law. But with the growth in the popular mind

of the value of predictability and subsequent efficiency in gaining end results, a value that has been impressed upon us by the strides of applied physical sciences and that has been interpreted for us in terms of personal and political life by Freud and Marx, the ideal of freedom as the supreme political value will suffer. As determinism and predictability and efficiency grow in the estimation of the public, public opinion, that extra-legal form of coercion, that mainstay of our national policy, will pass its judgments more and more in terms of a deterministic political society. And since determinism and freedom are incompatible, this means that progressively we tend towards a more totalitarian form of state life. For only when freedom is minimized under the weight of the restrictions of absolutistic law, can the ideal of efficiency based on predictability be realized. In a dictatorial state there is public opinion, but it is one that is obsessed with the value of efficiency. For the citizen of the totalitarian state human activity has no value in itself, for it serves only as a means to an end. When public opinion becomes thus efficiency-minded, it ceases to conceive of human activity as a good in itself as emanating from a free agent; human activity for such public opinion is of use only when it aids in the progress towards a predetermined end. There, in the substitution of efficiency or predictability for freedom as the supreme political value in the opinion of the public, lies the beginning of change from the type of community proper to rational and free beings to the deterministic society that does violence to the nature of man.

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THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE SALAMANCA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY *



THE Salamancan theologians followed faithfully the teachings of the Angelic Doctor on the concept of law in general and of the natural law in particular. They were able to give a new actuality to both of them by their dynamic incorporation of the ethical-juridical problems of their time. But their progressive labor and creative genius are most manifest in the field of the law of nations. For here they were able not only to contribute developments and applications in close conformity with Thomistic principles, but to make original advances as well in a doctrine that has always been embodied in philosophical-juridical studies. The names of these great theologians will always be associated with the problems of the law of nations and with international law, since their intellectual fostering of these sciences is universally recognized.

To call Vitoria the founder or the father of the law of nations and of international law may perhaps meet with some opposition, since the famous "jus gentium" has been spoken of from the days of antiquity. Therefore, to evaluate the doctrinal originality of the classical theologians it is necessary to compare their interpretations with those that preceded them. As signposts along the way we shall briefly indicate the Roman, Isidorian and Thomistic ideas pertaining to our subject.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

I. *Roman Law*

In the Pandects of Justinian, edited in the middle of the sixth century (533), is found the very same matter which had been inherited from the Roman jurists of classical times. One can

* In tribute to Francis de Vitoria, O.P., Founder of International Law, on the occasion of the fourth centenary of his death (August 12, 1546).

easily recognize a twofold division of law in the doctrine of these jurists, with distinct concepts in the terms employed.

Gaius (160²) established the first twofold division: "All peoples who are governed by laws and customs utilize a law which is partly proper, partly common to all mankind. That law which each people establishes for themselves is proper to each city and it is called civil law, because it is proper to the city itself. But that which constitutes the natural law among all men and which is equally observed by all is called the law of nations, since it governs almost all peoples."¹

Now we have indicated the first distinction between civil law, which is proper to each city, and the law of nations, which is the common inheritance of all mankind, dictated by natural reason and commonly used in almost an identical manner among all peoples. In this twofold division we see that the law of nations is almost identical with natural law, since it proceeds from natural reason as the directive of a natural order of juridical relations coetaneous with humanity itself.² By nature alone all peoples have been led to give almost identical solutions to the fundamental problems of life before any legislator had established laws in the strict sense. These solutions were the product of natural reason and they remained separate from the domain of positive law.³ The Roman jurist presents various examples which in our modern terminology have sometimes been included in natural law and at other times in the law of nations in the strict sense; for example, the appropriation of abandoned property, the spoils of war, servitude, imprisonment of the conquered, etc., which are commonly considered to be governed by the law of nations.⁴

Almost a century later Ulpian (228) proposed a new three-fold division, which finds foundation in Cicero: natural law,

¹ *Dig. L. 1, tit. 1, 9.*

² *Dig. L. 41, tit. 1, 1:* "Antiquius jus gentium cum ipso genere humano proditum est."

³ *Dig. L. 7, tit. 5, 2:* "Nec enim naturalis ratio auctoritate Senatus commutari potuit." *Dig. L. 4, tit. 5, 8:* "Civilis ratio naturalia jura corrumpere non potest."

⁴ *Dig. L. 41, tit. 1, 1 & 3; L. 41, tit. 1, 5 & 7; L. 1, tit. 6, 1.*

the law of nations, and civil law. The law of nations as Gaius conceived it, i. e., as distinct from civil law, is subdivided into two species. First is the *jus naturale*, classically defined as *quod natura omnia animalia docuit*, or as *commune omnium, eo quod ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione habetur aliqua*. It is distinguished from positive law in its origin and governs those acts which are common to men and animals; for example, the union of the sexes, nourishment, conservation, and defense. The second is the *jus gentium*, *quo gentes humanae utuntur*, not only as something proper but even exclusive to men alone, although for their general use. The natural law does not require the intervention of the human will, although its dictates are moulded by the law of nations; "by natural law all men are born free . . . but afterwards the law of nations introduced slavery, commonly admitted as a consequence of war and of social necessities, which is established by rational intervention."⁵

In the sixth century (533), the *Instituta* of Justinian renewed the triple division of Ulpian, but with a difference regarding the law of nations. To define the latter the formula of Ulpian was substituted for Gaius', which made it imperative to seek a better clarification of the law of nations and of natural law. This also required that the distinctions of Ulpian be suppressed. Many times the same expressions are used when one or the other law is considered and the law of nations is thus made immutable.⁶ The very same cases are sometimes considered examples of natural law and at other times examples of the law of nations, becoming almost identical in one text: "The dominion of some things has its origin in the natural law which, as we say, is called the law of nations."⁷

⁵ *Dig. L. 1, tit. 1, 1 & 4.*

⁶ *Instit. L. 1, tit. 2, paragraph 2.*

⁷ Observe how the text of Gaius was corrected: "Quarundam rerum dominium nanciscimur iure gentium, quod ratione naturali inter omnes peraeque servatur; quarundam iure civili" (*Dig. L. 42, tit. 1, 1*). But the *Instituta* say: "Quarundam rerum dominium, nanciscimur iure naturali, quod sicut diximus, appellatur ius gentium; quarundam vero iure civili." The parallelism and variation are clear; the same can be observed by comparing *Dig. L. 41, tit. 1, 9, paragraph 3* with *Instit. L. 2, tit. 1, paragraph 4*.

Therefore we may affirm that in the conception of Roman Law the law of nations only seems to have the characteristics of universality and rationality and that it sometimes seems to be almost immutable. A certain intervention of the human intellect is recognized in its formulation, but it is far from being a positive law. Under any aspect it had to be incorporated in the natural law, which proceeds from that "*ratio naturalis*" common to all men.

II. *Saint Isidore of Seville*

In the fifth book of his *Etymologies* the Bishop of Seville offers us a twofold classification of law. Considering their origin first, he divides laws into divine and human. The former are impressed by nature itself, the latter are established through the customs of peoples.⁸ The second classification is of greater importance; to it he devotes chapters IV, V and VI. He again uses the triple division of Ulpian, but he changes slightly the concepts and content. He formulates the *jus civile* with very little change from that of Gaius.⁹ Abandoning Ulpian's definition of the natural law, he insists on its origin and universality: "It is common to all nations, since it is given everywhere by natural instinct and not by any establishment." In this broader consideration of the natural law, there is room for that matter which in the Roman conception of the *Instituta* pertains both to the natural law and to the law of nations. The examples he gives prove this: the union of the sexes for procreation, nourishment and education of children, common property, liberty—all things which pertain to the natural law. For those things which pertain to the law of nations he lists the acquisition of the things of the sky, the sea, and the earth (*res nullius*) and some agreements, as those of depositing, borrowing, etc. (Chapter IV).

Since St. Isidore made this change, he also had to change the

⁸ "Divinae natura, humanae moribus constant" (cap. 2, 1).

⁹ "Quod quisque populus vel civitas proprium, humana divinaque causa constituit" (cap. 5).

conception of the law of nations. The classical formulation is abandoned to such an extent that it could be said that he chose none at all. For after enumerating certain cases, he is content with these vaguely descriptive words: "the law which almost all nations use."¹⁰ Among his examples we find some that are included by the Roman law in the law of nations, such as the *jus bolle*, the law for the occupation of a fortification, captivity and slavery, building, etc. At the same time he includes other examples, which later on were included in international law: treaties of peace, marriage with foreigners, etc.¹¹

If St. Isidore conserved Roman terminology, he certainly departed from its signification and content. Gratian and the decretists recognized his contribution, but neither they nor he were able to clarify sufficiently these definitions, which yet remained vague.

III. *Saint Thomas Aquinas*

The Angelic Doctor had the wisdom to include within his system the thought of the most brilliant men of antiquity. He made use of the greatest authorities, both pagan and Christian, in regard to juridical matters: Aristotle, the Roman jurists, St. Augustine, and St. Isidore. He possessed the ability to assimilate their teachings, many times trying to harmonize and always to systematize them. But of all these authorities Roman Law seems to have played the greatest role. We shall briefly analyze the more obvious texts containing his teaching.

A. *In his Commentary on the Book of Sentences* (1254-55) ¹²

In his consideration of polygamy St. Thomas develops and analyzes the different conceptions of natural law. It can be defined from an intrinsic aspect, through its origin, as Cicero treated it, or it can be done in a more extrinsic manner, as was

¹⁰ "Quod eo iure omnes fere gentes utuntur" (cap. 6).

¹¹ "Foedera pacis, legatorum non violandarum religio connubia inter alienigenes prohibita" (cap. 6).

¹² *In IV Sent.*, dist. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4um.

the method of St. Isidore and Gratian, considering it from the aspect of its Author—God, who implanted it in nature. It is in this latter sense, when they assimilate the natural law with the divine, that they state that the natural law is contained in the Law and the Gospels. But there is also a more objective concept of the natural law, a narrower sense, *strictissimo modo*, as defined by Ulpian. In order to treat of it, St. Thomas leaves out of consideration, although he is not ignorant of it, another type of law which in Roman terminology is the *jus gentium*. This law is derived from “the dictates of natural reason” and, although it is distinguished from the natural law *strictissimo modo*, it seems, nevertheless, to be a natural law in a broader sense of the term.

There is no doubt that of the three definitions St. Thomas preferred that of Ulpian. This does not mean that the use of reason is suspended, as we noted previously.¹³ For it will always be the “natural reason” which dictates the solutions among the inclinations we share materially with other animals, although their normative regulation corresponds to entirely different principles in accordance with different natural divergencies.

B. *Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle* (1266) ¹⁴

In his commentary upon the Greek philosopher, St. Thomas found another opportunity to develop his preference for the Roman definitions and his inclination to bring the law of nations into closer harmony with the natural law.

His intention is to harmonize the Philosopher's twofold division of law into natural and legal or positive, with the threefold division of Ulpian and St. Isidore: natural law, the law of nations, and civil law. He points out at once the parallelism between the positive law of Aristotle and Roman civil law. To determine the nature of the law of nations he distinguishes two kinds of acts in human nature (always understood in a material

¹³ P. 189.

¹⁴ *In V Ethic.*, L. 12.

sense). First, there are those acts or inclinations which man has in common with the animals; they are the matter of the natural law, e. g., the law of conservation, nutrition, defense, reproduction, etc. Secondly, there are those inclinations which are properly and exclusively the product of rational nature. The latter are common to all peoples and are called the law of nations by the jurists. St. Thomas' adoption of the Roman distinctions is evident. And he adds: "Both laws are included in the *justum naturale* in the sense in which the Philosopher spoke. It seems, then, that the law of nations pertains to that law of which we said before, 'it proceeds not from human opinion, but from nature itself,' to which man feels himself inclined by nature."

C. In the *Summa Theologica* (1271-73) ¹⁵

1. Tract on Law

The problem of the natural law and of the law of nations is discussed in two places in the *Summa*. The two solutions might appear to be contradictory; however, by a comparison of them and by understanding a distinct sense and finality within them light will be shed on the true thought of St. Thomas and on his constant fidelity to the Roman considerations.

In the tract on law St. Thomas examines the theory of St. Isidore. He asks if the division of human laws made by St. Isidore is sound.¹⁶ It is here that the Angelic Doctor takes his apologetic or defensive stand.

His problem is the nature of the law of nations. In the body of the article cited, the law of nations is included within the positive law. He abandons the distinction of the *Commentary on the Ethics*, so that he may now fix his attention upon the derivation of the natural law. Those laws which are derived from the law of nations come through deductive conclusions, while the specific determinations of the generic principles would be of the civil law. This method of reasoning seems to introduce

¹⁵ *Sum. Theol.*, I-IIae, q. 90-97.

¹⁶ *Sum. Theol.*, I-IIae, q. 95, a. 4.

a new difficulty. If the law of nations is included within the positive law, nevertheless in describing it we should conclude in a different manner, because the conclusions which are directly deduced from the natural law also pertain to that law. The definitions themselves of St. Isidore almost identify the law of nations with the natural law.¹⁷

How is this apparent contradiction to be reconciled? With didactic skill St. Thomas himself gives the answer in defense of St. Isidore's authority, which he valued so highly.¹⁸

In the solution to the first objection, St. Thomas begins by stating again the doctrine which he held in his previous works: "The law of nations is, in a certain manner, natural to man inasmuch as it is derived from the natural law by way of immediate conclusion from its principles. Thus is explained the ease with which men can formulate it." But to validate the classification of St. Isidore, which includes the law of nations among human laws (1st arg.) or positive law (*in corp.*) he then states: "Nevertheless, the law of nations is different from the natural law, most of all from that viewpoint in which the latter law is common to all animals."

The strategy which St. Thomas employed to defend St. Isidore is clear. St. Isidore could not be defended in his own terminology and St. Thomas did not hesitate to seek the assistance of Roman Law. The Roman concept of the *jus naturale* which had been abandoned by St. Isidore is now invoked to save the situation. The Isidorian theories had to seek refuge once more in the sacred formulas of Roman Law.

2. Tract on Justice and Right ¹⁹

The problem of the nature of the law of nations inspired the first and third objections. Ulpian defined the law of nations as "that which all people use," but men can only agree spontan-

¹⁷ The law of nations: "Quod omnes fere gentes utuntur." Natural law: "Quod commune est omnium gentium" (*Etym. L. 5, c. 4-6*).

¹⁸ *Sum. Theol.*, I-IIae, q. 95, a. 4, Sed Contra: "In contrarium auctoritas Isidori sufficiat."

¹⁹ *Sum. Theol.*, II-IIae, q. 57, a. 3.

eously on those things which have their origin in their very nature. It seems that the law of nations must be considered as a natural law after all. St. Isidore, whose authority is quoted in the *Sed Contra*, establishes the distinction between the two. The progressive reasoning within the body of the argument seems slowly to depart from the Isidorian conception, as though St. Thomas did not wish to separate the law of nations from the natural law. "The natural law is that which by its very nature is adequated to and commensurate with another." This adaptation and commensuration can first of all be imposed by nature itself in an absolute manner, according to the proper consideration of things in themselves, and it will constitute the natural law. Again, it might be required as a necessary means for the realization of a natural end, since it is not imposed by the absolute nature of the thing, but by something which follows from the thing itself, and this will be the law of nations. As examples of the first he offers those things or inclinations which are common with animals, *e. g.*, conservation, procreation, etc.; of the second, the division of property, which is not demanded by nature itself but by convenience for orderly and useful cultivation and for peaceful possession.

The natural law in the strict sense he circumscribes within that matter which is common to all animals; the law of nations is proper and exclusive to rational nature. Therefore, he returns to the concept of Roman Law. In this sense the law of nations is "natural to man, according to his rational nature." And for the first time St. Thomas ends his development with the famous formula of Gaius: "That which the natural reason ordains among all men and which is equally observed by all is called the law of nations."

Although St. Isidore's distinction of the law of nations in regard to the natural law is granted, since the article closes with the text of Gaius, the impression is left of a law of nations derived from the "natural reason," of a law which does not require a special institution, but which springs naturally from reason (*ad Sum*), of a natural law which is specifically human.

In conclusion, we may affirm, after the exposition given, that the thought of St. Thomas, through the long space of time which elapsed from his commentary on Peter Lombard (1255) to the *Summa Theologica* (1271-73), maintained the same preference for the Roman formularies. Being faithful to them, St. Thomas desired to justify and clarify the impressions of St. Isidore, out of respect for the latter. From Roman Law he took his distinction and at the same time the tendency to link the law of nations more closely with the natural law. The law of nations is common to all men, imposed by the necessities of the same human nature, founded on the natural reason itself and exclusive to the rational nature. St. Thomas adopted a tradition which was considered little more than intangible and incorporated it within his own system without notable change.

DOCTRINE OF THE THEOLOGIAN OF SALAMANCA

I. *Clarification of the Concept of the Law of Nations*

To the great theologians of Salamanca was reserved the task of clarifying these formulas which came—encumbered by a confusion of ideas—from a far distant past, as well as the task of defining the limits of these formulas within the field of law.

For this purpose emancipation was necessary, at least materially, from the Roman formulas. Vitoria began by stating at great length the notion of the law of nations left by Ulpian. He pointed out that the worship of God, the honor due to parents, etc., properly and exclusively human as opposed to the animals, all were part of the law of nations, since it is clear that they pertain to the natural law. But on the other hand, his concept of the natural law is not clear either: "There are many things of the natural law which do not extend to all animals, such as the worship of God, restitution, etc."²⁰

De Soto also combats the Roman concept, under which the Ten Commandments would be considered only as a part of the

²⁰ *In II-IIae*, q. 57, a. 3 (Bk. 3, pgs. 13-14, no. 2).

law of nations. This criterion of distinction, based upon the material distinction of each law, is often inexact and therefore it is necessary to find another differentiating principle which possesses formal value and which rests upon the same intrinsic nature of both laws.²¹ Dominic Bañez more openly attacks the Roman conception which joins both men and animals as the material of the natural law. Among irrational beings there can be neither justice nor law, and St. Thomas implies only an analogous sense when he speaks of the absolute commensuration of justice, common to men and animals. There can only be a resemblance of proportion in their natural rule. If that is called the natural law in man which responds to his absolutely necessary requirements, ordained to an end formally known and towards which he is directed by his conscience and liberty, then it can only be called a natural inclination or instinct in animals. Upon its impulsion, by the absolute necessities of their nature, they draw towards an end of which they can only have material knowledge and to which they experience a necessary attraction. For the apprehension of the end and the ordination of the means is not in them but in the Author of Nature.²²

These theologians were not satisfied simply to rectify the formulas; they also contributed towards a conceptual clarification in their analysis of the conclusions of the law of nations and towards a formal differentiation.

It is certain that a principle of formal differentiation is found in St. Thomas, in spite of some of his statements. For while he gives an adequation or proportion in the natural law, based upon the very natures of things (absolutely considered), the proper adequation of the law of nations is based only upon convenience which must result from it (because of the consequences which follow it).²³ Vitoria recognized and enlarged upon this distinction, for the natural law is commensurated and adequated in itself (*ex sua natura*) and it recognizes in itself the equality

²¹ De Soto, "De Iustitia et Iure," L. 3, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1um.

²² "De Jure et Justitia Decisiones," q. 57, a. 3, dub. 1, concl. 1 & 2.

²³ *Sum. Theol.*, II-IIae, q. 57, a. 3-c.

of justice (*dicens de se aequalitatem*). Vitoria constantly repeats that in the law of nations the adequation is further ordered to another form of justice and is established by human consent: "That which is not just in itself, but only by a human statute based upon reason, is called the law of nations, in such a manner that by itself it does not imply equity, but only by reason of its ordination to something else, such as war and other similar things."²⁴

De Soto explains the difference a little more when he says that the proper adequation of the law of nations is realized by considering a certain pre-established end, considered in determined circumstances.²⁵ He illustrates his statement by the example of the division of property, required for the maintenance of peace among men, in view of the perverse inclinations of nature. And then he continues: the law of nations is exclusive to man, because only human reason can make this deduction of fittingness, deduced from the circumstances ordered to an end. He uses the words of Gaius, who places its origin in the "*naturalis ratio*," i. e., the elaboration of human reason in regard to the things which the natural law imposes by itself. The obligating force of the natural law is preceded by an absolute necessity. This character of necessity, upon which Vitoria insisted so much in his treatment of the natural law, will finally become a truly differentiating character to distinguish it from the law of nations.

Vitoria maintained that the law of nations, even though it derives from the natural law, does not proceed from it by way of a necessary conclusion. Because in such a case (according to sound Thomistic doctrine) the conclusion would be of the natural law. It is not deduced, then, with absolute necessity, nor is it entirely necessary for the conservation of the natural law, but "almost necessary" (*pene necessarium*), because only

²⁴ In *loc. cit.* (Bk. 3, pgs. 12-13, nos. 1 & 2): "Ordinatur ad alium justum." "Non est aequum ex se sed *statuto humano* in ratione fixo." "Non habet in se aequalitatem ex natura sua sed ex *conducto hominum* sancitum est."

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, L. 3, q. 3, a. 3.

"with great difficulty" could the natural law be conserved without the law of nations.²⁶

Dominic de Soto develops more fully this differential character by his analysis of the reasoning that produces the conclusions of the law of nations. He chooses a principle of the natural law and therefore one that possesses a necessary character, for example: men should live in peace. However, in his reasoning he afterwards introduces a minor premise of contingent character (*subsumpta altera praemisa*), which is not natural and the necessity of which depends upon a fact or supposition of a universal character, for example: granted the corruption of nature after sin, men would not live in peace nor cultivate the soil well without the division of property. From these two premises he establishes a conclusion of the law of nations, which although it is universal in its extension, has lost its absolute necessity in the minor premise. Therefore it concludes with only relative necessity, or fittingness.²⁷ He can say, therefore, in another place that the conclusion of the law of nations "is derived from the principles of nature, not by a completely necessary inference, but by fittingness in view of a determined end, according to the natural order of things."²⁸

Medina censures de Soto for his affirmation (Bk. I) that the law of nations is derived from nature through conclusions. Medina regarded this opinion as final, although de Soto himself denies it in other places, where he states that this derivation is made through illations that are not of necessity but of fittingness (*per illationes non necessariam sed conveniens*). Medina also insisted on this differential note, when he emphasized "certain contingent suppositions" in the deduction.²⁹

Finally Bañez also points out, in view of the absolute neces-

²⁶ *In II-IIae*, q. 57, a. 3 (Bk. III, pg. 16, no. 4).

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, L. 1, q. 5, a. 3.

²⁸ "Elici ex principiis naturae per viam illationis, non omnino necessaria sed rei naturae ordine ad talem finem conveniens" (L. 3, q. 1, art. 3, ad 2um).

²⁹ *In I-IIae*, q. 95, a. 4: "Facta quadam suppositione" "quod homines sunt perfidi ut in pluribus"—"supposita imbecillitate naturae humanae quae post peccatum mansit infecta."

sity which is proper to the incident principles of the natural law and its consequences, that this contingent character of the conclusions of the law of nations is of "sufficient probability and utility for human society."⁸⁰

Expanding yet a little more upon this minor contingent premise, we can distinguish among the principles themselves. First are those which indicate a very great convenience or utility (*pene necessarium* in Vitoria and de Soto; probable and useful in Bañez) for the conservation of the natural law. On the other hand there are those suppositions which, although they are of a somewhat contingent character in themselves, yet, once given, are of a universal character and from which one cannot prescind; for example, the case of original sin and of human malice which follows from it as a consequence (de Soto, Medina, Bañez).

Since the law of nations does not derive necessarily from the natural law in its conclusion, it will need the consent of men for its establishment. "It receives its sanction from the consent of men," Vitoria said. But that consent, which in some concrete cases might be expressed, is usually tacit and, as de Soto affirmed, "in order to constitute the law of nations, it is not necessary that all men should meet in one place," nor is it necessary "that a principle be imposed which is held throughout the world, but the common consent of men is sufficient and that it be introduced by custom as very fitting for the natural law."⁸¹

All of the theologians insisted upon this customary character of the law of nations and Francis Suarez also insisted upon it some years later.

II. *Comparison of the Natural Law with the Positive Law*

When the characteristics of the law of nations have been pointed out, one can easily see the necessity of including it

⁸⁰ "Quavis colligantur per consequentiam adeo probabilem et utilem humane societati" (*loc. cit.*, dub. 2, concl. 2).

⁸¹ De Soto, *op. cit.*, L. 3, q. 1, a. 3, *loc. cit. ad ultimum*. Vitoria "De Indiis Secunda," no. 9.

under the positive rather than under the natural law. We said that the twofold division of law into natural and positive was adequate and admitted no intermediary and for this reason, these theologians included the law of nations within the positive law, although some, as Medina and Bañez, considered it, in a less strict sense, as an intermediate category.

Bañez begins the comparative study of both laws, clarifying the terms of the question. The classic definition, which considers the law of nations as that which is "common among nations," can be interpreted in two different senses. It can mean "that which is found commonly among nations"—*quod invenitur*, or that which is instituted and sanctioned by the generality of nations—*quod a gentibus sit institutum*. If it is understood in the first sense, it will be necessary to include within the law of nations many things which are of the natural law and others which are of the positive law, since among all people both kinds of law are found. It was for this reason that the Roman jurists almost always included the worship of God, respect for parents, etc., under the *jus gentium*. But when the law of nations is understood in the second sense, as instituted by nations and sanctioned by them, it is evident that it pertains, properly speaking, to the positive law.³²

To point out the positive nature of the law of nations, besides the arguments of authority taken from St. Isidore and St. Thomas, the theologians in question usually arrived at their conclusion in this manner: The things which are of the natural law are good or bad in themselves, by their proper nature, or, as it is usually expressed in the definition formulated by Hugh de San Caro, O.P., "just because good, prohibited because bad" (*justa quia bona, prohibita quia mala*).³³ But the things about which the law of nations is concerned are not good or bad by their nature alone, but by contingent fittingness which depends upon determined circumstances. Therefore, they are not of the natural law, although their affinity with it is great.

³² Bañez, *op. cit.*, q. 57, a. 3, dub. 2, concl. 1a & 2a.

³³ Dom. Lottin, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 & 116.

We said before that Medina and Bañez considered the law of nations as an intermediate category. They did this because they noted its affinities with the natural law and because of the positive nature they assigned to it. They assigned it to a special category because between the precepts of absolute necessity (natural law) and its prudential determinations, made by the positive law with attention to the particular circumstances, there yet remained an intermediary zone, that of relative or hypothetical necessity, which is the area of the law of nations. Between the precepts of pure natural reason and those of simple human institution, we have others in which the natural precept is joined with a contingent fact. It becomes, then, a dictate introduced by the consent and implicit acceptance of all men.

Its agreement and discrepancy with the natural and positive law can almost be illustrated schematically.

It coincides with the natural law: (1) in that it is not written; (2) in its tacit promulgation by human reason, without the necessity of all men actually coming together, since a tacit consent is sufficient; (3) in the universality of its observance; (4) in that it is very similar to the natural law.³⁴

The law of nations is fixed in a medial, differential point between the two laws. The natural law is absolutely necessary, an evident principle or a necessary conclusion. The law of nations is hypothetically necessary, a conclusion of the greatest fittingness. Positive law is hypothetical, by circumstantial determinations.

The law of nations coincides with the positive law in the following respects: (1) it is not from natural instinct (*ex instinctu naturae*), but by consent (*ex condicto*); human reason establishes it by the free consent of the will; (2) it considers human nature not "absolutely," but in its actual historical milieu; (3) its precepts lack general or circumstantial utility; (4) it can be abrogated. This last characteristic needs special clarification in reference to the law of nations.

³⁴ Bañez, *loc. cit.*, dub. 2, concl. 3a.

III. *The Problem of the Abrogation of the Law of Nations*

The solutions which the theologians of Salamanca have given to this problem are apparently different, although substantially they agree.

Vitoria begins by establishing a negative conclusion, because of the origin of the law of nations. This law was introduced by tacit general consent, hence it is not possible to obtain identical universal consent for its abrogation.³⁵

Bañez can be cited as opposed to this manner of reasoning, because he considers a law of nations sanctioned by a pact among nations, which could be abolished in the same manner, i. e., by an agreement to the contrary, or by the falling into disuse of the custom which introduced it.³⁶ In this sense, Vitoria himself, basing his opinion on the authority of Paludan, admits a certain partial abrogation, as in the case of slavery, to which state, by the law of nations, prisoners of war are reduced. This cannot be admitted among Christians.

Dominic de Soto develops this teaching further by introducing a distinction which will be the key to the solution of the problem. Two kinds of conclusions must be considered in the law of nations: some precepts are so hypothetically necessary for human convenience that they can never be abrogated. He gives the example of the division of property. Other precepts can be abrogated when there is sufficient reason (*pro causa*), as in the case of Christian prisoners of war, who are exempt from slavery.³⁷ This conclusion is based on that which we established above.³⁸ There are certain contingent facts which, once granted, determine invariable conditions of universal extension and lead to immutable conclusions in the law of nations. Again, there are other cases in which the minor premise is of simple fittingness or circumstantial utility (*ut in pluribus*) for

³⁵ Vitoria, *In II-IIae*, q. 57, a. 3 (Bk. 3, pp. 16-17, no. 5).

³⁶ Bañez, *loc. cit.*, concl. 4a.

³⁷ De Soto, *op. cit.*, L. 3, q. 1, a. 3, dub. postr.: "Nullatenus fas sit super illis dispensari; immo forsan dispensatio esset irrita."

³⁸ *Supra*, p. 197.

the application of the natural law. In these latter cases the conclusions of the law of nations which are abrogated will not be immutable in themselves if the circumstances of convenience and utility can be abrogated. Among the first conclusions is placed the division of property, the abrogation of which would always be harmful because it militates against a permanent necessity of man's social nature, in view of the perversion of man after original sin. Among the second conclusions is placed that of slavery resulting from war, which can be abrogated according to the agreements and circumstances of people.

On this point the reply of Bañez⁸⁹ seems to be different, since he is inclined to the possible abrogation of that law of nations which divides the property of things. He explains his divergence on this point from the doctrine of de Soto: the latter, he says, had denied to the king the power of abolishing the division of property by himself alone, but granted him that power upon the consent of his kingdom (*de consensu regni*). Bañez proves the abrogability of the law of nations from the fact that it is a positive law. Just as it is constituted by human assent (*ex humano beneplacito*), so it can be abrogated in the same manner, for the matter with which the law of nations is concerned is not in itself good or bad, but only by reason of circumstances, which can be changed.

Nevertheless, this reasoning of Bañez does not seem to be conclusive. In the first place he himself, like de Soto, makes a distinction among things: a) Some can be abrogated licitly, among which we can include those things admitted by Vitoria and de Soto, because conditions of fittingness and utility vary and because those pacts are licitly revoked in which these precepts were formulated. b) There are other cases in which the law of nations cannot be abrogated licitly, but if it is abrogated, the abrogations would be valid and obligatory, e. g., the division of goods. This second statement can be refuted by the very principles of de Soto himself. In the first place, one must ask if a valid but illicit abrogation is possible. The reply in regard

⁸⁹ Bañez, *loc. cit.*, dub. 2a, concl. 4a.

to the law of property must be negative, since it disagrees with the teachings of the Church. But Bañez bases the problem upon an impossible hypothesis as well. He requires the consent of the whole kingdom for the illicit abrogation, for "even though the kingdom transmits all its authority to the king, this must be understood under certain conditions, that is to say, within the limits of what is established by the natural law and also the common law." But could the kingdom give this necessary consent for the abolition of the division of property? In favor of this opinion the cases of voluntary possession of goods in common among the early Christians is usually cited, or the practice of religious communities. In these cases the abrogation of a right is not properly considered, but a simple voluntary renunciation of use, a renunciation of such a nature that all of humanity could not undertake it. For its attainment it would be necessary to suppose that all men are in such a state of perfection that the circumstances which make the division of goods almost necessary (*pene necessarium*) for the maintenance of peace among men after original sin are entirely changed. In this sense the supposition of Bañez which makes the abrogation of this law of nations possible is altogether unreal, because the necessary consent of the kingdom could never be obtained. The contingent fact which makes such an institution almost necessary cannot be changed once it is established. It seems, then, that we must renounce the solution given by de Soto; and in the final analysis the apparently distinct solution of Bañez is of the same cloth.

IV. *Foundation of the Law of Nations*

The philosophical foundation for the law of nations according to the concepts of these theologians is to be sought not so much in a doctrinal relationship with the juridical principles which are treated in the *Summa Theologica* (*De Justitia et Jure*, *De Lege*) as in the principles of Thomistic sociology, in the organic concept of the social and political body. From Vitoria's commentaries on the questions of justice, we now

proceed to his famous *Relationes Teologicas*. His ethical-juridical system is principally found in his two reports on the Indies and in his work on the civil power. The foundation upon which his whole development rests is that which constitutes the first legitimate title for the first work on the Indies, namely, "Natural society and communication."⁴⁰ "Intelligence need go no further," writes Professor Lasala y Llamas, "it need not seek a more profound reason. It is this very necessary fact which justifies the very existence of the law of nations; the essential condition of human life among both individuals and communities (either of which would be powerless without society and communication); the actualizing of the inclination for sociability which is the core of all juridical relationships; that which history and common opinion and every philosophical system have recognized as necessary."⁴¹

Vitoria explained the social and civil nature of man at greater length. The material and spiritual necessities to which nature is subject make it "necessary that men should not live in error and isolation, as do the animals of the forest, but that they should dwell in society and that they should mutually assist one another."⁴² He further develops his doctrine with sound arguments from authority (Sacred Scripture, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Augustine) and from reason. He concludes, "This grouping together is as though we were left a most beneficial communication with nature" and "The fount and origin of cities and republics was not the invention of men nor should it be considered as something artificial, as something which does not proceed from nature itself, which reason suggested to men for defense and conservation."⁴³

This "natural communication" among all men causes a series of mutual rights and obligations springing from a universal sociability anterior to the establishment of civil societies and before any positive legislation.

⁴⁰ First edition "De Indiis," tit. legit. num. 1.

⁴¹ Lasala y Llamas, "Conceptos y principios fundamentales de derecho de gentes, según la doctrina del P. Vitoria"—*Anuario de la A. Vit.*, vol. 1, 1927-28, page 275.

⁴² *De potest. civ.*, no. 4.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, nos. 4 & 5.

When these first social conditions were given, "the human race had the right to elect a sole monarch in the beginning, before making the division of different countries,"⁴⁴ because "the whole world, in a certain manner, forms one republic."⁴⁵

Therefore, before the constitution of individual states, the existence is conceived of one universal society, which did not arrive at a universal organization in the political and juridical order, but whose existence cannot be denied nevertheless. The organization of particular states, subsequent to universal society, came to remedy the lack of universal juridical protection in the duties and obligations which have their origin in common sociability. With the advent of nationalities or definite and organized political groups, they received sanction and juridical force. But with all this "the division of humanity into a plurality of nations cannot be contrary to the universal society formed by all men, nor can the ties which bind each individual to his own nation break those other ties with which he is bound to the whole human race."⁴⁶ And so the law of nations is a requirement of that universal society of men who, inasmuch as they are men, have mutual rights and obligations. The law of nations will be the norm of the great obligation of humanity. "Two kinds of relations arise from human sociability, with things and with men, which cause what we have called the 'society of civilization.' This right of sociability, which is equivalent to the right to the benefits of civilization, is the foundation for the law of nations."⁴⁷

This foundation has been taken from the very end of man, from the necessities of his nature in his actual state, extracting from those necessities the general principles of social organization corresponding to them. Thus solid relationships for every international organization could be established, based on the

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, no. 14.

⁴⁵ *De potest. civ.*, nos. 21 & 13.

⁴⁶ P. Ignacio G. Menéndez Reigada, O. P., "El sistema ético-jurídico de Vitoria sobre el derecho de gentes," Salamanca, 1929; p. 5.

⁴⁷ P. Delos, O. P., "La société internationale et les principes du droit public"—Paris, 1929; pp. 214-215.

very rights and necessities of human nature. These basic principles are the original right of every man over the whole of nature and they form the equality and human fraternity in man's unity of specific nature.⁴⁸

It should not be said that the natural law is sufficient to establish these relationships. This law always moves within a circle which considers human nature in its essence. It would be sufficient for the elementary relationships of an absolute and necessary character in a purely natural order, anterior to every social organization, such as are the laws of conservation of the individual and of the species, or for those laws specifically rational, as those which treat of God, ourselves, and our neighbor. But to the law of nations pertain "all those regulations and customs which, contained within humanity, are considered by right reason as just and most fitting in regard to peace and harmony among men."⁴⁹ As Fr. Menendez Reigada, O. P., says, "It embraces all that which, without pertaining properly to the natural law, is yet necessary for peace and concord among men and to realize the end of man by a tacit consent of all humanity. The law of nations regulates the acts of each and every man in regard to all humanity, in relation to universal society."⁵⁰

Realizing the objective foundation of the law of nations, we should not forget the rational value assigned it, in accordance with the Thomistic conception of law as opposed to other voluntaristic ordinations. Vitoria always places great emphasis on the rational aspect of that "statute fixed in reason itself." "There is a collective mentality of all humanity," writes Fr. Reigada, O. P., "which is the norm of those acts affecting human well-being in general, and those norms are what properly constitute the law of nations."⁵¹ It is the intellect which evalu-

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

⁴⁹ P. José Ma. Palacio, O. P.: "Enquiridion sobre la Propriedad," Madrid, 1935, pp. 195-196.

⁵⁰ P. Reigada, O. P., *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁵¹ Anuario de la Asociación Francisco Vitoria, vol. 4, 1931-32, pp. 53 & 54. It reproduces with some further amplifications the work cited before.

ates the utility and fittingness of these norms and thus obtains universal consent to their dictates.

V. *The Obligation of the Law of Nations*

The moral aspect of this problem appears clearly in the very form with which Vitoria begins when he asks "if it is sinful to violate the law of nations."⁵² It can be seen from this that its compulsive force is reduced to the moral field alone. It is here that we see confirmed those words of Fr. Reigada: "The chief characteristic of Vitoria's system is the force realized by him to give juridical value, according to the organic state of humanity at that time, to what had had only an ethical and moral value."⁵³

In treating of the effects of this obligation, Vitoria distinguishes two forms of the law of nations, setting up a parallelism with positive law. There is that law of nations which is sanctioned by a legal form. This law certainly binds in conscience in the same way as every positive law. But there is another law of nations, which we might call customary, established by the tacit and general consent of all nations. Vitoria places the binding force of these universal norms upon a twofold motive: a) in the universal consent which sanctions and promulgates them as something very convenient and useful for peaceful intercourse among men and without which only the natural law would be observed; and b) by reason of justice and natural equity, for, as he says, "If the French hold our ambassadors to be inviolable, so should we regard theirs. From which it is inferred that if one nation sends ambassadors to sue for peace, and they are not mistreated, and the other nation sends ambassadors who are attacked, a wrong and an injustice would be committed."⁵⁴

The constraining force of the law of nations is intimately connected with the natural law. For as necessity was the basis

⁵² *In II-IIae*, q. 57, a. 3 (Bk. 3, p. 14, no. 3).

⁵³ Reigada, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁴ *In II-IIae*, q. 57, a. 3 (Bk. 3, pp. 15-16, no. 3, final).

for the latter's compulsive power, so the obligation of the law of nations is based on its relative or hypothetical necessity for the observance of the natural law, from which it arises as a rational deduction.

A very eloquent text of Vitoria introduces us fully to this strictly juridical constraining force: "The law of nations has its power not only by an agreement and accord among men, but it has the true force of a law."⁵⁵ And it should not be thought that this text has reference to a force which is sanctioned in international treaties. Allusion is made here, and even more in what follows, to a law of universal validity, which carries with it a universal authority that promulgates and sanctions it. It is the authority of "the whole world, which in a certain manner forms one republic and has the power of giving just laws, fitting for all, as are those of the law of nations."⁵⁶ Vitoria, then, teaches a universal authority and a universal law which is imposed with the power of compulsive force.

VI. *The Authority of the Law of Nations*

The last words of Vitoria raise and solve the problem of authority in the law of nations. Granting the existence of a supreme authority—that of the entire world—which legislates for all that pertains to world society, then that society could not subsist without a norm and an authority. "The very end and necessity, the very reasons of utility and use concur in respect to public power (authority) for the community and society."⁵⁷

This universal authority comes to be the common limit of the sovereign states. Because they, in Vitoria's conception, far from constituting a full and absolute power, independent in all its manifestations, can never be freed from this relational life, not merely contractual, which the law of nations imposes upon them. "Vitoria is one of that noble minority who have taught,

⁵⁵ *De potest. civ.*, no. 21.

⁵⁶ *De potest. civ.*, no. 21.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, no. 5.

not that form of independence which divides and isolates, but that form of interdependence which unites."⁵⁸

But this authority of the whole world is conceived of in Vitoria's system as an organic concept parallel to that of the individual state. "In the particular states there exists organically that power which is the foundation of the essence of the state and of its perfection. And in the same way the power is also given in the multitude of the whole human race over that multitude and over each one of its parts. But without a determined organ to which that power is entrusted, it cannot be said that it is exercised in a proper sense and with proper authority."⁵⁹

Upon whom will that function of authority fall? What is its medium? Vitoria does not give the reply expressly; but indirectly we can deduce it from his general doctrine.

When speaking of the power of the republic, Vitoria says that "by natural and divine law it resides in the republic itself, to which it pertains to govern itself, to administer and to direct all its powers for the common good."⁶⁰ "It is necessary that society be sufficient in itself and that it have the power to govern itself. This authority is rooted in the whole world," as Vitoria explicitly declares.⁶¹ But when seeking the medium which holds this authority, we find that universal society has not yet arrived in its organic development at establishing a concrete instrument which authoritatively discharges these functions. The "State of States," dimly perceived by Vitoria, continues to be merely a utopian desire. The possibility of its institution seems negligible to him when he states that "The human race had the right of choosing only one sovereign at the beginning, before it made the division of principalities." It follows that if it had this power, then it still possesses it, for

⁵⁸ Barcia Trelles, "Francisco de Vitoria, Fundador del Derecho Internacional"—Valladolid, 1928, p. 116.

⁵⁹ P. A. Emilius Naszályi, S. O. C.: "Doctrina Francisci de Vitoria de Statu," Rome, 1937, p. 127.

⁶⁰ *De potest. civ.*, no. 7.

⁶¹ *De potest. civ.*, no. 21, final.

it is a right which "does not cease."⁶² "Just as the greatest part of the republic can appoint a king over the whole even though this should be against the will of the minority, so the greater part of Christianity, even though the others oppose it, can choose a monarch to whom all the kingdoms and provinces would owe obedience."⁶³

That authority could be entrusted to a monarch or to an assembly, committee, etc. But Vitoria has no doubt that "a common authority can be nominated for the whole world when the majority of nations thus agree, without those nations losing any of their independence in that which is pertinent to their own internal government, for the function of this 'super-national' authority would have for its sole object the law of nations."⁶⁴ To this authority all the nations would be subject, willingly or not, for all would have only limited external protection of their individual sovereignty, in favor of human universal solidarity to which the whole community would oblige them for the common good of the entire human race.

VII. *The Sanction of the Law of Nations*

What coercive powers can the law of nations employ to exact its fulfillment?

An original sanction emerges from its ethical value, from its moral obliging force. Historically such sanction was the moral conscience of people which was invoked to maintain the edicts of justice, condemning the despotism and immorality of its transgressors and removing them from office.

But when the law of nations acquired juridical normative value, its sanctions should have been endowed with coercive juridical efficacy. We have already said that the actual medium which imposes that sanction was not yet universal. But because of this it cannot be said that the law of nations had no warranty. Although imperfect in itself and at times unable to reestablish justice, war at least must be considered as a sanc-

⁶² *De potest. civ.*, no. 14, third paragraph.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, no. 14, second concl.

⁶⁴ P. Reigada, O. P., *op. cit.*, p. 15.

tion. War is considered by these theologians as an instrument of violence in the service of justice, for the reparation and imposition of law. "In Vitoria's system," writes Barcia, "war comes as a last resort, not in the sense of blind violence, but as a coercive and unfortunate means of attaining justice in the world."⁶⁵

The juridical-theological doctrine upon war, whose basic principles St. Thomas had well established, following the tradition of St. Augustine,⁶⁶ is given full development in the writings of Vitoria and his disciples. We shall not stop here to explain this valuable "addition to juridical philosophy"; we shall only briefly develop the juridical function of war, its sanctionary force for the law of nations.

War is an act of vindictive justice, entered upon to reestablish the juridical order which was broken. "In Vitoria we constantly find the ideas of wrong, judgment, penalty, etc.; necessary elements to formulate a sentence of vindictive justice."⁶⁷ He points out that the sole just cause for waging war is an injury received;⁶⁸ that war is a "resort to force in the absence of a superior tribunal to which the dispute could be submitted."⁶⁹ All the juridical means for the vindication of wrongs in the particular order have been entrusted to the international order.⁷⁰ The ruler who declares a just war must act as a true judge who imposes a sentence upon the transgressor and arranges the coercive means for its fulfillment and to reestablish order.⁷¹

⁶⁵ Barcia Trelles, *op. cit.*, p. 129. See also Beaufort, "La guerre comme instrument de secours et de punition."—La Haya, 1932.

⁶⁶ *Sum. Theol.*, II-IIae, q. 40.

⁶⁷ A. Vanderpol, "La doctrine scholastique de Droit de guerre." Paris, 1925; p. 64 and following.

⁶⁸ Vitoria, Second edition "De Indiis," props. 4 and following.

⁶⁹ James Brown Scott, "Origen español del Derecho Internacional moderno"—Valladolid, 1928; p. 107.

⁷⁰ Vitoria, *loc. cit.*, nos. 13 & 14.

⁷¹ He considers this judicial function of the ruler who declares a just war under many headings; e. g., "Enemies remain subject to the ruler as to their own proper judge" (*loc. cit.*, no. 19); "the conqueror who is considered as a judge between

Dominic de Soto, in discussing why one who is not convinced of the justice of his cause may not resort to arms, makes the same comparison as did Vitoria between war and judgment. He who is "justly and legally" declared guilty and condemned may not defend himself without committing a further crime.⁷² Bañez expresses the same idea with the greatest force: "The ruler of the perfect republic which has been wronged, is the judge and the superior of the ruler of the republic which has done the injury." "War is the supreme act of vindictive justice; as this act is proper to a judge, then this position of a true judge is possessed by the ruler who declares war."⁷³

But the power of a judge supposes a power of jurisdiction, which seems to be lacking between states that are equally sovereign. For where do rulers derive such jurisdiction?

In the first place, "rulers are judges in their own causes because they have no superiors."⁷⁴ Next, it always belongs to a ruler to defend and vindicate the interests of his nation, not only to repair an injury which has been committed against it, but also because a wrong has been done to the law of nations, which affects the entire world. "If enemies disturb the peace of the republic, it is licit to take vengeance upon them through suitable means. Furthermore, if it is licit to take all these means against internal enemies, i. e., against bad citizens, then it is possible to do the same against external enemies."⁷⁵ If the national authority can do this, "it is certain that world authority can do the same to pernicious and evil men, and this must be executed through the rulers."⁷⁶ This right of the entire world is that upon which the jurisdiction of the ruler is founded; he

two republics, the one the offender and the other offended" (*ibid.*, no. 61); "The ruler who carries on a just war is considered as a *judge*" (*ibid.*, no. 17); "Granted that those rulers who aspire to ruling having a right, then they are *judges*" (*ibid.*, no. 27); "the ruler who wages war, in virtue of this same authority has the right to be considered as *judge* and ruler over his enemies" (*ibid.*, no. 46).

⁷² De Soto, *op. cit.*, L. 5, q. 6, a. 4.

⁷³ Bañez, *In II-IIae*, q. 40, a. 1, dub. 2, concl. 4a.

⁷⁴ Vitoria, Second Edition "De Indiis," No. 29; Bañez, *In II-IIae*, q. 40, a. 1, dub. 1, prob. 4.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, no. 18.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, no. 19.

becomes a judge who declares war in defense of right, because "rulers do not have power only over their own subjects, but also over strangers to oblige them to refrain from injury, and this by the law of nations in virtue of the authority of the whole world." The foundation of that jurisdiction is further strengthened by the natural law itself, "for the world could not otherwise subsist, if there was not authority and power in some to strike evildoers with terror and to reprimand them so that they will not commit crimes."⁷⁷

It is this text of Vitoria's which offers us the means of solving the jurisdictional power of the ruler over the subjects of other sovereign independent states. The foundation of this solution is perfectly in harmony with the organic concept of the state and of universal society. For as Fr. Naszályi says, "If this republic of the universe has the power of establishing laws, known, at least virtually, by all the states and obliging all because they are given by this universal authority, in the same way the universe has jurisdictional power to compel by force anyone who does not wish to comply."⁷⁸ Rulers who declare a just war are the holders of this jurisdiction; at such a time they do not act in their own name, but as the organs of that universal jurisdiction which has its origin in the law of nations and even in the natural law itself.

This transitory function of the judge is a particular case "of extreme gravity and terrible in its consequences." It obliges him, as the chief actor in a very important juridical process, to "examine with great diligence the justice and the causes of it . . . to take counsel with grave and wise men, who speak with absolute freedom and without anger, hatred or passion."⁷⁹ De Soto follows this same idea when he says, in reference to war, "the legal formalities should be observed with far greater care than when private judgments are considered, since something so dangerous for the public good is considered."⁸⁰ Bañez states also that the ruler "ought to evaluate the war as a just judge,

⁷⁷ Vitoria, II "De Indiis," No. 19.

⁷⁸ Vitoria, II "De Indiis," nos. 20 & 21.

⁷⁹ P. Naszályi, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁸⁰ De Soto, *op. cit.*, L. 5, q. 3, a. 5.

i. e., so that the sufferings which accompany it do not exceed the measure of the guilt and injury done. The measure of the crime should be the same as that of the penalty.”⁸¹

War then is the only coercive sanction of the law of nations. The ruler, assisted in his judgment, acts as judge, as plaintiff, and as executor in a case wherein the supreme interests of peace and justice are at stake.

Often enough the consequences show the inefficacy of this coercive means, because victory by force does not always correspond to the force of justice. At least the sad results which this means carries with it are evident proof of its imperfection. War in Vitoria's system will always be a circumstantial, transitory means, which should automatically disappear if in the international life his ethical-juridical conceptions of the law of nations should become both predominant and strong.

VIII. *The Law of Nations and International Law*

Neither the systemization and purification of the classical concepts nor the historical reality of a medieval society enable St. Thomas to attain definitive precision in the conception of the law of nations and even less a progressive evolution of an international law in the modern acceptance. Both were the glorious achievements of these theologians of Salamanca in the sixteenth century.

Today no author denies to Vitoria the glory of being the founder of modern international law. From the testimony of Sir James Macintosh, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, to the more modern testimony of Scott, Vanderpol, Von Vollenhofen, De Nya, and Delos among the non-Spaniards,⁸² and of all Spanish writers Vitoria's paternity is universally recognized, although this title had previously been usurped by Grotius.

⁸¹ Bañez, *In II-IIae*, q. 40, a. 1, dub. 1, concl. 1a, third note.

⁸² Many of these testimonials have been collected by Scott in a symposium published in the *Anuario de la Asoc. Francisco Vitoria*, Vol. 1, pg. 129 & the following.

More than a century before the Englishman, Richard Zouch,⁸³ who has frequently been considered as the first to define international law, we were given Vitoria's definition, formulated when he introduced a simple but intentional correction in the classical formula of Ulpian: *Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes gentes constituit*: "That which natural reason established among all nations is called the law of nations."⁸⁴ This definition has been commented upon and praised by the modern internationalists in spite of its obvious imperfections.⁸⁵

Only one word has been substituted, *homines* (men) for *gentes* (nations), but this substitution in terminology also represents a very profound conceptual distinction. "In Roman law," writes Barcia Trelles, "the individual is considered as the subject of that which is called the *jus gentium*; Vitoria transferred the subject, who for him was placed in a community of men organized into a superior entity: peoples or nations."⁸⁶

Professor de Nya deserves the principal credit for vindicating the originality of Vitoria's definition, for he saw all that the definition implied with "a clear vision of the interdependence of the states with their reciprocal rights and duties."⁸⁷

In the juridical terminology of our day we frequently find the law of nations identified with international law, at least in terminology. This causes a manifest inexactitude, which sometimes produces a confusion in ideas. If international law falls within the ambit of the law of nations, it goes beyond the law of

⁸³ His work was published in 1650, entitled "*Iuris et iudicii fecialis sive iuris inter gentes in questionum de eodem explicatio.*"

⁸⁴ Vitoria, I "De Indiis," tit. legit. 1, no. 2.

⁸⁵ Scott, "El origen español del Derecho internacional moderno," Valladolid, 1928, pp. 87 and following. Vanderpol, "La doctrine scholastique du Droit de guerre"; Paris, 1925, p. 469. Lasala y Llamas, *Anuario de la Asociación Francisco de Vitoria*, vol. i, p. 271. Esperabe Arteaga, "El Derecho de gentes según Bañez," *Anuario Asociación Fr. Vitoria*, v. 5, p. 135. Ramón Riaza, *op. cit.*, p. 170. Delos, O. P., "La societe internationale . . .," *Cit.*, pp. 65 and 215; "La justice," appendix 2, p. 221. Barcia Trelles, *op. cit.*, p. 86 and following.

⁸⁶ Barcia Trelles, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

⁸⁷ "Los origenes del Derecho internacional," p. 11. Cited in the *Anuario de la Asociación Francisco de Vitoria* by Scott, p. 158.

nations because within it questions must be included that affect the relational life of the state.

Such an identification might be explained because of the tendency of some writers to incorporate within the natural law in a secondary manner those cases of the law of nations which fall within the internal ambit of national life, leaving only a true law of nations for those things which have reference to life among the states, i. e., international relations. But such an incorporation is incorrect because the cases in question, since they are part of hypothetical necessities, of which there are many in the field of the law of nations, are not a part of those absolute necessities proper to the natural law.

In Vitoria's conception the law of nations embraces "a common groundwork of institutions among the different peoples, whether they have reference to their internal life or to their regime of relations."⁸⁸

To make his view clearer it is necessary to bear in mind the ultimate philosophical foundation for the law of nations, which is man's natural sociability.

The law of nations, anterior to the "social fraction," could not be destroyed in the juridical life of man, since, before men were members of this or that particular organized state, they were, as men, members of the universal society and as such they continued to maintain their relationships with the rest of mankind beside those relationships which began among them as integral members of each state.

The law of nations established the division of property, and the rights which flow from this fact cannot be granted to us as members of a certain nation or state, but simply because we are men, members of this universal society.

Afterwards, new relationships arose among men, inasmuch as they were members of a determined political organization, members of a sovereign moral person. These relationships form the proper object of international law. The subject of these

⁸⁸ Ramón Riaza, "Doctrinas jurídicas y políticas de Vitoria," incorporated as chapter ten in the work "Francisco de Vitoria," by P. Beltrán de Heredia, O. P.

relationships may be considered as simple isolated individuals, pertaining to different nations and in relationships of merely particular value: private international law. Or they may be considered as subjects obligated by laws binding the whole nation, i. e., in so far as they are members of an organization, politically independent and sovereign, the subjects of rights and duties in relation to other nations: public international law. An example will serve to make this distinction clear. A Spaniard has juridical relationships with his fellow men by the mere fact of natural sociability, because he is a man. He also has rights and obligations which he bears in his particular and private relationships with other individuals of different nationalities, French, English or German. Finally as a Spanish citizen he has rights and duties which are common to all Spaniards, which are the rights and obligations of the Spanish nation to which he pertains, in relation to other nations which are also subject to public law.⁸⁹

Because the universal society of mankind shares the same nature and has the same need for mutual aid and collaboration in the specific unity of mankind, unbreakable bonds of universal solidarity have been established which will cement the moral unity necessary to intensify the life of mutual communications and interdependence among the states, each time further organized and defined in international juridical norms.

From another standpoint Vitoria "remained faithful to the Thomistic theory that law possesses objective foundation. Because of this he has placed the foundations of a universal society which reunites the national states into one community, non-contractual but organic and institutional. International law both begins and ends its continuous progress with an objective and transcendent ideal as opposed to merely national ideals—an ideal of a universal society. Vitoria stands out not only as its founder but as the initiator whose doctrine corresponds to the requirements of modern juridical thought."⁹⁰

⁸⁹ P. Ignacio Menéndez Reigada, "El sistema ético-jurídico de Vitoria sobre el Derecho de gentes": Salamanca, 1929, pp. 8 et seq.

⁹⁰ P. Delos, O. P., "La société internationale . . .", pp. 200 and 217.

The investigating method proper to Scholastic philosophy harmoniously and satisfactorily solves the conflict between reason and history in regard to moral problems. Two different methods can also be employed in the international order. First is the purely natural, which analytically speculates in regard to the philosophic determination of a supreme ideal of a universal organization, using general and immutable principles. Second is the experimental historical method, which sets up an empirical factor and works from that, i. e., the sociological data in the evolution and customary development of international institutions. This sets up the same antinomy here as the remainder of the juridical-philosophical field.

Vitoria applied to the juridical international organization that wise system of Scholastic investigation which harmonizes both methods so that they are mutually complementary.

We have seen Vitoria's construction to be built upon a deeply philosophical foundation, which embraced a rational consideration of human nature, its specific unity, the dominion of man over nature, the necessity of mutual aid and social dependency for the attainment of its ends. On the same philosophical-juridical ground, as we have seen, is based his study of the civil power, the organic constitution of the state, the objective foundation of law, political sovereignty, relational independence, etc. This rational basis was perfectly developed in the ethical order and then placed in the field of law.

But it was necessary to embody these rational principles in a living reality. This practical application was facilitated through the historical occasion of the discovery of America. The moral and political problems to which the colonization of the New World gave rise and, on the other hand, the concentration in the metropolis of a great national political organization in the modern acceptance, offered the sociological factor, the experimental contrast necessary in order that these juridical norms should attain an exceptional and efficacious perfection in the laws of the Indies. As finished examples of the practical-speculative method relative to the study of international law, Vitoria left us his two famous *Relecciones de Indias*. If they did

not attain a finished and complete systematization, they at least began a definitive attempt and a successful methodology in the study of international law.⁹¹

Someone has said that Vitoria never dreamed of the repercussions that would flow from the principles that he formulated for the conquest of the Indies, or the transcendency they would attain. His rules were formed only as the consequences of the principles that were developed. They came to form a basic and global whole of juridical doctrine, whose actuality was determined by the constant repetition, with accidental changes, in the life of men, of the juridical moral situations and necessities which inspired them.⁹²

⁹¹ P. Carro, O.P., "La Teología y los teólogos juristas ante la conquista de América," 2 vols.; Madrid, 1944. Delos, O.P., *op. cit.*, pp. 275 et seq. Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 et seq.

⁹² In a rapid glance over the legitimate grounds for colonization and the arguments with which they are sustained there are found the basic principles of modern international law, which both protect and guarantee the rights of men and of nations. We offer only an enumeration, without comment upon the principles.

1. The general principle for international collaboration and interdependence: "Natural society and communication" (1st tit., no. 1, 1).

2. The right of free relationship and intermingling; of immigration and emigration (1st tit., 1st concl., no. 2).

3. The right of freedom of the seas (1st tit., 1st concl., 10th arg., no. 2).

4. The right of exploitation of common things and "nullius" (1st tit., 3rd prop., no. 4).

5. The right of freedom of commerce (1st tit., 2nd prop., no. 3).

6. The right of spiritual, cultural, scientific, etc., intercourse. "That which considers any other human discipline" (2nd tit., no. 9).

7. The right of nationalization or naturalization (1st tit., prop. 2, no. 5).

8. The right of expelling strangers (1st tit., 6th arg., no. 2).

9. The equality of right among different people, Spanish, French, Indian, etc. (1st tit.—*per totum*—and props. 2 and 3, nos. 2, 3 and 4).

10. The protection of minorities (1st tit., 5th, 6th and 7th propositions, nos. 6, 7 and 8).

11. The right of international intervention: for religious motives (4th tit., no. 15).

12. The right of an international protectorate (7th tit., no. 17).

13. The right of warfare—second edition "De Indiis," *per totum*.

14. Possible forms of superstate organization as organs and the authority of the law of nations: Christianity, Universal Society, the Church. *Passim*.

15. Freedom of evangelization (2nd tit., 9).

16. Means of pacification in international conflicts. The obligation to have resort to them before waging war (1st tit., 5th prop., no. 6). "De Indiis," nos. 20, 1, *passim*.

The doctrinal contribution of these Salamancan theologians represents a great and almost definitive advance in the elaboration of generic concepts in juridical philosophy. They pointed out the solid philosophical foundation of the principle of the law of nations and sketched precisely the outline of this concept. The ambiguities and false impressions of the thinkers who preceded them were fully resolved. The idea of the law of nations was definitely placed within its own field, with its proper object and its own characteristics relative to contingent and hypothetical necessity, which is its differential aspect as opposed to natural and positive law. At the same time its relationship with those two laws is shown clearly. Its value and efficacy in the juridical order complement its ethical structure. They have shown, too, inasmuch as an embryonic organization of a world state permits, the notes of its compulsive force and the authority which promulgates, guards, and sanctions it.

Their basic pronouncements concerning the international order admit of further development (and today they have been given scientific systematization in international studies). When the science of international law forgot the orientation received from Vitoria and his disciples, it travelled toward an inefficacious positivism which almost always has conceived the despotic tyranny of strong states. If the new international order wishes to establish itself strongly and orientate itself by norms of justice, then it must once again return to the teachings of Vitoria.

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17. The principle of international arbitration. It would seem that Vitoria conceived of it only confusedly. One might maintain that it is implicitly contained in some of his texts (1st tit., prop. 5, no. 6; "De Indiis," dub. 3, prop. 3, no. 29). But the doctrine of international arbitration, although it was known by previous Scholastics—Juan López de Segovia—appears for the first time with a definite character in Domingo Bañez. In his inspiration Vitoria's aid is clear (*In II-IIae*, q. 40, a. 1, dub. 3).

Cf. Jaime Vinas Planas, "El arbitraje internacional en los Escolásticos Españoles"; doctrinal thesis, Salamanca, 1941, published in "Ciencia Tomista," 1941-42.

THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT IN SAINT THOMAS

(Concluded)

Possible developments of our relations with the divine

For St. Thomas the feeling of reverence is a *natural sentiment*. He teaches that, to have this sentiment arise in our souls, we must know God at least confusedly. To become conscious of our dependence upon Him as the principle of our being and of all our goods, we must first experience how much we need Him. In this light, the attitudes of reverence or submission to God, which we spontaneously adopt upon recognizing His excellence and our dependence, are inspired by the clear vision we suddenly have about what God means to us. The depth and intensity of our reverence for God are thus proportionate to what we know about Him. For some degree of reverence a confused knowledge about God is sufficient, but greater precision in knowing God is demanded if this reverence is to endure and flourish in the soul. Moreover, as we have noted before, our reverence for God can easily deteriorate into superstition and idolatry, if our intellect adheres to errors concerning God.

In determining the multiple causes which have a part in the development of our relations with God we shall try to ascertain which are apt to bring about the deterioration of these relations, and which are apt to accomplish their rectification and intensification.

St. Thomas considers this problem in his treatise on religion.¹²¹ We shall try first to understand the elements of solution which he offers in this place. Then we shall try to pene-

¹²¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 94, a. 4, c.

trate into the immediate reasons which he gives by considering the whole of his theology, especially by considering what he says with regard to original sin.

St. Thomas enumerates and classifies these factors when he deals with idolatry and superstition in the *Summa*. These latter are the two forms which our relations with God can take on when they degenerate by excess.

However, before taking up this consideration, there is a historical question which must be taken into account: "At what moment in the history of various peoples do we find the deterioration of the natural instinct which would lead them to manifest their reverence for God and to submit themselves to Him?" St. Thomas is of the opinion that idolatry did not exist in the first ages of the world. The remembrance of the creation of the world, which was still fresh in the minds of the people, made the knowledge of the One God vivid in the human mind.¹²² Now we must see what would contribute to the appearance of these deteriorations in the personal history of each man.

St. Thomas admits that the devil can do his part; but if the devil can influence us, this is only because our nature is already defective, either because of intellectual ignorance, or because of disorderly affections.¹²³ Let us continue to follow St. Thomas in his analysis and try to discover the order of causality which he establishes in the interplay of these different factors, and the degree of efficiency which he assigns to each. When he shows the limitation of the devil's role, the Angelic Doctor takes notice of the fact that man and the devil act in accord and simultaneously: the devil only seals idolatry by achieving man's deception. Man is disposed to error because of his poor nature.

¹²² "Dicendum quod in prima aetate non fuit idolatria propter recentem memoriam creationis mundi, ex qua adhuc vigeat cognitio unius Dei in mente hominum" (*Ibid.* ad 2um).

¹²³ "Dicendum quod causa dispositiva idolatriae fuit, ex parte naturae hominis defectus vel per ignorantiam intellectus, vel per inordinationem affectus" (*Ibid.*, ad 1um).

The cause of idolatry was *consummative* on the part of the devils, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in idols.¹²⁴

Whatever form superstition may take, from the moment that the demons contribute their bit, they use their ingenuity to deceive ("deceivers of souls") and seduce souls by clever lies. If men give themselves over to this game very enthusiastically, this is because the demons find them willing accomplices. The most fundamental element in this complicity is the ignorance of most men concerning the true God. When man is left to his own resources, a somewhat precise natural knowledge of God is difficult to acquire. Moreover, man's imagination is apt to deceive him, even if he has the leisure to undertake this study.

Thus the human race would remain in the very great darkness of ignorance, if only the way of reason was left to man as a means of knowing God.¹²⁵

In this light, it is not surprising that the religious instinct should be directed to other objects, no matter how natural the instinct itself may be. When explicating the proper object of religious instinct, it is very easy for man to deviate and fall into the grossest errors.

Furthermore, the religious instinct can be mistaken in following its own bent. It is definitely a sentiment and as such has to be guided by understanding. When understanding itself is seduced by error, anything can happen. Then sentiment encroaches upon knowledge and slowly misdirects man to the worst religious aberrations.

St. Thomas distinguishes two factors which will produce such excess of sentiment: disorderly affections and the natural pleasure which man has in creating representations for himself.¹²⁶ First let us consider disorderly affections. This disorder is a veneration or love for beings to which we attribute

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, c.

¹²⁵ *I Cont. Gent.*, 4.

¹²⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 94, a. 4, c.

absolute value by granting them cult and reverence which we had formerly reserved for God. The other source of disorder and deviation appears when man, indulging in his taste for creating representations of what he loves and adores, comes to the point of being excessively attracted by the sensible. When this happens, man usually lets himself be seduced by the representation itself and gives to the sensible thing as such the respect and deference that should be given only to what the thing represents. Since the devil plays his part in this, one can easily imagine where such a practice will end.

St. Thomas marks the order of causality in the interplay of these factors. The devil succeeds in deceiving souls only because they have in themselves everything which disposes them to accept the devil's lies as truths.

There is a twofold cause of idolatry: one is *dispositive*, this is on man's part; . . . the other is *consummative*, this is on the devil's part.¹²⁷

In the same article of the *Summa* on idolatry, St. Thomas tells us that we must look deeper for the real explanation of these disorders. In response to an objection, St. Thomas says that in man's nature there are dispositions which incline him to the sin of idolatry, and that these very dispositions come from sin: "And this too pertains to sin."¹²⁸ The Angelic Doctor thus invites us to consider the problem of the deviations of our relations with God in relation to the whole of his theology on the Redemption. There we learn that if the best in us becomes the worst, it is because from the very beginning man has perverted his relations with God by letting himself be induced by the devil to attitudes of pride and revolt against God. The devil now finds access into the fallen soul.

It is easy to see how our reverence for God can degenerate into superstition in the state of original sin, once we see exactly what superstition is. We know already what causes come into play to make our religious instinct deviate. Now we must find out what the deviation is in itself.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, ad lum.

According to St. Thomas, superstition is an excess (and thereby a vice) in the way we manifest our reverence and submission for God.¹²⁹ This can happen in two ways: either it is made to God in an improper way, or it is made to someone or something other than God through those respects and sentiments which are due to God alone.¹³⁰ The latter is the more serious; it is properly idolatry according to St. Thomas. Since it is the typical manifestation of superstition, we shall concern ourselves with this form alone for the present.

Let us try to isolate the elements which constitute this disorder. It consists in what modern psychologists would call a "transfer of object." One gives to poor created realities sentiments which should be experienced only in the presence of the Creator:

It is of the very nature of divine excellence to be singular and *incommunicable*, but through idolatry someone *communicates* divine reverence *to another*.¹³¹

Here it is not a matter of any reality whatsoever, but only of those which our imagination and sensibility have *deified* upon the devil's suggestion. As in every grave sin, the soul completely turns away from God and seeks its end in the created order. Furthermore, in this case the imagination is seduced to such an extent that it gives a *divine value* to certain realities and covers them with mystery. Here perversion is realized on the sensible plane; man is too ignorant and too spiritually weak to offer any serious resistance. Thus the devil succeeds

¹²⁹ " . . . superstitio est vitium religioni oppositum secundum excessum . . . quia exhibet cultum divinum vel cui non debet, vel eo modo quo non debet " (*Ibid.*, q. 92, a. 1, c).

¹³⁰ " Potest enim divinus cultus exhiberi vel cui exhibendus est, scilicet Deo vero, modo tamen indebito; et haec est prima superstitionis species.—Vel ei cui non debet exhiberi, scilicet cuicumque creaturae. Et hoc est aliud superstitionis genus, quod in multas species dividitur, secundum diversos fines divini cultus [scilicet, in quantum istae species contrariantur finibus divini cultus, secundum quod] ordinatur . . . divinus cultus ad reverentiam Deo exhibendam . . . ad hoc quod homo instruatur a Deo, quem colit [et] . . . ad quamdam directionem humanorum actuum secundum instituta Dei " (*Ibid.*, a. 2, c).

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, q. 97, a. 4, ad 3um.

in his deception inasmuch as these created realities take on a divine value and inspire man with sentiments of total love, mixed with the fear and deference which previously he gave to God alone. This is a "transfer of object" which brings with it a fatal degradation of that reverence which now degenerates from its state of spiritual tonality into a fear dominating the senses. In this light, idolatry presents the spectacle of a sensibility which (thanks to the already assured complicities) succeeds in imposing the pursuit of its own object as man's end and in giving the value of cult to the passions of love and fear which this object inspires through the devil's suggestions.

This sensibility enslaves man instead of serving him. The intellect and the will contribute to the production of gods according to the measure of such a sensibility. For St. Thomas such attitudes in man can be explained only in the light of their definitive cause, that is, the lamentable state of disorder in which man was left after original sin. Before the fall, man lived in perfect conformity of will with his Creator. Like the facts we shall now mention about original sin and its consequences, this is an article of faith which we must accept as such. With St. Thomas, we shall try to understand this article as well as possible.¹³² Before the fall, man lived in a state which St. Thomas calls original justice.¹³³ As a gift on God's part the sensible in man was perfectly subject to the spiritual, the body to the soul, and the latter to God.¹³⁴ Adam's sin was an act of insubordination to God; he preferred himself to his Creator and decided to seek his own end in himself.¹³⁵ According to

¹³² *I Cont. Gent.*, 9.

¹³³ "... iustitia originalis . . . erat quoddam donum gratiae toti humanae naturae divinitus collatum in primo parente. Quod quidem primus homo amisit per primum peccatum" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 2, c.).

¹³⁴ "Dicendum quod per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta" (*Ibid.*, q. 85, a. 3, c.). "... per peccatum primi parentis sublata est originalis iustitia, per quam non solum inferiores animae vires continebantur sub ratione absque omni deordinatione, sed totum corpus continebatur sub anima absque omni defectu" (*Ibid.*, a. 5, c.).

¹³⁵ "peccatum . . . originale . . . est quaedam inordinata dispositio ipsius naturae" (*Ibid.*, q. 82, a. 1, ad 2um).

St. Thomas, this was formally for man the deprivation of original justice; his spirituality was forever turned away from God.¹³⁶

The consequences of this sin were lamentable. Among them was the infection of all of Adam's descendants. The soul, turned away from God, lost its control over the body; suffering and death followed. The will had to admit its incapability to master sensibility and man's other potencies. After the fall, man found that he possessed a multitude of appetites which were mutually opposed, constantly conflicting in their demands because each appetite sought its own good.¹³⁷ Having wished to throw off God's yoke, man became the slave of his sensibility, which was now abandoned to itself and given over to its own concupiscence.

Still worse, the disorder reigning in the soul of the first man was transmitted by generation and became the normal state of all men. From then on, each man came into the world as a sinner.¹³⁸ In effect, we must believe that we have all sinned in Adam and that we share in his act of disobedience and its consequences. In Scholastic terminology, St. Thomas says that Adam was the principal cause of sin, human semination is the intermediary, the instrumental cause by which sin is transmitted, and sin is found in the soul of each man as its proper subject.¹³⁹ Let us note, finally, that in each man sin appears as an innate habit contracted at birth.¹⁴⁰ It affects more the

¹³⁶ "privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali" (*Ibid.*, a. 3, c).

¹³⁷ "ex aversione voluntatis a Deo consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae viribus . . . Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commutabile; quae quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici concupiscentia" (*Ibid.*).

¹³⁸ "secundum fidem catholicam est tenendum quod primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros . . . Sic igitur inordinatio quae est in isto homine ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius, sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet *motione generationis* omnes qui ex eius origine derivantur" (*Ibid.*, q. 81, a. 1, c).

¹³⁹ "sicut in subiecto, peccatum originale nullo modo potest esse in carne, sed solum in anima" (*Ibid.*, q. 83, a. 1, c).

¹⁴⁰ "peccatum originale . . . [est] per vitiatam originem innatus" (*Ibid.*, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3um).

essence of the soul than its potencies, and among the latter it affects the will more than the other potencies,¹⁴¹ thus constituting for each man a propensity to evil, a seat of disorder, a source of actual sin.¹⁴²

It is important to detail St. Thomas' conception about original sin if we want to understand how the sin of idolatry is the fatal result to which the devil should lead man after he had once succeeded in detaching man from God. Now we can give a better account of the ease with which the devil leads the most natural, as well as the most spiritual, instinct in man to fall to the level of the senses. After the fall, man was a prey to a vagrant and unbridled sensibility; his intellect was darkened and weakened; his will inclined to evil, with a propensity to seek itself in everything.¹⁴³ The devil would be very successful in deceiving human souls by inciting them to seek the absolute, which they still needed, in the senses—whither concupiscence would lead them.¹⁴⁴

Fundamentally the devil attempts to satisfy that *disordered love of self* in which man lives.¹⁴⁵ The cult formerly given the

¹⁴¹ "anima secundum essentiam est *primum* subiectum originalis peccati" (*Ibid.*, q. 83, a. 2, c). "Dicendum quod in infectione peccati originalis duo est considerare. Primo quidem inhaerentiam eius ad subiectum, et secundum hoc primo respicit essentiam animae . . . Deinde oportet considerare inclinationem eius ad actum, et hoc modo respicit potentias animae. Oportet ergo quod illam per prius respiciat, quae primam inclinationem habet ad peccandum. Haec autem est voluntas" (*Ibid.*, a. 3, c).

¹⁴² "etiam ex peccato originali [sequitur] aliqua inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis iustitiae" (*Ibid.*, q. 82, a. 1, ad 3um).

¹⁴³ "Dicendum quod per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis . . . Et ideo omnes vires animae remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine . . . Inquantum ergo ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus concupiscentiae" (*Ibid.*, q. 85, a. 3, c).

¹⁴⁴ "Dicendum quod illi qui peccant, avertuntur ab eo in quo vere invenitur ratio ultimi finis, non autem ab ipsa ultimi finis intentione, quam quaerunt falso in aliis rebus" (*Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 7, ad lum).

¹⁴⁵ "[Sapiens] loquitur de superbia secundum quod est inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae . . . In . . . ordine [intentionis] habet [superbia] rationem

true God, Whose transcendence can never satisfy insatiable appetites, is realigned to realities better suited to the sensitive appetite, which is finally convinced of their divinity. Fallen man is satisfied with this, but the reverence and the submission which he manifests to his new gods are only *imaginary fears* entirely out of proportion to the excellence and dignity of these realities. Such reverence and submission constitute *enslavement* and *servitude* which bring only ridiculous benefits.

Now we have to consider what modifications the reverence of the idolater undergoes. We have said that when reverence is perverted, it degenerates into imaginary fear. Let us go to St. Thomas for a more detailed analysis.

With regard to idolatry, St. Thomas has pointed out that we turn away from the true God and give the cult which we previously reserved to God to sensually attractive realities of the created order:

The first species of superstition is idolatry, which *unduly* offers divine reverence to *creatures*.¹⁴⁶

We must make an explicit account of the alterations which reverence undergoes when it falls to the level of the senses. We shall be interested, then, in studying what St. Thomas has said with regard to worldly or human fear. There we shall find a number of relations to be established; too, we shall be able to identify under this name what our reverence becomes in idolatry.

By worldly or human fear, St. Thomas means the fear which turns us from God:

Since the object of fear is evil, sometimes man recedes from God because of the evils which he fears: this fear is called human or worldly.¹⁴⁷

Here we have the *same effect* as in idolatry: man is turned

principii et finis . . . Fines autem in omnibus bonis temporalibus acquirendis est ut homo per illa quandam perfectionem singularem et excellentiam habeat. Et ideo ex hac parte superbia, quae est appetitus excellentiae, ponitur initium omnis peccati ” (*Ibid.*, q. 84, a. 2, c.).

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 92, a. 2, c.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 2, c.

away from God. We have, too, the *same motives*, as we shall see later. Let us follow St. Thomas in distinguishing between the evil which is feared and the reality from which this evil can come:

The evil from which one flees is *contrary to a corporal or temporal good which one loves inordinately*; . . . and he flees from suffering *at the hands of some temporal man*.¹⁴⁸

Both of these are created realities. It must be noted, too, that both of them have a relation with *disordered love*, which can result only from a disordered love of self. St. Thomas is more explicit on this point in the *Summa*:

And in this way worldly love is properly called that love by which someone turns to the world *as to his end*. Now fear arises from love, for man fears to lose what he loves. And thus worldly fear is that fear which proceeds from worldly love *as from an evil root*.¹⁴⁹

We can analyze the whole psychology of idolatry under the expression "worldly or human fear." Although this expression seems deceptive at first, we must remember that St. Thomas takes it from the Fathers. If we want to understand the expression which St. Thomas uses out of respect for tradition, it seems that we are authorized to conclude that the word "world" is used in this context to designate *all created reality*. As soon as any creature takes on the value of an end for us, and is substituted for God, we are smitten with love for the world—a disordered love which can only engender the unreasonable fear of losing this creature. We were inspired with reverence because of the fear of being separated from God. Reverence kept us "collected within our own smallness." We feared to dare to make ourselves His equals. In idolatry our reverence remains a fear, even a "fear of separation," but this is the fear of being separated from the sensible realities which our imagination, under the devil's insinuations, represents to us as divine. *This* separation now seems to us

¹⁴⁸ *Ad Romanos*, c. 8, lect. 3.

¹⁴⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 3, c.

to be the greatest evil. Consequently, our reverence remains, too, a "fear of adequation": we fear lest we should make ourselves the equals of these realities. Moreover, we are inclined to manifest our slavery to them by signs of deference—in exaggerated cases.

Certainly these are unreasonable fears, since they have to do with an evil which is not definitive for us: the separation from, the deprivation of a sensible good, of the sensible joys which we experience in the cult of false gods. They are unreasonable, too, because they are aroused by realities from which no really serious evil can come to us. Finally they are unreasonable because they result from a disordered love of self, which makes us seek our wellbeing and end wherever our concupiscence can be satisfied, and makes us turn from God whenever His demands come into conflict with the false pleasures which we taste and which we fear to lose at any price.

The result of idolatry is that reverence, perhaps the truest attitude for men in God's presence (because it is the consciousness of our state as creatures), degenerates *into evil passion*. This passion is false in its origin and development, even though it preserves the depth and vitality of a natural instinct. "*Corruptio optimi, pessima*."

Now we have to recall what has just been said about original sin. From this we can see that in such a state of disorder our relations with God would deviate and finally be broken—unless they were rectified. In man's state of impotency to turn again to his true end, God alone could renew relations with him.¹⁵⁰ This is entirely gratuitous on His part, a case of merciful condescension,¹⁵¹ no longer depending upon man.

This again is a matter of faith. God has revealed man's redemption. Therefore, it is not a matter for research or

¹⁵⁰ "quod homo convertatur ad Deum, hoc non potest esse nisi Deo ipsum convertente" (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 6, c).

¹⁵¹ "Donum . . . gratiae excedit omnem facultatem naturae creatae; cum nihil aliud sit quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae, quae excedit omnem aliam naturam . . . Sic enim necesse est quod solus Deus deficiet, communicando consortium divinae naturae per quandam similitudinis participationem" (*Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 1, c).

demonstration. We can only penetrate as well as we can into the meaning of the words of salvation which have been spoken for us.

In trying to construct the theological context in which St. Thomas' religious vocabulary should be interpreted, we mentioned the principal facts which command the theology on the redemption. Humanity was brought back by Jesus Christ, God's own Son. It is our task now to determine in what way our relations with God have been renewed and profoundly transformed since Christ suffered and died for us. To do this we must determine what our redemption by Christ entailed. This redemption was not only a work of justice and satisfaction for sin, but also a work of superabundant mercy.¹⁵² Therefore, as St. Thomas remarks,¹⁵³ Christ not only liberated us from sin, the slavery to the devil, and the penalties due to sin, thereby reconciling us with God;¹⁵⁴ He also opened up to us the gates of heaven, and made us sharers in His glory.¹⁵⁵ By His Passion He merited salvation for us. In this light, we must see that Christ first healed us from sin and the disorders which flowed from it, and then raised us up to His own glory.¹⁵⁶ St. Paul says that He is "the firstborn amongst many brethren." From that time on, relations with God were established again, this time on the level of friendship.¹⁵⁷

In the light of these notations, we can now undertake to demonstrate the successive and gradual transformations which

¹⁵² "Dicendum quod hominem liberari per passionem Christi, conveniens fuit et misericordiae et iustitiae eius . . . Et hoc fuit abundantioris misericordiae quam si peccata absque satisfactione dimisset" (*Ibid.*, III, q. 46, a. 1, ad 3um).

¹⁵³ "Quia [Christus] est caput nostrum, per passionem suam . . . liberavit nos . . . a peccatis" (*Ibid.*, q. 49, a. 1, c.).

¹⁵⁴ "per [crucis] passionem] . . . diabolus est a potestate hominum eiectus" (*Ibid.*, a. 2, *sed contra*). "Dicendum quod per passionem Christi liberati sumus a reatu poenae" (*Ibid.*, a. 3, c.). "Dicendum quod passio Christi est causa reconciliationis nostrae ad Deum" (*Ibid.*, a. 4, c.).

¹⁵⁵ "per passionem Christi aperta est nobis ianua regni caelestis" (*Ibid.*, a. 5, c.).

¹⁵⁶ "Sunt . . . quinque effectus gratiae in nobis: quorum primus est ut anima sanetur; secundus ut bonum velit; tertius est ut bonum quod vult, efficaciter operetur; quartus est ut in bono perseveret; quintus est ut ad gloriam perveniat" (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 111, a. 3, c.).

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 110, a. 1, c.

the relations with God undergo in the case of one who passes from the state of idolatry to the state of grace. We choose this case as the one which will exhaust the possibilities of rectification and intensification in the progressive development of relations with God.

The person who succumbs to the devil and commits the sin of idolatry has turned away from God *through fear* of losing the sensible realities which he has made gods in relation to himself. In this pitiful state a man enslaves himself to beings which are lower than he is. Yet his state is not desperate. Christ has come upon earth. God can condescend to his misery and, in a gesture of unheard-of mercy, renew contact with him if he does not place an obstacle to this merciful gesture.¹⁵⁸

The initiative belongs to God. He alone can move us to conversion by that special impetus which is actual *operating* grace.¹⁵⁹ From this point on, man is invited to *cooperate* in God's action. The first act which he has to perform is an act of faith in God, Who justifies men by Christ's mysteries.¹⁶⁰ The act which follows on man's part is a *movement of servile fear* which draws us from sin through fear of being punished by God. Then comes an act of hope which inclines us to make amendment, in hope of obtaining pardon from God. Following upon this is the act of charity which makes us hate sin as sin—no longer as the cause of punishment. Finally, St. Thomas tells us, there appears in the soul a *movement of filial fear* flowing from a full heart which leads us to offer God satisfaction because of the reverence due God. Let us carefully take note of this last motive: "because of reverence for God."¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ "defectus gratiae prima causa est ex nobis, sed collationis gratiae prima causa est a Deo" (*Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 3, ad 2um).

¹⁵⁹ "liberum arbitrium ad Deum converti non potest nisi Deo ipsum ad se convertente" (*Ibid.*, q. 109, a. 6, ad 1um). "homo ad recte vivendum dupliciter auxilio Dei indiget. Uno quidem modo, quantum ad aliquod habituale donum . . . Alio modo indiget homo auxilio gratiae ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum . . . [i. e.] ad recte agendum" (*Ibid.*, a. 9, c).

¹⁶⁰ "in iustificatione impii requiritur actus fidei quantum ad hoc quod homo credat Deum esse iustificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi" (*Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 4, ad 3um).

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, III, q. 85, a. 5, c.

In this psychological description we find the four acts required, according to the Council of Trent, for man's sufficient disposition to sanctifying grace from God, that is, to justification: acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance.¹⁶² However, as St. Thomas warns us, it is important not to conceive the justification of the sinner after the manner of physical motion. Here everything is done in an instant: ¹⁶³ the motion of free will to God, the movement away from sin, the remission of the sin, and the infusion of grace.¹⁶⁴ These are indispensable distinctions for the true understanding of how the soul in the state of idolatry, where reverence for God was turned into unnatural fear (which we have identified with what St. Thomas calls "worldly fear"), gradually experiences for God, under the action of grace, first a servile fear, then a filial fear which St. Thomas himself associates with reverence. The foregoing explanation permits us to pursue again our inquiry into what St. Thomas means by servile fear.

As we have said before, grace first heals, then elevates. Hence, first there is the gradual rectifying of each of our faculties by God's grace, and our cooperation until the moment when God completes the healing of the soul by the infusion of habitual grace. In this very infusion God brings about the ultimate disposition in the soul for receiving this grace.¹⁶⁵ We

¹⁶² "Disponuntur autem adulti ad ipsam iustitiam, dum excitati divina gratia et adiuti, *fidem ex auditu* concipientes . . . et dum, peccatores se esse intelligentes, a divinae iustitiae timore, quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad considerandam Dei misericordiam se convertendo, in *spem* eriguntur, fidentes, Deum sibi propter Christum propitium fore, illumque tanquam omnis iustitiae fontem *diligere* incipiunt ac propterea moventur adversus peccata per odium aliquod et detestationem, hoc est, per eam *poenitentiam*, quam ante baptismum agi oportet; denique dum proponunt suscipere baptismum, inchoare novam vitam et servare divina mandata" (H. Denziger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* [Fribourg: 1937], n. 798). "Si quis dixerit, sine praeviente Spiritus Sancti inspiratione atque eius adiutorio hominem *credere, sperare* et *diligere* aut *poenitere* posse, sicut oportet, ut ei iustificationis gratia conferatur: A. S." (*Ibid.*, n. 818).

¹⁶³ "Gratiae . . . infusio fit in instanti absque successione" (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 7, c.).

¹⁶⁴ "quatuor enumerantur quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii, scilicet gratiae infusio; motus liberi arbitrii in Deum per fidem; et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; et remissio culpae" (*Ibid.*, a. 6, c.).

¹⁶⁵ "Dicendum quod agens infinitae virtutis non exigit materiam, vel dispositionem materiae, quasi praesuppositam ex alterius causae actione. Sed tamen oportet quod,

must investigate further the extent to which infection of the soul with regard to original sin remains. Let us try to determine what rectification servile fear brings to our relations with God. Before studying the nature of this fear, let us note that it is the third act which man is inclined to place, that this act is inspired by the faith which the soul experiences concerning God and His mercy, and that, in its turn, this servile fear causes an act of penance and regret with regard to the sins which have separated the soul from God.

Since this fear is inspired by faith and can provoke acts of penance in the soul, it is manifestly distinct from worldly fear. The latter separates us from God, while servile fear makes us draw closer to Him:

Worldly or human fear has to do with the penalty *turning man from God*, while servile fear has to do with the penalty *drawing man to Him*.¹⁶⁶

To understand the nature of this fear, let us seek the object and causes which St. Thomas assigns to it. As in the case of wordly fear, one can distinguish two objects: the evil itself which is feared, and the reality whence this evil can come to us. The *evil which is feared* is the punishment for our sins:

If, therefore, anyone is converted to God and inheres in Him *because of the fear of punishment*, there will be servile fear.¹⁶⁷

Then, as in the case of every fear inspired *by God*, it is the consideration of His justice which makes servile fear arise:

Fear arises in us according to the consideration of His justice.¹⁶⁸

Therefore servile fear has the property of making us fear the punishments which will come from God because of our sins.

St. Thomas adds that such a fear comes to us from the Holy Spirit:

secundum conditionem rei causandae, in ipsa re causet et materiam et dispositionem debitam ad formam. Et similiter ad hoc quod Deus gratiam infundat animae, nulla praeparatio exigitur quam ipse non faciat" (*Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 2, ad 3um).

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 2, ad 4um.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, in c.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 1, ad 2um & 3um.

Servile fear is not to be enumerated among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, although it comes *from the Holy Spirit*.¹⁶⁹

The Holy Spirit is in charge of our sanctification. It is He Who, without us, takes the initiative to convert us. It is under His motion that we make an act of faith in the mystery of our redemption by Christ. Through this act of faith He reveals to us the gravity of our fault and the punishments which await us. Under His motion, we conceive the fear of being punished by God. Thanks to Him, we place the second act which makes us approach God. However, as yet the Holy Spirit does not act without resistance. This fear proceeds also from another principle which remains in the soul and vitiates the good movements which God inspires in us, that is, the love of self:

Servile fear is caused *by love of self*, because it is the fear of the punishment which is a detriment to one's own good.¹⁷⁰

The idolater who turns away from God because of love of self now approaches Him for the same reason. What one fears above all is punishment, because what one still loves above all is oneself. In this light we can see that this fear, although felt under the action of the Holy Spirit, coexists with a state of sin, with a disordered love of self:

Insofar as someone flees from punishment which is contrary to one's own natural good *as the principal evil* contrary to the good which is loved as an end. . . . That fear of punishment is not said to be servile except when it is feared as a principal evil. And thus fear as servile *does not remain with charity*.¹⁷¹

Like "worldly" fear, servile fear has to do with punishments, since it proceeds from a disordered love of self; and yet it is clearly distinct. "Worldly" fear, by inspiring us with the fear of evils which could come from created realities, had turned us away from the true God; the second (servile fear) turns us away from creatures through fear of punishment, it is

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, a. 9, c.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, a. 6, c.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

true, but the evils concerned can come from God. In this way it is an inverse movement. Now we can understand the influence of this movement on our relations with God.

The precise role of servile fear in the work of justification is to separate us from sin and make us regret sin. Thus it disposes the soul for the reception of grace as from the outside:

Servile fear is as the principle which *exteriorly disposes* one to wisdom, insofar as someone *leaves sin* because of the fear of punishment and is thereby habilitated to the effect of wisdom.¹⁷²

Even more precisely, servile fear inspires us first with the fear of sin, then with the resolution to amend, and finally with the hope that through the amendment we shall be pardoned:

The third act is the motion of servile fear, by which one *is drawn away from sins* through fear of punishment. The fourth act is the *movement of hope*, by which one makes a *purpose of amendment* under the hope of gaining pardon.¹⁷³

From these texts we can conclude that St. Thomas conceives servile fear as a movement of the soul which removes the obstacles opposing the renewal of our relations with God on our part. This time the will has regained control. It is not as yet rectified relative to God, since it still entertains a disordered love of self; but it has turned away from creatures, and now fears God. It is the will which experiences this fear. The will alone can fear God. But the disorder still remains in the soul of the idolater. One would seek in vain for the moment when these sentiments of reverence and submission to God, which the soul has felt in the recognition of its sin, appear. Reverence proceeds from love of God. Moreover, it is an annihilation of our being in the presence of God's majesty. Servile fear, on the contrary, is entirely preoccupied with self and with one's own good. Properly speaking, it is a fear of God.

Another is the fear which flees from the evil which is contrary to a created nature, that is, the *fear of pain*, and yet it flees from this *because of a spiritual cause*, namely, God. This fear is praise-

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, a. 7, c.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, III, q. 85, a. 5, c.

worthy at least insofar as it fears God. To this extent it comes *from the Holy Spirit*. But insofar as such a fear does not flee from an evil which is opposed to spiritual good, namely, sin, but only the penalty, it is not praiseworthy. It has this defect, not from the Holy Spirit, but from man's fault. . . . Whence if anyone does a good through fear of this kind, he does not do it well, because *he does not do it of his own accord, but under the coercion of the fear of punishment*. This type of action is *proper to slaves*.¹⁷⁴

We have determined the stages according to which our relations can be taken up again with God, thanks to His infinite mercy. These relations ceased temporarily with man only that they might be taken up again with greater intensity, according to God's own plans. We could doubt about this, especially with regard to our reverence for God, for the fact of His Incarnation seems to have effaced the infinite distance which separated Him from His creatures. St. Thomas, however, has another opinion. The reason he gives should help us orientate, according to their true meaning, the researches we must undertake in order to analyze very clearly the factors and nature of the new relations which God urges each of the souls He justifies to entertain in regard to Him. This is, in effect, why St. Thomas concludes that the Incarnation has contributed only to augment our reverence for God:

God did not diminish His majesty by taking on flesh. As a result, the *reason for reverence* for Him is not diminished; this reverence is increased *through the increase of knowledge about Him*. From the very fact that He wished to come to us through the assumption of flesh He has attracted us more to knowing Him.¹⁷⁵

Once again we find the argument upon which we have insisted in the course of this study: our relations with God are proportionate to what we know about Him.

What new relations of knowledge does justification grant us, so that our relations with God are radically transformed? To see this point clearly we must briefly recall the profound

¹⁷⁴ *Ad Romanos*, c. 8, lect. 3.

¹⁷⁵ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 1, a. 1, ad Sum.

changes which sanctifying grace accomplishes in us. We have already noted how this grace heals and rectifies our corrupted nature. We must now find out what super-elevation it realizes in our being. St. Thomas insists that it heals and raises our nature.¹⁷⁶ Grace raises us insofar as it makes us share in God's own nature.¹⁷⁷ This is a participation by similitude, St. Thomas adds¹⁷⁸—one which transforms our being. Once we are justified by God, we possess a supernatural being which is proportioned to the exercise of supernatural operations.¹⁷⁹ This is so true that at the end of his treatise on grace, St. Thomas in admiration confesses that the justification of one man is a work higher than the creation of heaven and earth.¹⁸⁰ Justification places the soul in immediate union with its ultimate end.¹⁸¹ Through creation, man shared in God's being; now man is, through participation, like God in nature. God's intimacy with him is that which one reserves for his friends, those whom one calls to share his life.

It will be useful to recall, too, what we indicated at the beginning of this study, namely, that if sanctifying grace makes us capable of supernatural operations, it can do this by giving us new principles of operation. Some give us the capacity to

¹⁷⁶ "homo ad recte vivendum dupliciter auxilio Dei indiget. Uno quidem modo, quantum ad aliquod habituale donum, per quod natura humana corrupta sanetur; et etiam sanata elevetur ad operanda opera meritoria vitae aeternae" (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 9, c).

¹⁷⁷ "gratia dicitur creari, ex eo quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, idest in novo esse constituuntur" (*Ibid.*, q. 110, a. 2, ad 3um).

¹⁷⁸ "necesse est quod solus Deus deificet, communicando consortium divinae naturae per quamdam similitudinis participationem" (*Ibid.*, q. 112, a. 1, c).

¹⁷⁹ "gratia dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo, divinum auxilium quo nos movet ad bene volendum et agendum; alio modo, habituale donum nobis divinitus inditum . . . Si . . . accipitur gratia pro habituali dono, sic est duplex gratiae effectus, sicut et cuiuslibet alterius formae: quorum primus est esse, secundus est operatio" (*Ibid.*, q. 111, a. 2, c).

¹⁸⁰ "Dicendum quod opus aliquod potest dici magnum dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte modi agendi. Et sic maximum est opus creationis, in quo ex nihilo fit aliquid. Alio modo potest dici opus magnum propter magnitudinem eius quod fit. Et secundum hoc, maius opus est iustificatio impii, quae terminatur ad bonum aeternum divinae participationis, quam creatio caeli et terrae, quae terminatur ad bonum naturae mutabilis" (*Ibid.*, q. 113, a. 9, c).

¹⁸¹ "Gratia . . . gratum faciens ordinat hominem immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi finis" (*Ibid.*, q. 111, a. 5, c).

think supernaturally, to think as God's adopted sons; others make it possible for us to love supernaturally. Since grace performs the function of nature, "*ad modum naturae*," the theological virtues which are infused with grace serve as potencies, "*ad modum potentiae*." The infused moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit fulfil the role of habits in the supernatural organism, "*ad modum habitus*." The justified soul is thus equipped to act on the supernatural level with principles which are analogous to those required for living a strictly human life fully. This parallelism reveals God's providential designs; St. Thomas has formulated it in an aphorism which has become famous: "Grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it."¹⁸² That is so true that grace, the supernatural virtues, and the gifts have as their subjects the very parts of the soul which they perfect. Grace inheres in the very essence of the soul; the virtues and gifts have one or other of the soul's faculties as the proper subject.¹⁸³ Having made these notations, we are now prepared to determine what new data become available with the grace of justification.

Ever since original sin, reason has remained confused concerning the true God. Once reason had demonstrated His existence, it had to admit its incapability to penetrate into His nature. However, reason could determine what He is not and what He is in relation to us. But to be justified, the soul must, in union with God, make an act of faith in the mystery of our redemption by Jesus Christ. The soul must implicitly believe in everything which God has revealed concerning His intimate life and His free and merciful initiatives in regard to man. At the moment of its justification, the soul receives the virtue of faith along with the other virtues. Faith enables the soul to adhere to what the Church proposes as authentically revealed by God.

The God which reason has presented to us as transcendent (because of His quality of being first cause), faith reveals to be three and one, our Creator, our Providence, and especially

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, q. 50, a. 2, c.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, q. 110, 3, c. & a. 4, ad 3um.

our Redeemer and Sanctifier. Faith reveals His sentiments of infinite mercy and love for man, and His plan to make men share in the intimacy of His divine life. Insofar as faith reveals God's new communications with His creature (the sharing in His life and the basis of our friendship with God), thereby bringing to human life a more perfect immanence, to the same extent we discover our incapacity to encompass God. We become more and more conscious of our disproportion to God, and of our nothingness in relation to Him.¹⁸⁴ Moreover, faith adheres properly not to purely speculative truths, but to vital truths, to the revelations of a personal being who is our sovereign Good and our proper End:

Faith is the *cause* of filial fear, by which one fears to be separated from God, or by which one flees from comparing himself with God *by showing reverence for Him*. And this insofar as through faith we have this estimation about God, namely, that He is *a certain immense and highest Good*, and that to be separated from It is *worst*, to wish to be equal to It is *evil*.¹⁸⁵

Therefore, in the light of faith, our reverence for God increases, for our souls know with greater certainty than ever that there could be no greater calamity than to wish to become God's equal or be separated from Him.

We have limited the new element of knowledge which can intensify our reverence for God. Now, since reverence always remains fear, we must disengage the transformations which the supernatural love of God causes in reverence. It is important to show, first, *how reverence reappears in the soul* at the moment of its justification.

As we have noted before, St. Thomas teaches us that at the moment of justification, two movements proceeding from each other arise in the soul: first a movement of charity, then a movement of fear which he explicitly calls reverence.¹⁸⁶ This is not surprising. For St. Thomas, in the supernatural order reverence is properly identified with a fear which he calls

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 11, c.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 7, a. 1, c.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, III, q. 85, a. 5, c.

initial, or *filial*, or *chaste*, or even *reverential* fear. (We shall see in an instant what nuances these different names contain.)

Reverence is properly initial and chaste fear.¹⁸⁷ Filial fear has two acts, namely, to have reverence for God and to fear separation.¹⁸⁸

St. Thomas establishes a distinction between initial and filial fears. Since they are essentially the same, they differ only as the imperfect differs from the perfect:

Initial fear and filial fear differ not essentially, but according to state, that is, as *imperfect to perfect*.¹⁸⁹

For St. Thomas, filial fear, chaste fear, and reverential fear are equivalent. In relation to initial fear, these denote a state of full development. Initial fear corresponds to and proceeds from imperfect charity; filial fear has the same relation to perfect charity. According to St. Thomas, our reverence consists rather in an initial fear at the beginning of conversion. Here is his detailed account of why this is so:

There is a fear which flees from the evil opposed to spiritual good, that is, sins or *separation from God*, which one fears he will incur by a just punishment on God's part. Thus, in the case of both objects, this fear has to do with a spiritual thing, and has *an eye for punishment*. This fear is said to be *initial* because it is usually in men at the beginning of their conversion, for they fear punishment because of what they have done in the past, and they fear to be separated from God through sin—and this because of the infused grace of charity.¹⁹⁰

This text furnishes all the distinctions desired. Moreover, it is important for us to note how initial fear is related to servile fear, and how the former is distinct from the latter. Both are fears about punishments which divine justice could inflict upon us for sins; but while servile fear, even in making us approach God, proceeds from a disordered love of self, initial fear presupposes that we are already adhering to God. Love of self is

¹⁸⁷ *Super Psalmos*, c. 34, fi., vers. 17.

¹⁸⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad 3um.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 8, c.

¹⁹⁰ *Ad Romanos*, c. 8, lect. 3.

still present, but this is a love of self subordinated to love of God. We fear sin lest we should be punished.¹⁹¹ In this light, at the beginning of our conversion the basic fear is lest we should be separated from the love of God and offend Him through sin. However, both fears spring from the fear of being punished. Charity is present, but in a very imperfect manner:

Initial fear is to be understood as that belonging *to the state of beginners*, in whom a certain filial fear starts to exist *through the beginning of charity*.¹⁹²

We have seen that initial fear proceeds from charity. To understand just how this happens we must recall how the natural feeling of reverence is related to our natural love for God. Inasmuch as God is the beginning and therefore the Father of every creature, we show reverence for and submission to Him, as the first expressions of our love of Him. These are natural and spontaneous attitudes which appear in the soul of every man as soon as he realizes his total dependence upon God: he is seized with the fear of daring to make himself God's equal and of being separated from Him.

However, strictly speaking, from the time of original sin, man left to his natural faculties has been incapable of loving God even through natural love, that is, of loving Him above all other things (as their principle and end).¹⁹³ Without grace man is unable to have true reverence for God. With the help of grace, in the light afforded by faith, man was called to find his true beatitude in God, to share God's own life.¹⁹⁴ God is

¹⁹¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 8, ad lum.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, in c.

¹⁹³ "homo in statu naturae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem . . . Sed in statu naturae corruptae homo ab hoc [idest a dilectione Dei quae erat sicut finis dilectionis sui ipsius et super omnia] deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei. Et ideo . . . in statu naturae corruptae indiget homo etiam ad hoc [scilicet ad diligendum Deum *naturaliter super omnia*] auxilio gratiae naturam sanantis" (*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3, c.).

¹⁹⁴ "Natura . . . diligit Deum super omnia, prout est *principium* et *finis* naturalis boni; caritas autem secundum quod est *obiectum beatitudinis*, et secundum quod homo habet quandam *societatem spiritualem* cum Deo" (*Ibid.*, ad lum.).

no longer man's Father simply because He has given him being and conserved him in being. God also has a right to this title because He has made man His adopted son by calling him to a share in the inheritance and glory of His Son by nature. As St. Thomas explains, God, in calling man to share eternally in His divine life, manifested a special love for man, that is, special in relation to the general love which God has for every creature. As a result, our relations with God now have the relations of God's own Son with Himself as their model and exemplar:

Through the love of charity God becomes *our Father*, as we learn in the Epistle to the Romans, VIII, 15: "you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)." ¹⁹⁵

It is easy to see that the revelation of being the object of such a love on God's part can only intensify our fear of being separated from Him. This happens even though at the beginning of our conversion the fear of the punishments which this separation would merit for us still remains. At the same time, the revelation of such a love can only intensify our reverence for and submission to God by throwing new light upon God's unheard-of beneficence and the infinite excellence of His Being. As St. Thomas noted above, man then realizes God's majesty and goodness so much that he judges that:

to wish *to be separated* from Him is worst, and to wish *to equal oneself* to Him is evil.¹⁹⁶

This is an intensification which is a super-elevation of the natural movements of the soul. Reverence which in the natural order was a spontaneous sentiment of man's nature is raised to the level of a gift in the supernatural order. God infuses it with grace, after the manner of an habitual and permanent disposition which serves the demands of our charity. For St. Thomas, reverential fear is inspired by the Holy Spirit. It constitutes the gift of fear in us:

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 2, ad 3um.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 7, a. 1, c.

The fear of God which is enumerated among the seven gifts is filial or chaste fear.¹⁹⁷

We know already that initial fear and filial fear are essentially the same. Let us add that for St. Thomas reverence is properly the act of the gift of fear:

To have reverence for God is an act of the gift of fear.¹⁹⁸

The gift of fear sounds out great excellence inasmuch as it implies reverence for God.¹⁹⁹

Filial fear has two acts, namely, to have reverence for God and to fear separation.²⁰⁰

Inspired by the Holy Spirit Himself, proceeding from the light of our faith and from the fervor of our nascent charity, our reverence for God dictates the attitudes required in our new relations with God. To understand what St. Thomas has to say on this matter, it is important to recall how we have related reverence with filial fear if we are to transpose this to the supernatural level. St. Thomas has told us that we could not respond to God's benefits through love without first having placed diverse acts of justice towards Him. These acts are demanded by the very inequality between ourselves as creatures and Him as Creator. By making us share in the divine nature grace removes the infinite distance which separated us from Him. In fact we know that although our relations with God have become more intimate through redemption, by associating us with the mystery of His life, they have only made us penetrate further into His infinite transcendence and inaccessibility. The more we succeed in knowing Him, the more we are convinced of the fundamental incapacity of every creature to encompass God completely. Whatever the enrichments of His mercy, there will always exist between God and ourselves the abyss between the one who is by essence and everything which is by participation. We remain creatures in every order and on every level.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 9, c.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 81, a. 2, ad 1um.

¹⁹⁹ *III Sent.*, d. XXXIV, q. 1, a. 2, ad 7um.

²⁰⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2um.

In this light one can understand that from the very beginning charity is expressed and translated into a instinctive movement of recoil and retreat. Reverence is purely and simply fear. Moreover, upon the fear of making ourselves God's equals, and thus of being separated from Him, there follows and appears as due a protestation of our submission. The first act, prerequisite to the love to which God urges His adoptive sons to respond, is to submit oneself to Him. St. Thomas explains this very clearly:

The relation of the slave to his master is through the power of the master, who subjects the slave to himself; but the relation of the son to the father is, on the contrary, *through the affection of the son, who subjects himself to his father*. . . .²⁰¹

The Angelic Doctor adds that to explicitate and translate the profound sentiments with which God's majesty and singular excellence inspire us in its diverse manifestations belongs to the infused virtue of religion:

To do *certain things* through divine reverence pertains to religion.²⁰²

To *have* reverence, as such, is an act of the gift of fear; but to *show* reverence, as *something due to God*, pertains properly to latria.²⁰³

Many things in these texts are worthy of note. Religion is a moral virtue, a potential part of justice, clearly distinct from the reverence which inspires and animates it. Its role is to order the interior and exterior acts which are most proper for the manifestation of our reverence for God according to His due. Thus, for St. Thomas, reverence is truly the source which gives the true life to our religion:

There is a *first motive* for honoring, that is, insofar as one honors another *from the reverence* which he has for him.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 2, ad 3um.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, q. 81, a. 2, ad 1um.

²⁰³ *III Sent.*, d. IX, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 3um.

²⁰⁴ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 103, a. 1, ad 1um.

Filial fear is as a *certain principle* of all those things which are observed in reverence for God.²⁰⁵

Reverence is both the principle of religion and its *crown and end*. In this light, an act of religion consists in trying to extend the respect for God which should always accompany the realization of His infinite perfection:

All exterior cult to God is *especially* ordained that man may hold *God in reverence*.²⁰⁶

It is man's *end*, that is, insofar as someone is honored in order that he may be held in *reverence* by others.²⁰⁷

The act of the virtue of religion which most properly expresses our entire submission is undoubtedly the *act of devotion*. As the first and principal act of the virtue of religion, it is an application of the will to God's service and honor. In this way we show the homage of our whole being to God.²⁰⁸ This act holds the soul in a state of fervor and promptness to accomplish everything which is due to God's honor.²⁰⁹ One can imagine the extent to which our charity and reverence for God find their fulfillment in the exercise of the virtue of religion.

The reverence which we have for God becomes efficacious through the virtue of religion. Through this virtue we succeed in expressing to God our response to His excellence, and by it we assure Him of our total submission. However, as long as charity remains imperfect, the love of self still lives in us, always ready to vitiate even our purest sentiments. According to St. Thomas, reverence is a movement of recoil which gathers us into our own smallness. Thus St. Thomas attributes to reverence not only the function of inspiring us with the most deferential submission to God, but also of keeping us in

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 22, a. 2, c.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 102, a. 4, c.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 103, a. 1, al 1^{um}.

²⁰⁸ "devotio nihil aliud esse videtur quam voluntas quaedam prompte tradendi se ad ea quae pertinent ad Dei famulatum [servitium]" (*Ibid.*, q. 82, a. 1, c.).

²⁰⁹ "devotio est quidam voluntatis actus ad hoc homo prompte se tradat ad divinum obsequium" (*Ibid.*, a. 3, c.).

our place before Him. From this we can see the very close connection of reverence with *humility*. This latter, a moral virtue insofar as it is a part of temperance, has the proper function of moderating and rectifying every unruly movement of pride, which is nothing other than an *immoderate desire for one's own excellence*.²¹⁰ St. Thomas goes so far as to say that humility proceeds from reverence for God:

Humility properly concerns the reverence by which man is subject to God.²¹¹

Humility is caused by divine reverence.²¹²

Here is the explanation which he gives for this statement:

Humility essentially consists *in the appetite*, insofar as one restrains the impetus of his mind, lest he should tend towards great things inordinately; but it has its rule *in knowledge*, namely, that one may not judge himself to be greater than what he is. *The principle and the root of each* is the reverence which one has for God.²¹³

This explanation advances two ideas. The first is that humility proceeds from the same realization of neediness and creaturehood as that which had inspired us with the fear of daring to make ourselves God's equals. More immediately it proceeds from the very fear which incites us to moderate our every desire for sufficiency and for the declaration of our own excellence. By relating humility to reverence in this manner, St. Thomas only manifests in the case of one of its potential parts the dependence which he has declared in the first article in the treatise on the virtue of temperance in relation to the gift of fear.²¹⁴ In this light, it is from one inspiration, from one filial and reverential fear of God, that the twofold complementary movement of the soul proceeds, holding itself in effacement before God through humility, and applying itself fervently to serve Him through devotion.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 84, a. 2, c.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 161, a. 3, c.

²¹² *Ibid.*, a. 4, ad lum.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, a. 6, c.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 141, a. 1, ad 3um.

Full development of our relations with the divine

With regard to this subject two questions arise: First, what happens to reverence for God in a soul which grows in charity? Second, does this reverence remain in the souls of the elect? At the same time we advance the problems of the possibility of a development in reverence, of the nature of this development, and of the factors which will most properly assure it.

We have just seen that the infusion of grace is accompanied by the rectification and intensification of our natural tendencies. However, the soul is not constituted in perfection simply by this fact. In St. Thomas' own words, "the healing which grace brings to the wounds incurred through original sin is only begun in the mind, and is not as yet consummated in the flesh."²¹⁵ Concupiscence remains in man in the state of grace.²¹⁶ As yet it is with difficulty that the intellect finds the good to be done; the will experiences languor in its attempts to pursue what is presented to it as its true good.²¹⁷ Charity is that of a beginner still preoccupied with self. As St. Thomas says, it "thinks" less of progressing in love for God than of avoiding sin and resisting the bad desires of the flesh.²¹⁸ Briefly such are the conditions and obstacles which prevent our reverence from developing. Now we have to see how these obstacles

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 10, ad 3um.

²¹⁶ "[Damnatio] debita peccato originali . . . aufertur per gratiam Iesu Christi, quamvis maneat concupiscentiae fomes" (*Ibid.*, q. 89, a. 5, ad 1um). Cf. also *ibid.*, ad 2um.

²¹⁷ "Quae [humana natura] licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem . . . Remanet etiam quaedam ignorantiae obscuritas in intellectu . . . Propter varios enim rerum eventus, et quia etiam nos ipsos non perfecte cognoscimus, non possumus ad plenum scire quid nobis expediat" (*Ibid.*, q. 109, a. 9, c).

²¹⁸ "primo . . . incumbit homini studium principale ad recedendum a peccato et resistendum concupiscentiis eius, quae in contrarium caritatis movent. Et hoc pertinet ad incipientes, in quibus caritas est nutrienda vel fovenda ne corrumpatur" (and this in contradistinction to the degrees of charity belonging to those who are advancing or perfect in charity. Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 9, c). "Primus . . . effectus caritatis est ut homo a peccato discedat; et ideo mens caritatem habentis in primis circa hoc maxime occupatur ut a peccatis praeteritis emundetur, et a futuris praecaveat; et quantum ad hunc affectum dicitur caritas incipiens" (*III Sent.*, d. XXIX, q. 1, a. 8, sol. 1).

can be eliminated one by one, as our relation of friendship with God is increased and intensified.

First, recall certain fundamental points of St. Thomas' theology which concern the increase of our spiritual life. They are indispensable to an understanding of texts in which he determines how our reverence can be developed here on earth. The first of these principles is that our spiritual life consists principally in the exercise of the theological virtues, which place us in immediate contact with God.²¹⁹ In this light, our spiritual life will be intensified according to the growth of charity, faith, and hope. The same can be said about that reverence which proceeds from faith and charity and is the perfection of hope.

The second principle—an extension and explicitation of the first—is that as the theological virtues increase, so the influence of the gifts, which at the beginning of conversion is felt only latently and intermittently, becomes more manifest and insistent.²²⁰ This occurs because the gifts are connected in charity. They are ordained to charity as well as to the perfection of the other two theological virtues. On the contrary, the infused moral virtues are ordered to the gifts which perfect them. When charity and faith increase, the gift of fear has a greater influence in the spiritual life. At the same time the gift makes the infused moral virtues which it perfects increase. St. Thomas explains in detail how these different factors influence one another and contribute to the full development of reverence for God.

If our fear of God endures and increases with growth in charity, this fear must be transformed. At the beginning of conversion to God, this fear is still mixed with the preoccupation about one's own good. That is why something of the servile remains—fear which the soul experiences before its conversion, that is, the fear of punishment from God. However,

²¹⁹ "Caritas . . . est quae unit nos Deo, qui est ultimus finis humanae mentis . . . Et ideo secundum caritatem specialiter attenditur perfectio christianae vitae" (*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 1, c.).

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 66, a. 2, c.; and q. 68, a. 5, c.

as love for God intensifies, its imperfections disappear gradually. The first of these is the fear of punishment—and that for two motives:

The fear of punishment is diminished as charity increases, especially with regard to the act, for the more one loves God, the less one fears punishment: first, because *one is less attentive about one's own good*, to which pain is contrary; second, because *as one inheres more firmly one is more confident about one's reward*, and, as a result, one has less fear about punishment.²²¹

By centering our attention upon God, charity eliminates all egoism and makes us seek our wellbeing only from God. Moreover, all the remnants of presumption disappear along with the fear of punishment:

The fear of punishment is what diminishes *as hope increases*.²²²

In repressing *the presumption of hope*, the principal reason is taken from *divine reverence*, by which it happens that man attributes to himself nothing other than what belongs to him according to the grade which he has obtained from God.²²³

However, when hope increases, *filial fear* increases; for to the extent that one more certainly looks for the possession of some good through another's help, one will fear to *offend him or be separated from him*.²²⁴

With the disappearance of presumption, hope and that filial fear which is its own perfection increase. According to St. Thomas, the gift of fear is principally ordered to the perfection of the theological virtue of hope.²²⁵ As filial fear appears in the soul, a positive effect follows upon the intensification of love for God. St. Thomas characterizes it in this way:

Under both considerations filial fear has an eye only for a spiritual thing, for it fears nothing *except to be separated from God*; and this fear is holy, remaining forever. However, just as initial fear is caused by imperfect charity, so this fear is caused *by perfect charity*. "Perfect charity casteth out fear" (I John, iv, 18). And thus initial

²²¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 10, c.

²²² *Ibid.*, ad 2um.

²²³ *Ibid.*, q. 161, a. 2, ad 3um.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 10, ad 2um.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 141, a. 1, ad 3um.

fear and chaste fear are not distinct from the love of charity, which is the *cause of both*, but only the fear of punishment. For just as the latter fear makes for slavery, so the love of charity makes for the liberty of children. For it makes man operate for God's honor *voluntarily*, and *this is proper to children*.²²⁶

In filial fear there are no longer traces of the fear of punishment. The soul now loves itself only in God and for God alone. However, it must be noted that here it is a matter only of a relative perfection which is ever susceptible of increase. Moreover, St. Thomas foresees that filial fear can be intensified proportionately to the augmentation of charity:

It is necessary that filial fear increase when charity increases, just as the effect increases when the cause increases; for the more someone loves another, the more he fears to offend the latter and to be separated from him.²²⁷

In what do these ultimate purifications of our reverential fear of God consist? They consist in a definitive elimination of every presumption to make oneself God's equal, and in a more and more total submission to Him. St. Thomas explains this in the following passage, in which he again insists upon the two essential aspects of reverence: the fear of making oneself God's equal and the fear of being separated from Him:

Filial fear does not imply separation but rather *subjection to God*, since it flees from separation by subjection to Him. However, in a certain way it implies separation, that is, insofar as [the person having filial fear] *does not presume to make himself His equal*, but subjects himself to Him. This separation is found also in charity, insofar as he loves God more than himself and all other things. Thus when the love of charity is augmented, *it does not diminish, but rather increases the reverence of fear*.²²⁸

In effect, the proper role of the gift of fear lies in inspiring and developing reverence and submission to God. This role is fundamental in our spiritual life, for it is a fulfilment of the

²²⁶ *Ad Romanos*, c. 8, lect. 3.

²²⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 10, c.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 3um.

first demands of our love for God. Moreover, that is why St. Thomas is of the opinion that the gift of fear is the first to develop in the Christian soul. The Christian can perceive the manifest influence of this gift, before that of any of the other gifts, in his life.

In order that anything may be well moved by some mover, it is *first* required that the movable thing *be subject to the mover*, not repugnant; for the movement is impeded by the repugnance of the movable thing to the mover. This is the effect of filial or chaste fear, insofar as *through it we venerate God and flee from withdrawing ourselves from Him*. Thus filial fear holds as it were the *first place* in ascending among the gifts of the Holy Spirit.²²⁹

Although it is the first gift to manifest the growth of our charity, we must not conclude from this that its action is transitory in the progressive development of the soul's interior life. Nor should we conclude that, as the influence of the other gifts becomes more frequent, the gift of fear is gradually replaced by them until a point is reached at which the soul will have attained a sufficient degree of perfection, whereupon this gift will disappear completely. St. Thomas has a quite opposite opinion. The role of reverence is so fundamental in the spiritual life that it is inseparable from this life. In fact, the degree of our love for God can be estimated by the reverence which we have for Him. Too, one cannot conceive of the development of a spiritual life here on earth without the concomitant development of our reverence for God. St. Thomas loses no opportunity to insist upon this point. He is particularly explicit on this matter when he takes up the question of whether one can receive the sacrament of the Eucharist daily. Yes, he answers, if on every morning one feels more reverence for God; for the true sign that one is developing further intimacy with God and that one experiences more love for Him lies in the fact that instead of ceding to familiarity we have the greatest respect for Him.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, a. 9, c.

In this sacrament two things are demanded on the part of the recipient: namely, the *desire for union* with Christ, and this is the effect of love; and *reverence for the sacrament*—this pertains to the gift of fear. Now the first incites one to receive this sacrament daily, but the second holds one back. Thus, if anyone knows from experience that the fervor of love is increased from daily reception, and that *his reverence is not lessened*, he should receive communion daily. However, if he notices that his reverence is lessened through daily reception, and that his fervor is not increased very much, he should stay away from receiving at times, in order that afterwards he may approach *with greater reverence* and devotion.²³⁰

In this light our reverence develops to the extent to which our faith, hope, and charity increase—especially our hope, since reverence is the perfection of hope, and our charity, since reverence is the first thing demanded by charity. Because all the gifts and the infused virtues are connected with one another in charity, as our charity increases each gift and virtue grows in perfection too, and contributes to the perfection of the others. Moreover, we can conclude that in the manner proper to each, the gifts and infused virtues all concur for the development of reverence for God. However, since this reverence is ordered to the perfection of the theological virtues, it especially receives its own perfection from what is more specially and more immediately ordained to it. This special factor is the next element for consideration.

It is not surprising to see that St. Thomas assigns to the virtue of religion the function of satisfying the demands of our reverence for God. In this way he makes religion the crowning perfection of this reverence. In fact, the more we realize the absolutely singular excellence of God, the more prompt and faithful we become in giving to God all the homages due to Him. There it is a case of mutual causality. Reverence cannot be perfected without the growth of religion; nor can the latter be intensified without the development of the former. One thing remains to be explained. Although St. Thomas has often repeated that the gift of fear is the beginning and end

²³⁰ *IV Sent.*, d. XII, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 2.

of our religion—the soul which gives religion its life and true meaning—nevertheless, he states that it is the gift of piety which properly corresponds to the virtue of religion.²³¹ Moreover, in the first reading of his texts, it is difficult to see how the gift of piety is clearly distinct from either reverence or the gift of fear. The act proper to the gift of piety is, according to him, to have reverence for God by a filial sentiment:

The principal act of the gift of piety is *to have reverence for God by filial affection*.²³²

Too, we know how St. Thomas has insisted upon the filial character of our reverence. For him filial fear and reverential fear are only one. From this arise two problems, one consequent upon the other. The first consists in discovering how piety is really distinct from reverence. The second lies in seeing, if they are distinct, how they influence each other and how they can complement each other.

First, in what are they distinct? The gift of fear and the gift of piety are principles of contrary movements. As we have noted before, for St. Thomas reverential fear is a movement of retreat. One would like to annihilate himself in the presence of God's majesty. The movement of piety is, on the contrary, something positive. One has only to confront the various passages in which this gift is treated to be convinced of this. In St. Thomas' thought, the gift of piety is properly an affection. In his commentary on the "Our Father" (a work considered by Father Mandonnet to be authentic), St. Thomas is most explicit on the matter. This is how he characterizes piety and distinguishes it from reverence:

The Holy Spirit makes us rightly love, desire, and seek, and first produces in us *fear*, through which we seek that God's name be sanctified. Another gift, the *gift of piety*, is properly piety, a *sweet and devout affection* for the Father, for every man constituted in misery. Since, therefore, God is our Father, as is evident, not only should we *revere and fear Him*, but too we should have a *sweet and pious affection for Him*.²³³

²³¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 121, a. 1, ad 2um.

²³² *Ibid.*, ad 3um.

²³³ *In Orat. Dom.*, opusc. 34, 2a petitio.

We must remember that for St. Thomas, while all the infused virtues and gifts proceed from charity, certain gifts or virtues are in closer connection with charity than others. It is through them that charity imperates and informs the activity of the other virtues and gifts. It is in this sense that the gift of piety is distinct from the gift of fear; for the gift of piety proceeds from the gift of science, while the gift of fear has a very special connection with the gift of wisdom. Reverential fear is the first manifestation of the influence of the gift of wisdom in our souls:

Chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as *the first effect of wisdom*. Since it pertains to wisdom to regulate human life according to divine reasons, in order to start, man must have reverence for God and submit himself to Him. It follows that in all things he will be regulated according to God.²³⁴

Through the gift of wisdom our charity experiences, as it were, the sovereign excellence of God and thereby tends to feel reverence for Him ever more vividly. The gift of science, on the contrary, gives us a supernatural appreciation not so much of God's inaccessible grandeur as of His benefits and the innumerable gifts with which He has enriched us. The submission which we protest because of His beneficence is transformed into a more fervent and filial adherence to His wishes under the influence of the gift of science.²³⁵ Here again one finds the same fundamental tendencies of the soul in its relations with God—the tendencies which appear as soon as the soul is conscious of the fact that God is its principle: reverence towards His excellence and submission to His beneficence.

The gift of piety is the perfect state of our sentiment of tenderness; the gift of fear is the perfect state of our sentiment of reverence. They are distinct in this. However, both are instruments in the hands of the same Spirit of love. Nor is it surprising to see them as mutually complementary. If we remember what has already been said about filial piety, we must conclude that the notion of piety includes in a certain way

²³⁴ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 7, c. ²³⁵ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 68, a. 7, ad 4um.

the notion of reverence. In the relation of son to father, there must exist not only reverence and submission, but also love; for in fact reverence and submission are only the manifestation of a very deep love which is very conscious of its debts to the beloved. Too, it is expressed first by acts of justice. Love informs the attitudes of the soul which are imposed in the relations of a son with his father, to whom he owes all. Therefore, love is a principle of our reverence and submission; it is also their end. Piety adds something over and above, the proper tonality which the relations of every son with his father should preserve: a confident spontaneity. Without piety, reverential fear is in danger of giving to submission a character of slavery, especially in our relations with God; reverential fear should be rather the fervent response to an immense love. In this light the gift of piety contributes to the perfection of reverence. This gift succeeds in transforming reverence into a filial attitude under the movement of an ever more intense charity and in the light afforded by the gift of science. Thus the gift of piety presupposes reverence in order to make it more in conformity with the love of God which urges us; the gift of piety makes our souls able to "revere God in a filial sentiment."

Reverence here on earth, like charity, can increase and be perfected. There is no possibility of a definitive development for reverence. However great its perfection may be, it remains unstable. To the fear of making oneself God's equal is added the very justifiable fear of being separated from God (and this because of the weakness of our nature). However, will the soul still experience reverence for God once it is beatified, that is, once it possesses its Good definitively?

St. Thomas' teaching on this matter is clearly established and in perfect conformity with his conception of reverence:

Filial fear is in the blessed, *with regard to the act of revering God*, but not to the act of fearing separation from God.²³⁶

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 67, a. 4, ad 2um.

Evidently the fear of being separated from God is no longer possible. That reverence remains and that we still experience fear even in heaven seems at first sight to be repugnant. It seems to be incompatible with our usual manner of conceiving eternal beatitude. However, St. Thomas is of a contrary opinion. He even maintains that in heaven our reverence will be in its perfect state:

Just as filial fear is increased when charity is augmented, so when charity is perfect, this fear *will be perfected*. Thus in the fatherland it will not have the same act as it has now.²³⁷

However, St. Thomas warns us that when our reverence is perfect it will not issue in the same act under all aspects. St. Augustine, whose conclusions on this question St. Thomas adopts, qualifies the reverence which we shall experience in heaven with the expression "secure fear."²³⁸ Whence comes this perfection, this security? Undoubtedly it comes from charity which definitively possesses God, thus excluding every possibility of being separated from God. The fear which was previously an integral part of our reverence resulted rather from its subjective conditions of existence. In heaven reverence will be perfect because we shall judge all things in the light of glory. Faith has dissipated many confusions about God; from the moment that we received faith, our reverence was rectified and intensified. However, there are still obscurities which even the illuminations of the gifts of wisdom, science, and understanding do not succeed in removing completely. In heaven, on the contrary, we shall no longer see God as "in a mirror" or "through a veil," but face to face, just as He is. In this light, everything will take on its true proportions, God will appear to us in all His transcendence. We, on our part, shall realize how much we depend upon Him. We shall forever experience reverential fear for God because we shall always remain creatures:

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 11, c.

²³⁸ St. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book 14, chap. 9.

Hope implies a certain defect, namely, the absence of beatitude; this absence is taken away through the presence of the same. But fear implies *the natural defect of the creature*, inasmuch as he is infinitely distant from God; and this *will remain even in the fatherland*.²³⁹

This clear consciousness of our creaturehood will then be accompanied with the certainty that God will always be the fundamentally inaccessible One Whom it is impossible to equal. This further realization will keep us "collected in our own smallness," with a great sensitivity about the things required in order to be divine:

Properly speaking, fear has evil for its object: not any evil, but *evil constituted as arduous*. Otherwise fear would not be in the irascible appetite. We do not, however, fear an evil which can be easily overcome or avoided; we only hate it. But the evil of separation from God is constituted *as most arduous*. Therefore, when the possibility of the evil is taken away, the operation of man to God *will remain as to something arduous*. In this light, fear will be taken away as to the act which consists in fearing separation, but it will remain as to the act which consists in admiring or *revering that arduous object*. This latter happens when man *leaps down into his own smallness* because he has considered such heights.²⁴⁰

In heaven our reverence will consist only in the "flight from adequation to God," which we have recognized to be the most proper and most characteristic element of reverence.

Christ serves to illustrate this teaching of St. Thomas most exhaustively. This is how the Angelic Doctor resolves the problem of knowing whether Christ's own soul possessed the gift of fear:

The fear of God was in Christ, certainly not as regards the *evil of separation* from God through fault, nor even as regards the *evil of punishment* because of a fault, but insofar as this fear has to do with divine eminence, that is, as Christ's soul was moved to God by the Holy Spirit, with a certain *affection of reverence*.²⁴¹

²³⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 19, a. 11, ad Sum.

²⁴⁰ *III Sent.*, d. XXXIV, q. 2, a. 3, quæst. 4, sol. 4.

²⁴¹ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 7, a. 6, c.

Christ's soul enjoyed the beatific vision even on earth. In this way it was in the state of the blessed. Thus, just as in the case of the blessed, there could be no fear of any separation from God whatsoever. Yet, His human soul was seized continually with an intense reverence for God. In His case, reverence was in the pure, exemplary state. Never will anyone else feel as He felt the reverential shudder, the flutter of a creature before its Creator, the feeling of total deficiency in the presence of Him Who is Being by essence:

Christ, as Man, has this affection of reverence for God *more fully than anyone else*.²⁴²

CONCLUSIONS

With our researches ended, the exact value and the proper merit of Mr. Otto's conceptions, as well as their lacunae and insufficiencies, can now be appreciated more justly. Moreover, as a conclusion to this study, we would like to bring a general judgment or to synthesize a number of parallels between his doctrine and that of St. Thomas, that is, the parallels which we have established at each step in this work. This judgment on the whole will therefore suppose and will be referred to the partial points of view upon which we have already compared these two conceptions. However, it would be well, too, to discern the constants proper to each doctrine, which these diverse parallels point out as one compares one parallel with another. In this way we shall set off the fundamental points of view in which these two conceptions agree or differ.

The first encounter with Mr. Otto for anyone who is somewhat familiar with St. Thomas is sympathetic (we have pointed out this fact before). Mr. Otto's terminology is full of recollections. Moreover, his terminology invites many reconciliations with Catholic doctrine to which we are strongly tempted to accede—and this because we are so happy to find even in the first pages of Mr. Otto's book the very profound meaning

²⁴² *Ibid.*

of God's mystery, to which St. Thomas has habituated us. On this point we can only agree with Mr. Otto. He is right in reacting against a certain self-sufficient conceptualism which makes us lose the consciousness of our incapacity to attain God as He is. It is true, also, that under this influence the religion of so many persons has been gradually rationalized, so much so that it has been transformed into a merely speculative adherence to a certain conception of God. Religion should consist in more and more intimate relations with a personal Being, Who is everything for us.

However, Mr. Otto has fallen into contrary excesses. Through reaction against anthropomorphism he has turned to an agnostic symbolism; then, to avoid the dangers of an exaggerated rationalism, he has ended up in an exclusive sentimentalism which is very deceiving. Respect for the mystery about God does not imply, as he thinks, that we must renounce knowing and attaining God in any way other than by sentiments which we feel when we come into contact with this mystery. We have already shown how much subjectivism is included in such a conception of our relations with God. Mr. Otto's different positions are commanded by a false theology on faith.

Faith is not a more precise philosophy about God, or, as he says, a more skillful conceptualization of God. It is true that faith brings us new lights on God and in this way serves to satisfy much of the intellectual curiosity which existed before faith came along. But essentially faith is unsatisfied knowledge. Faith is always in the process of going deeper into its data and always awaiting a truly comprehensive vision of its object. Therefore, it is naturally humble and very conscious of its limits and imperfections. It has no pretension of understanding God or of exhausting the infinite richness of His nature. Mr. Otto's reproach has no bearing upon us. He does not speak to us when he states rightly "that a God Who is understood is not a God." He is mistaken because the true nature of faith has escaped him. Faith is more than adherence to dogmatic formulae; through these formulae it attains God

as He is, in His very individuality. Faith is more than an assent to truths of a strictly speculative order, for it is the response of our whole being to the advances of a personal Being Who reveals Himself as our end and life. Moreover, it is in the light of faith that our relations with God originate, and it is in conformity with these relations that our lives are modeled and our attitudes towards Him are regulated. The act of believing has the selfsame reality for its object and its end: God in all the ineffability of His Being. Faith is a participation in the knowledge which God has concerning Himself and is thus a sharing in God's own life. It is evident, then, that no one can penetrate more deeply into the mystery of God, no one can be more conscious of His infinite transcendence than the believer by means of his faith. In this there is nothing which resembles, as Mr. Otto would have it, a form of theism in which the quality of the religion in a soul would be proportionate to the depth and penetration of its natural speculations about God. History has sufficiently pointed out that no religion is born or developed in dependence upon a philosophy. The contrary rather seems true.

Let us note finally that, even in the natural order, St. Thomas shows the relation of reverence not to the intellectual progress in knowing God, but to the consciousness of *what God is for us*. It is a matter of very practical truth and a sort of personal experience of our contingency and our absolute dependence upon God. This conscious realization is possible for every soul—so much so that the movements of reverence and submission which arise from this realization are considered by St. Thomas to be natural and quite spontaneous on our part, “by a certain natural instinct.” Thus in both the natural and supernatural orders, our relations with God, according to St. Thomas, depend upon what we know about Him. These relations depend, not upon our speculative knowledge of God, but, if we accept the expression as he himself understood it, upon our practical knowledge about Him, that is, upon the conformity of what we know about God with the demands for the

wellbeing of a right appetite. Mr. Otto's great error comes from ignoring the part of the will, which is essentially inherent to every act of faith.

Another fundamental error of Mr. Otto's teaching (one which seems to be a logical consequence of the preceding error) consists in not having made our relations with God begin in love. For St. Thomas, reverence and submission are the first, spontaneous manifestations of a movement back to God, as soon as one realizes His unheard-of beneficence. Too, for St. Thomas, the initiative of our relations with God belongs to Him. He is the first to love us, by making a gift of being, then of grace. That is why St. Thomas quite naturally shows the relation of the fear which we experience in the presence of God's infinite excellence to the love which we feel for Him. If this fear is the first manifestation of this love and is accentuated as we love Him more, that is due, according to him, to the exceptional nature of our relations with God. One cannot conceive conditions more unequal than between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless, for St. Thomas, our relations with God are relations of friendship. If the fear always remains and tends to be intensified along with love, this is because fear is one of the characteristics proper to our love for God. Since man always remains a creature, the more he loves God, the more he shudders at the thought of consenting to try to become His equal. However, because reverence proceeds from a love of friendship in regard to God, it is a fear opened out upon God. Although reverence consists in a movement of retreat, it is, in fact, only an annihilation of ourselves in the presence of God's infinite majesty. It is evident that St. Thomas is logical with himself in making reverence proceed both from a practical knowledge about God and from a love of friendship for Him. From the very act of faith, revealing to us God's transcendence and beneficence, our wills are engaged and bound with Him through love.

Mr. Otto has quite a different theory. God inspires us with fright, then little by little He fascinates us. First God makes

us afraid, then He attracts us. Here fear precedes love or rather evolves into love. Fear seems hardly to be, as with St. Thomas, the respectful expression of love. Moreover, can this fear about God, this terror which we feel as we approach Him, be identified with what St. Thomas calls reverence? A fear which excludes the love for God at this point proceeds rather from a very pronounced love of self. The fearful man thinks only of himself. St. Thomas would identify this fear rather with servile fear. He would undoubtedly consider it to be a passion of the strictly sensible order, depending upon an imaginative conception of God. Whatever Mr. Otto may say, no object has any control over our affections without first having been known and appreciated as being good or bad for us. In wishing to eliminate every rational factor in our relations with God, Mr. Otto would have to admit the dictates of our sensitive faculties of knowing, especially imagination. However, in this light one can no longer see how a religion can be elaborated from the data of the imagination concerning God, how it can be proposed as the achieved model. Thus, in wishing to find the meaning of the mystery about God beyond all knowledge, and wishing to take only affectivity as a guide, Mr. Otto unwittingly fails to go beyond the level of the senses. He is quite confident that our sensibility alone can attain what our reason cannot, that is, our sensibility can succeed in seizing God in the ineffable reality of His Being.

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THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

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CHAPTER VI *

The Gifts of Piety, Fortitude, and Fear

1. The Gifts of Piety, Fortitude, and Fear are found in the appetitive part of the soul, and they are related to the cardinal virtues. Just as the Gift of Counsel corresponds to the virtue of

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OUTLINE OF CHAPTER VI

The Gifts of Piety, Fortitude, and Fear (1)

I. THE GIFT OF PIETY

- A. The difference between Piety and Fear (2)
- B. The opinions on the difference between the virtue of Religion and the Gift of Piety (3 and 4)
 - 1. The first explanation (5)
 - 2. Refutation of the first explanation (6)
 - 3. Criticism of another explanation (7)
 - 4. Appraisal of a third explanation (8)
 - 5. The final refutation of these explanations (9)
- C. The doctrine of St. Thomas on the distinction between the virtue of Religion and the Gift of Piety
 - 1. On the virtue of Religion (10)
 - 2. On the Gift of Piety (11)
 - a) Corroborated by Scriptural texts (12)
 - b) Corroborated by St. Bernard (13)
 - 3. Conclusion on the formal aspect of Piety (14)
- D. The object of Piety (15)
 - 1. Relative to reverence for Scripture and the Saints (16)
 - 2. Relative to matters of justice (17)
 - 3. Relative to God as Father of men through grace (18)
 - a) Fulfilling the true notion of Piety (19)
 - b) In its full extent (20)
- E. An objection (21)
 - 1. Confirmed (22)

Prudence, so the Gift of Piety is related to the virtue of Religion and the whole matter of justice in the will. The Gift of Fortitude is related to the virtue of the same name in the irascible appetite. The Gift of Fear has its counterpart in the virtue of Temperance, since from fear of God a man is withheld from carnal concupiscence—*Pierce my flesh with Thy fear for I am afraid of Thy judgment.*¹ Fear also bears a relation to the virtue of Hope, since it is essentially and primarily directed to a reverence for God and

2. Refuted

- a) In itself (23, 24 and 25)
- b) In its confirmation (26 and 27)

II. THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (28)

A. Its formal aspect (29)

- 1. The general notion of Fortitude (30)
- 2. The difference between the Gift and the Virtue (31)
 - a) An objection (32, 33 and 34)
 - b) Reply (35, 36, 37, 38 and 39)

B. Its material aspect

- 1. The opinion of some theologians (40)
- 2. The doctrine of St. Thomas (41)
 - a) *A priori* proof (42)
 - b) *A posteriori* proof (43)
- 3. A corollary on the Gift of Fortitude and the Gift of Perseverance (44)

III. THE GIFT OF FEAR

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- 1. Its relationship with Hope and Temperance (45)
- 2. The kinds of Fear (46)
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- 4. The formal distinction between Fear, Temperance and Humility (48)

B. Its material aspect

- 1. The objects of Fear (49)
- 2. The first objection (50)
- 3. The reply to the first objection (51 and 52)
- 4. The second objection (53 and 54)
 - a) Explanation of Suarez (55)
 - b) Refutation of the Suarezian explanation (56, 57 and 58)
- 5. Teaching of St. Thomas relative to the second objection
 - a) Concerning the first effect of the Gift of Fear (59)
 - b) Concerning the second effect of the Gift of Fear (60)
 - c) Summary of teaching on both effects (61)

¹ *Psalm cxviii*, 120.

an avoidance of offense against Him as well as the repression of presumption opposed to Hope. According to St. Thomas ²: "The Gift of Fear has God for its principal object, for it avoids offending Him, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of Hope, as stated above.³ However, it may have as its secondary object anything a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now a man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore, the Gift of Fear corresponds to temperance also."

Concerning each of these gifts two things must be explained:

a) their essence, by which they are distinguished from the corresponding moral and infused virtues, and

b) their objects, or matter, to which each of these Gifts extends.

The Gift of Piety

2. Although in Isaias the Gift of Fortitude, subordinate to the Gift of Counsel, precedes Piety, itself subordinate to Knowledge, the present treatise will not follow that order. Religion and justice, with which Piety is concerned, have greater nobility than the object matter of fortitude, for Religion and justice are in the will.

It is true that some do not distinguish Piety from Fear in this text of Isaias, since in Hebrew one word is used for both.⁴

Regardless of what is in Hebrew codices recently made available—or in other private translations, it is certain that the Vulgate, which is approved by the authority of the Church, names the Gift of Piety as distinct from the Gift of Fear. Moreover, the most ancient tradition in the Fathers approves, and the common usage of the Church confesses, the Sevenfold Spirit because of the seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost enumerated in Isaias.

Furthermore, although worship which belongs to Piety and reverence which belongs to Fear have much in common, they differ both in their material objects and in their formal notes.

² II-II, Q. 161, a. 1 ad 3.

³ Cf. II-II, Q. 29, a. 9 ad 1.

⁴ 'mora.' Cf. Edward Robinson, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, p. 549: Boston, Crocker and Brewster, 1865.

Piety and religion have for their object the worship to be rendered to God, serving Him as a Benefactor, indeed the origin of all good. On the other hand, Fear shows reverence by shrinking back into its own littleness from God, the principle of the highest majesty, Who has the power of inflicting evil. Even reverential fear does not regard as a Benefactor the person whom it fears. Otherwise, the soul would be soothed and not fearful. But Fear looks upon God as One having the power to inflict evil, even though He should never use that power. Therefore, it is completely different from piety.

3. It is now possible to delineate the objects of Piety and differentiate it from the virtues.

4. A difficulty may arise in distinguishing the essence of the Gift of Piety from the essence of the infused virtue of religion, with which it is intimately connected. St. Thomas remarks⁵ that the Gift of Piety looks upon God as a Father, while the other virtues do not; Religion, for example, looks upon Him as Lord. It is proper to Piety to show obedience to parents. Since it is possible for a person to be elevated to the position of having God not only as his Lord but as his Father, he may worship Him with a loving Piety. This is the possession of those *who received a spirit of adoption as sons, by virtue of which we cry Abba! Father!*⁶ However, according to St. Thomas this distinction is not sufficient, since infused religion itself looks upon God as a Father and proffers Him worship as such. For to look upon God as a Father is nothing other than to look upon Him as the principle of grace which He pours out upon men and through which He adopts them as sons. Infused religion does exactly this, since it looks upon Him as the author of grace and the whole supernatural order. Consequently, if Piety consisted solely in looking upon God as Father, it would not be distinct from infused religion. It would, however, be distinct from the acquired virtue of religion, which worships God only as Creator and principle of all nature.

5. It may be alleged that the infused virtue of Religion considers God as a Father in an ordinary way, knowing Him as Father of grace in the articles of Faith concerning salvation and glory. The

⁵ II-II, Q. 121, a. 1.

⁶ *Romans*, viii, 15.

Gift of Piety, on the other hand, looks upon God as a Father because of a special impulse of the Holy Ghost.⁷

6. Even this explanation fails. A special impulse does not add anything to the knowledge of God as a Father except perhaps greater intensity. Yet intensity of action makes for a more perfect act without varying the nature of the act. No more valid is the claim that the distinguishing element between Piety and Religion is the special impulse in the Gift of Piety employed only in extraordinary cases in which even infused Prudence fails. For example, by divine impulse one might remain in prayer until death overcame him, or one might seek from God a miracle for the defense of his country. Such an impulse does not belong to infused prudence, nor does it follow religion. The Gift of Piety, then—in the opinion of some theologians⁸—must have these extraordinary acts for its peculiar function.

7. Certainly this taking refuge in extraordinary cases is unwarranted. Such incidents belong to the charisms, found even in sinners, and are not restricted to those in the state of grace. Yet the Gifts of the Holy Ghost belong to all who are in the state of grace and to them only. Since, then, those in the state of grace do not always perform miracles or extraordinary works, an explanation based on unusual actions does not describe the special impulse required in the Gift of Piety.

Moreover, St. Thomas⁹ does not explain the Gift of Piety by its conformity to an extraordinary impulse. The only difference he posits between Piety and Religion is that Religion looks upon God as Creator while Piety looks upon Him as Father. Consequently, the Gift is more excellent than the acquired virtue of Religion. Nowhere does he compare this Gift with infused religion, which looks upon God as the Author of the supernatural order and hence as a Father through grace. The difficulty, then, remains as before.

8. Others claim that the Gift of Piety is distinguished from the infused virtue of Religion by the scope of its object. They contend that the Gift of Piety extends to all matters of justice. By it a man worships God as his Father in such a way that he looks upon all men as his brothers in the communication of grace and the Spirit.

⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*

⁸ Cf. Gregorius Martinez, *Commentaria in I-II*, Q. 68, a. 6, dub. 3.

⁹ Cf. *loc. cit.*, ad 2.

Through it he renders worship to God and their due to all men. Religion, on the other hand, is restricted to the worship of God. It does not extend to other matters of justice.

Finally, others add that the Gift of Piety is concerned with due reverence for the Scriptures, by not contradicting them whether their contents are understood or not. Even St. Augustine¹⁰ attributes this to Piety. Furthermore, that pious affection by which a man is attached to the things of Faith, and moved to believe them even without understanding them, is generally related to the Gift of Piety.

9. None of these hypotheses explains fully the special formality and essence of the Gift of Piety. The first does not explain the formal aspect of the Gift. It merely indicates the extent of its object. But why should the Gift of Piety have such an extension? The essence of the Gift alone can give the answer. In addition to this, it is not certain that the Gift of Piety actually extends to all the matter of justice while the infused virtue of Religion does not. If the Gift of Piety extends to all matters of justice because it looks upon God as Father and consequently upon all men as brothers, why should not the infused virtue of Religion do the same? It too is related to God as the Author of grace and to all men as sharers in that grace. Moreover, if the infused virtue of Religion cannot be concerned with all men as brothers but only with God as Father, what is the special formality by which the Gift of Piety is so elevated that it can embrace both?

The second hypothesis is likewise insufficient. Reverence for Sacred Scripture cannot be the total and adequate act of the Gift of Piety, since this Gift includes also the reverence and worship of God. Furthermore, the Angels and the Blessed, although they have the Gift of Piety, do not concern themselves with Sacred Scripture. Finally, reverence for Sacred Scripture pertains more to Faith or to the pious affection which disposes the soul for Faith than to the Gift of Piety or the virtue of Religion. Faith accepts the testimony of Scripture and shows it reverence by not contradicting it. Certainly if this reverence is attributed to the Gift of Piety, it can be assigned to the infused virtue of Religion as well. Hence, this one element does not distinguish Piety from the virtue of Religion.

¹⁰ *II De Doctrina Christiana*, c. vii, P. L. 34: 39; *I De Sermone Domini*, c. iv, P. L. 34: 1234.

Furthermore, according to St. Thomas: ¹¹ "To show reverence to Sacred Scripture would seem to belong to Latria."

10. To solve this question in consonance with the doctrine of St. Thomas it is necessary to pursue his intention in other passages in which he treats of the Gift of Piety.¹² In them he distinguishes the Gift of Piety from the virtue of the same name, always identified with the infused virtue of Religion in rendering worship to God, the Author of grace. He affirms that "although piety, the virtue which is called Latria, shows reverence to God Himself, it takes something human as its measure, namely, the benefits received from God for which it is indebted to Him. Piety the Gift, however, has something divine as its measure; it shows honor to God not because of a debt, but because God is worthy of honor as He is an honor to Himself."¹³ Thus the Gift of Piety and the virtue of religion, or latria, differ by reason of a diverse debt. This is the more formal and intimate aspect of those virtues which involve a relation to others.

St. Thomas then has indicated how the Gift of Piety should be distinguished from latria or the infused virtue of Religion by interior principles. Religion looks to the essence of the worship of God as founded upon the notion of a mutual exchange—by looking upon the benefits of God toward men and the reciprocal debt men owe Him. *What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He has rendered to me? I will take the chalice of salvation; and I will call upon the name of the Lord*¹⁴—an act of religion through retribution for a debt.

11. The Gift of Piety, on the other hand, transcends this notion of gifts and debt. It honors and magnifies God for His own sake, regardless of whether He bestows good or evil. In a sort of nakedness and annihilation of self it gazes upon the divine magnitude in itself and for itself, saying with the Psalmist, *O magnify the Lord with me, and let us extol his name together*,¹⁵ that is, let us adore Him not for what He has given us, nor according to the measure of His gifts, but for Himself and in Himself. *I am brought*

¹¹ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 2, quaestiunc. 2 ad 1.

¹² Cf. *loc. cit.*, quaestiunc. 1 ad 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Psalm cxv*, 12.

¹⁵ *Psalm xxxiii*, 4.

*to nothing and I knew not. I am become as a beast before thee: and I am always with thee . . . For what have I in Heaven: and besides thee what do I desire upon earth? For thee my flesh and my heart hath fainted away; thou art the God of my heart and the God that is my portion forever. But it is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God.*¹⁶ That is the perfect Gift of Piety, the worship of God without measure and beyond a merely human manner of acting. The soul considers itself as nothing, worthless, despoiled of all created good, foolish and without understanding in wordly things, a beast fit only for sustaining burdens and following the motion of God. When the soul recognizes nothing either in heaven or on earth as its own, when the flesh faints away and is consumed, then it is always in God's presence. Its very substance is as nothing before God. In such abjection and annihilation it is not led by any weighing of divine gifts. Mindful only of His justice, the soul looks upon God Himself as its eternal inheritance. It adheres to Him without any medium and it worships and venerates Him in Himself. For according to St. Thomas,¹⁷ to adhere to God is the end toward which the Gift of Piety tends. With an eye only for God's magnificence, Piety honors Him considering neither His blessings nor His chastisements, nor honor nor shame, nor glory nor ignominy. For, according to St. Paul, *Christ is magnified in my body, whether through life or through death.*¹⁸

The Most Blessed Virgin evidenced the Gift of Piety in the words: *My soul magnifies the Lord, and my spirit rejoices in God my Savior; because he has regarded the lowliness of his handmaid.*¹⁹ For her the reason for magnifying God and exulting in Him is the loftiness of God, Who looks upon her profound humility and servile condition, rather than the most sublime benefits accorded her, even that of divine maternity.

12. Essentially different from the Gift of Piety which honors God as He is in Himself, the virtue of Religion gives thanks and worship to God for His Blessings, especially that of creation. Honoring God the Author of nature, it prompts the soul to say: *Worthy art thou, O Lord God, to receive glory and honor and*

¹⁶ *Psalm lxxii*, 22.

¹⁷ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunc. 1 ad 3.

¹⁸ *Philippians*, i, 20.

¹⁹ *Luke*, i, 46.

*power: for thou hast created all things.*²⁰ Similarly, the infused virtue of Religion offers worship and thanksgiving to God as the Redeemer and the Author of the supernatural order: *Worthy art thou to take the scroll and to open its seals; for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us for God with thy blood . . . And thou hast made us for our God a kingdom and priests.*²¹ The supernatural benefits of redemption, man's membership in the Kingdom of God by grace, therefore, is the motive of the infused virtue of Religion.

The Gift of Piety, on the other hand, transcends the notion of benefits received, and gives thanks and worship to God alone because He is great and holy: *We give thee thanks, O Lord God Almighty who art, and who wast and who will be, because thou hast taken thy great power and hast begun thy reign . . .*²² *Who will not fear thee, O Lord, and magnify thy name? for thou alone art holy.*²³ The Church sings: "We give thee thanks because of thy great glory."²⁴ Worship and thanks are not offered to God because of any particular benefits given to men, nor is He revered because of any special relation with men, but because God is holy in Himself, because of the glory that is His, because He has taken great power and has reigned.

13. St. Bernard has written beautifully of the differences between three types of love: the love of a servant who hopes for a reward, that of a son who has an eye to an inheritance, and the love of a spouse. The spouse alone loves his spouse because she is another self. The two former kinds of love are typical of those looking upon God for His benefits, while the love of the spouse exemplifies the soul which loves God for Himself. In the words of St. Bernard, "With the spouse, the one care, the one hope is love. In this his spouse abounds, in this her spouse is content. Pure love is not venal, pure love does not derive its strength from hope, nor does it feel the chastisements of a want of trust."²⁵ Such love has a higher motive, and it is more sublime. It seeks something higher than human virtue, which regulates the worship of God according to the

²⁰ *Apocalypse*, iv, 11.

²¹ *Ibid.*, v, 9.

²² *Ibid.*, xi, 17.

²³ *Ibid.*, xv, 4.

²⁴ *Gloria* of the Mass.

²⁵ Sermon 83 in *Canticum Canticorum*, P. L. cxxxiii, 1181.

measure of His benefactions. Without any concern for His blessings, pure love honors Him because He is great in Himself and exceedingly praiseworthy. It worships Him with a most excellent love for a Father.

14. From all this it is evident that the Gift of Piety is distinct from both the infused and the acquired virtue of Religion. The acquired virtue is in the natural order. It looks upon God as the Creator and Author of nature, while the Gift of Piety has a supernatural reason for worshiping God as Father and the Author of grace. The infused virtue of Religion is concerned with God as Father and the Author of grace, but not in the same way as the Gift of Piety. The infused virtue of Religion is concerned with God as the Author of grace and as Father not in Himself but by reason of the love He arouses in men. Hence, this Gift of Piety has reference to God as He is in Himself, His glory and His majesty, even should He give no benefactions, or should He give punishment and death. With the Apostle, Piety exhorts: *Magnify Christ either through life or death.*²⁶ It does not venerate God as Jacob did, *If God shall be with me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk, and shall give me bread to eat and raiment to put on . . . the Lord shall be my God.*²⁷ In this case, Jacob worshiped God according to His blessings, for he promised that *a tenth part of all that you give me I shall offer to you.*²⁸

Far more elevated, however, is the habit which would offer worship to God even if He did not give any blessings. It leaves all to follow Christ, magnifying Him in both life and death. Like St. Peter, the soul can say, *With thee I am ready to go both to prison and to death;*²⁹ and with the Prophet it sings, *For though I should walk in the midst of the shadow of death, I will fear no evils, for thou art with me.*³⁰ The very essence of this act is higher than that of the virtue. It looks upon God as a Father, since He is holy, merciful, and rich, and not because of His blessings.

15. It is true that the Gift of Piety extends to all matters of justice, while religion does not. Yet this material difference is insufficient to distinguish the two. For this appeal must be made to the formal difference, which touches the matter and differen-

²⁶ Cf. *Philippians*, i, 20.

²⁷ *Genesis*, xxviii, 20.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁹ *Luke*, xxii, 33.

³⁰ *Psalms* xxii, 4.

tiates it. From what has already been said, the formal difference is clear: infused religion inclines to the worship of God, author of the supernatural, according to the measure and the manner of the gifts of grace; piety is moved by the majesty and glory of God in Himself, whether or not He confers benefits. Hence Piety broadens out to embrace observance, piety, and whatever else in human affairs belongs to the matter of justice. It looks upon men, not as men, but as sons of God, or as capable of being such. Worshiping God as Father, Piety sees all men as brothers by grace. How it does this will presently be explained.

16. The honoring of the Saints and the complete acquiescence to Scripture, which St. Augustine attributes to the act of Piety, belong more to latria or religion.³¹ These acts, of course, also belong to the Gift of Piety but in a higher way. Moreover, they are not the only act proper to Piety, since this Gift also shows mercy to others. For this reason the beatitude *Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy*³² corresponds to the Gift of Piety.³³ Furthermore, in a general way, Piety operates in all that is related to justice whether it is toward God or toward one's neighbor. Consequently, reverence for the Saints and for Scripture cannot distinguish the Gift of Piety from the virtue of Religion.

17. The object of the Gift of Piety is primarily and principally the filial worship of God. Secondly, however, and under the same formal specifying aspect, Piety embraces justice to one's neighbor.

According to St. Thomas,³⁴ "The Gift of Piety directs all relations with one's neighbor, but it does so according to a measure other than that of the virtue. That measure is simple and one, and hence the Gift is one spiritual habit, and according to this measure all its acts are specified." This Piety in the appetitive part of the soul corresponds to the cardinal virtue of justice in all its latitude. Within its higher formal motive it embraces all matters of justice.

18. For a fuller understanding of this doctrine of St. Thomas it should be noted that among the virtues which are potential parts

³¹ Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2 ad 1.

³² *Matt.* v, 7.

³³ Cf. *II-II*, Q. 121, a. 2.

³⁴ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2.

of justice, the one which renders worship to God is called religion or latria. The one which gives respect to parents is called piety, while the virtue which honors superiors is called respectfulness. For Piety, the Gift of the Holy Ghost, is concerned with these matters in a higher way and is related principally to God. It renders fitting worship to Him, looking upon Him not as Lord and Creator but as Father. *You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, by virtue of which we cry Abba! Father!*³⁵ In the order of grace God is a Father. *Of His own will he has begotten us by the word of truth, that we might be, as it were, the first-fruits of his creatures.*³⁶ The faithful, then, should act towards God as towards a Father through grace, since they are His adopted children. By the virtue of religion they should render honor to Him as Lord and they should worship Him as a Father whose eternal inheritance they hope for. Since, then, among men piety is a virtue which renders honor to parents, the Gift in the appetitive part of the soul which is concerned with a debt to another uses the name Piety rather than religion or latria. For it regards God as the Father of men.

19. While by its very nature the Gift of Piety extends to all creatures who communicate in grace or can communicate in grace, the virtue of Religion is concerned with God alone, leaving the relationship with creatures to other virtues. The reason for the difference is that Religion is concerned with the worship due to God under the aspect of the proper excellence and uniqueness of God Himself, in which others do not participate, *since my glory I shall not give to any other.*³⁷ Consequently, it is wrong to honor anyone besides God with the worship of latria. Religion, then, from its formal motive, the unique and incommunicable divine excellence, is concerned with knowing creatures but with worshiping God alone.

Piety, on the other hand, sees in parents the notion of origin, by virtue of which honor is paid to a father as one having the authority of an originator. Wherever this notion of origin is participated, there is established a relationship to the habit of piety. Through piety a man is made dutiful to his parents, and honors members of his family. For they share in this notion of origin and generation, being born of blood and of the will of man and of the will of the flesh.

³⁵ *Romans*, viii, 15.³⁷ *Isaias*, xlii, 8. Cf. *ibid.*, xlviii, 11.³⁶ *James*, i, 18.

It is much the same with those who are born of God from the regeneration of the Spirit. But the habit which is concerned with the principle of such generation should also be concerned with others related to it. Secondarily, then, all who share in spiritual regeneration are brothers in the communication of grace. The formal aspect of piety, therefore, directs the soul to God as Father and also extends its interest to men as sons of God, fellow-citizens of the saints, of the family of God. Even the infused virtue of Religion does not do this, since it does not formally look upon God as a Father but the supreme Lord to be worshiped in the order of grace according to the benefits He has bestowed.

20. The very nature of the Gift of Piety demands that it be extended to men as children of God, since it implies a reverence for the majesty of God, not according to the measure of His blessings but according to the greatness of His glory. Moreover, the greatness of the glory of God is considered both in His infinity itself and in the participation of it found in those who are the sons of God and consorts of the divine nature. It belongs to the greatness of God as a Father to lead many sons to glory, just as it belongs to the greatness of God as Creator to create many species of things in the universe. For this reason no habit can incline towards the veneration and worship of God precisely under the aspect of Father without being directed to His children. Since all intellectual creatures who are not damned are sons of God or can be made sons of God, the Gift of Piety extends to all of them. In much the same way, charity, which looks upon God as a good to be loved, is concerned with everything which belongs to God and participates in His goodness. Charity is precisely concerned with the notion of love; Piety, with the notion of debt and of respectfulness.

21. Objection: Despite previous denial and protestation,²⁸ the foregoing would seem to indicate that the infused virtue of Religion also extends not only to God but to all men in all matters of justice. Religion is concerned with God as a Father, indeed as the Author of grace in the supernatural order. Consequently, if it is concerned with Him as a Father, it should at least secondarily be concerned with his sons, just as is the Gift of Piety. Therefore, there is only an inadequate explanation in the statement that religion is concerned with God according to the blessings He gives

²⁸ Cf. *supra*, no. 14.

to men, while Piety is concerned with God Himself, to be worshiped for His own sake.

For if this were true, Piety would be more concerned with the excellence of God and less with participations of the divine life, or blessings upon men, while Religion would be just the opposite. Hence, Piety would not be concerned with the divine excellence as communicated to men but only as it is in itself, while Religion would be just the contrary. To Religion, then, would belong a concern for God in Himself and men as participating in the blessings of God.²⁹

22. Moreover, even if Piety were concerned with both God and men, it would look upon them under the aspect of a duty or veneration. Consequently, the Gift need not embrace all the matter of justice, since there are many things which belong to justice by reason of a strict debt, legal or moral, which are not matters of worship and veneration. Hence, Piety does not embrace all matters of justice merely because it is concerned with duty and the worship of God and men. In the same way, although Piety towards parents and relatives is concerned with willing submission to them, nevertheless some other reason for a debt in rigorous justice may arise which is not carried out by piety but by commutative or distributive justice or some other form of that virtue.

23. Reply to the objection: The inference must be denied. Religion is not concerned with God's parental right as the Author of the supernatural order but with His right as Lord of that order. The same Person, of course, is the Author of supernatural grace and the Father who adopts sons through grace, and hence He Who is the object of the virtue that is concerned with God as the Author of the supernatural order is the Father. Nevertheless, diverse rights are established on the same dignity, which formally specify the diverse virtues or the various parts of justice.

While the right of friendship by which God calls men not servants but friends belongs to Charity and not to Piety, the dominative right—that of Supreme Lord in giving grace—and the parental right through God's adoption of men as His sons, communicating as coheirs in the same spirit, establish relationships of both Religion and Piety towards the one supernatural Author.

The supernatural dominative right is the foundation in *Latria*

²⁹ Cf. *infra*, no. 25 for reply.

for the unparalleled worship of God as the Supreme Lord Who can, if He wills, give grace or take it away, with or without sin on man's part. For in Latria, human reciprocity to God's supreme dominion, the infused virtue of Religion looks upon the Author of the supernatural order as the Supreme Lord Who is at the same time a Father. It realizes that, because of His works within the souls of men, God deserves honor and worshipful service according to the measure of His blessings, for God does not dominate a soul, nor is a soul subject to Him except by reason of what God works within it and what it receives from Him, which, of course, is His benefaction.

24. By paternal right God acts as a Father through the spirit of adoption, "in which we cry Abba! Father!" This adoption lays the foundation for the Gift of Piety, which worships God as the Author of the soul's generation in grace. Not concerned with worshiping and honoring God because of His blessings, Piety attends strictly to God's immense glory as Father and heritage of the sons of God. It puts aside God's dominative right and is concerned with His paternal right alone. It honors and magnifies God because He is holy.⁴⁰ Yet it is so directed to God as Father that it can extend secondarily to all the sons of God and to all the things pertaining to God's paternity. For in the virtue of Piety a man venerates his parents and likewise honors his brothers and relatives, because they are of the same parental origin.

25. It has been alleged ⁴¹ that since the infused virtue of Religion is concerned with God communicating His blessings, while the Gift of Piety is centered in God as He is in Himself, Piety should not be concerned with God in His bestowal of graces.

However, by distributing blessings to men as their Supreme Lord, God does not give them a participation of His honor but only the inferior status of being His servants. Consequently, the virtue which is concerned with God as the Supreme Lord and renders Him worship in the supreme servitude of latria does not give the same latria to others. Moreover, the Gift of Piety is concerned with God as Father—to whom sons participating in His honor are essential. Not interested in God's blessings (although it does not despise them), Piety like pure love "does not derive its strength

⁴⁰ Cf. *Apocalypse*, xv, 4.

⁴¹ Cf. *supra*, no. 21, second paragraph.

from hope, nor does it feel the chastisement of a want of trust.”⁴² Just as the mutual and amicable love of Charity communicates itself to others not as servants but as friends, Piety honors God and the sons of God participating in the Divine Honor.

26. Moreover, by a willing submission to other men as the sons of God, brothers in grace, and members of the household of God, Piety can act upon the whole matter of justice in two ways.

The first of these ways is by commanding. It may command commutative and distributive justice or the satellite virtues surrounding justice to exercise their function towards other men in order to show them honor worthy of children of God. However, by this same reason, Religion may command the other virtues to do what is proper to them for the sake of worshiping God, since God is worshiped by the virtues. It is not sufficient, therefore, that the Gift of Piety should extend to the whole matter of justice, for the same might be said of Religion.

27. In the second way, according to St. Thomas,⁴³ Piety (as an elicitive principle) extends to all matters of justice and offers direction in all human intercourse. It has this extension under a higher aspect, which pertains to the supernatural order and concerns itself with relations with one's neighbor, not according to the human manner of social intercourse, but according to the supernatural communion among sons and members of the household of God. Eminently extended to other matters of justice, Piety does not formally practice them according to their proper essences. It is not necessary that the Gift of Piety, in extending to all matters of justice, should treat of them under the particular and proper formality of each virtue. For example, it is not necessary that Piety should treat of the matter of commutative justice or distributive justice under the notion of strict reciprocation or equal debt. If it treats of the matter of liberality or fidelity, it is not necessary that it treat of these matters according to their peculiar essences and motives. It is sufficient that Piety treat of them as inadequate objects under its higher formal aspect. For its being exercised in one case through commutative justice and in another through distributive justice, fidelity or affability is only a material consideration in the Gift of Piety.

⁴² Sermon 82 in *Canticum Canticorum*, P. L. clxxxiii, 1181.

⁴³ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiunc. 2.

In its proper formality, Piety looks upon such matters in their relationship to the sons and members of the household of God. Therefore, in view of Piety's willing submission to God and mutual respect of brothers related by spirit and grace, brothers in the communion of Faith and of the Saints, these debts of justice are the least consideration. According to the Apostle, *Dare any of you, having a matter against another, bring your case to be judged before the unjust and not before the saints? Do you not know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world will be judged by you, are you unworthy to judge the smallest matters? Do you not know that we shall judge angels? How much more worldly things.*⁴⁴ The Apostle does not deny that the Saints as such, or as sons of God led by His spirit and by the Gift of Piety, will judge worldly things and treat of social intercourse or extend to acts of commutative and distributive justice. He merely considers these acts as minor or material considerations. Under a more elevated formality, which men have in common with the Angels, the faithful shall judge of these things. This higher formality is the spirit of Piety which treats men as sons of God, spiritually related in one communion. Virtually and eminently—not formally in the inferior way of commutative justice—Piety elicits acts of strict justice and of the other virtues which include a relationship to others. For in its dealing with men in the communion of the sonship of God and brotherhood of the spirit, Piety does not imperate acts of virtue but elicits them in an eminent way.

The Gift of Fortitude

28. The treatment of the Gift of Fortitude is bipartite, considering both the formal and the material aspect of the Gift.

29. In its formal aspect the Gift of Fortitude differs from the virtue of the same name because, in conquering dangers and difficulties, the Gift is not founded on human powers or circumscribed by human limitations. It depends solely upon the divine power; it is, as it were, clothed with strength from on high. Some theologians,⁴⁵ believing that any act of fortitude can be performed by that virtue, are of the opinion that the Gift of Fortitude does not differ in species or substance from the virtue. Nevertheless, since

⁴⁴ *I Corinthians*, vi, 1 ff.

⁴⁵ Suarez, *II de Gratia*, c. 21, no. 10, according to Vanentia.

the Gifts are habits distinct from the virtues and superior to them, the formal nature of the Gift of Fortitude is specifically distinct from the virtue of Fortitude.

The material object of the Gift of Fortitude is the conquest of every difficulty and the avoidance of all dangers. According to St. Thomas,⁴⁶ while the principal object of Fortitude is the danger of death, accessory matters, such as magnificence, perseverance, and patience—which belong to virtues allied to fortitude—may be considered its secondary objects.

30. Fortitude implies a firmness of mind in attacking and sustaining grave and difficult evils, especially the danger of death, which is more terrible than any other. This firmness can take hold in the soul only through consideration and regulation of the powers and the means by which evil can be resisted and conquered. Since human powers are limited and fragile, especially in waging a victorious struggle amid the multitude of dangers in the pursuit of eternal life, the common virtue of Fortitude is not sufficient to eliminate all dangers and to conquer evils.

Presupposing the help of God received into the soul and limited by it, the acquired virtue of Fortitude implies a firmness in overcoming evils according to the limited capacity of man. According to the Philosopher,⁴⁷ "he who is strong cannot be terrified as a man"—by dangers and evils superable by a merely human mode of action.

Even the infused virtue of Fortitude, although it orders actions to the supernatural end of charity, does not receive from supernatural powers any regulative principle which exceeds the natural capacity and limitations of man. Although it judges that much greater things can be done, its own infirmity and limitation detain it, thereby limiting and modifying even supernatural actions and powers.

The Gift of Fortitude, however, clothes the virtue from above, so that God seems to cast aside human infirmity and apparently operates in the soul according to His own power. The Psalmist expressed this in the words: *I love thee, my Lord, my strength, my stay, my refuge.*⁴⁸ *By the Lord I was able to leap over a wall*⁴⁹—

⁴⁶ II-II, Q. 139, a. 1, and III Sent., d. 34, q. 3, a. 1.

⁴⁷ III Nichomachean Ethics, c. 9, B 1117b.

⁴⁸ Psalm xvii, 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 30.

“the name ‘wall’ means everything that can stand as an obstacle to human infirmity.”⁵⁰

31. Thus the virtue of Fortitude differs from the Gift of Fortitude in the degree that human strength differs from divine. The virtue of Fortitude is regulated in a human way prescribed by Prudence, while the Gift enjoys the full scope of the divine impulse and is moved by the power of God. The Psalmist sang: *They did not get possession of the land by their own sword, nor did their own arm save them. But thy right hand and thy arm and the light of thy countenance.*⁵¹ The sword and arm indicate the human virtue of Fortitude. However, when anyone acts by the right hand and by the arm of God, he does not act according to an ordinary rule, but according to the illumination of the face of God and the instinct of His Spirit. Not caring for his own infirmity, he does not prudently measure his strength but acts according to the power of God and His right arm. Such Fortitude is more than a virtue. Above all prudential rules and beyond human fortitude, clothed in divine strength, the Gift of Fortitude perfects and helps a person's failures through the virtue. For according to St. Gregory,⁵² “the virtues are helped through the Gifts.”

32. Objection: According to St. Thomas,⁵³ the virtue of Fortitude is concerned with all evils but especially with the danger of death. But to conquer such dangers there is no need for a special gift. Hence, the Gift is certainly not necessary for any other evil, for if the greatest danger and the greatest difficulties can be conquered without the Gift, so can the lesser. Therefore, there is no need for the Gift.

Furthermore, even without the virtue of Fortitude one can sustain death even amidst bitter torments; for example, there are gentiles and infidels, and suicides. Therefore, there are no difficulties so great and so arduous that they demand a special Gift of Fortitude over and above the virtue.

33. Perhaps this ordinary virtue of Fortitude, which proceeds according to common rules, does not ordain its actions to a supernatural end through any supernatural assistance. None the less, this does not mean that the Gift of Fortitude is necessary, since

⁵⁰ Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1.

⁵¹ *Psalm* xliii, 4.

⁵² 35 *Moralium*, c. 7, *P. L.* lxxvi, 755.

⁵³ II-II, Q. 123, a. 4.

the infused virtue of fortitude should suffice. Concerned with a supernatural end, founded upon supernatural help, the infused virtue of Fortitude is regulated by supernatural Prudence. Therefore, in substance it should be able to do all the difficult works in the supernatural order attributed to the Gift of Fortitude. For works more or less outstanding and extraordinary which demand a special motion and impulse of the Holy Ghost are merely accidental considerations—according to a greater or less perfection within the same species of supernatural act.

34. This objection is confirmed by the fact that the virtue of Fortitude inclines a man to sustain even the dangers of death because of the very nobility of the virtue and because of man's supernatural end. Yet this fact does not argue to any impulse or motion of the Holy Ghost except new knowledge or a new precept. Yet for a new precept no new virtue is needed, since the specific formality and essence of a virtue is not changed by a new precept. For, even when a new ecclesiastical precept is added, Temperance is not changed in its proper formality. Moreover, although God's precept that Abraham should kill his son commanded an extraordinary thing, which could be licit only at the command of God, its execution belonged properly to the virtues of Obedience and Religion. In a word, heroic and extraordinary acts of virtue, despite the fact that they require special divine help and motion, and even impulse, do not pertain to virtues distinct from the cardinal virtues. Furthermore, believing a particular revelation of God does not require a new Faith over and above the theological virtue. Therefore, the extraordinary works of Fortitude, although they proceed from a special impulse of God, do not require any virtue other than the virtue of Fortitude.

35. Reply: The virtue of Fortitude is concerned with the dangers of death. If it is a question of the infused virtue of Fortitude its object is still the danger of death, but from a supernatural end and with supernatural help. Precisely for this act the Gift of Fortitude is not required.

The Gift of Fortitude is required, however, for a firmness in the danger of death and in other difficulties which exceed the measure of human powers and the limitation of human infirmities. For although the virtue of Fortitude has these difficulties as its object, it tends toward them with a certain weakness and trepidation on

the part of the individual. This personal trepidation and weakness is lessened or taken away by the Gift of Fortitude, which uses divine power as its own and acts with a motion and impulse from the Holy Ghost. It strengthens human infirmity and leads men with power from on high, so that they may act with the solidity of a rock: *He has exalted me upon a rock; and now he has lifted up my head above my enemies.*⁵⁴ According to St. Thomas, "The virtue of Fortitude is concerned with a work which is of its very nature difficult, however, not too difficult for the person acting, since it does not exceed his powers. The Gift of Fortitude, on the other hand, is concerned with things which exceed human ability."⁵⁵

36. The firmness which the virtue of Fortitude gives the soul in the face of danger and imminent evil should be measured according to the weak and defectible powers of human infirmity. Proceeding in a human way, even when it acts for a supernatural end, the virtue of Fortitude attempts to repel evils and to accomplish arduous tasks with powers which are weak and defective, but sufficient for the substance of the work. It cannot repair this defect and infirmity, since, although inclining to the conquest of difficulties, it cannot completely strengthen the weakness and defectiveness of human powers. Thus even a strong man falters and falls.

However, the Gift of Fortitude inclines essentially to difficult acts in such a way that by the power of the Spirit it strengthens personal infirmity and dispels natural fearfulness. Even in the face of extreme dangers, such as the dangers of death, the person is moved by a higher motive than the virtue of Fortitude. For this reason, in His Passion Christ Our Lord first, acting in the human way of the virtue of Fortitude compatible with fear, gave evidence of His trepidation to show the infirmity of human nature, then He immediately attained strength in the Gift of Fortitude. According to Pope St. Leo,⁵⁶ "when the trembling of infirmity had been cast aside and the magnanimity of His powers had been strengthened, He returned to the resolution of the eternal decree." Thus the Gift of Fortitude strengthens the virtue in matters in which the latter admits of defectiveness and fear because of its own weakness. The

⁵⁴ *Psalm* xxvi, 6.

⁵⁶ Sermon 8 *de Passione*.

⁵⁵ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 3, a. 1.

Gift of its very nature takes away these defects, since from an impulse of the Holy Ghost it uses divine power as its own.

37. That many should endure grave danger without either the Gift or the virtue of Fortitude, and even in sin, is not surprising. They do not suffer dangers from true Fortitude, but rather from dejection, pusillanimity, temerity, vanity, or even ignorance, never real strength. True Fortitude is not indicated so much by bodily acts as by the affections of the soul. No man is strong who is dejected, indifferent, desperate, or vain, although he may perform an act of a strong man by throwing himself into dangers. He does so not because of any strength of spirit but rather from a weakness and disturbance of his soul. For example, a weak man, not a strong one, commits suicide because of worry over temporal affairs. He cannot withstand temporal worries, and he wishes to finish them through death. The man who throws himself into the dangers of death out of vanity is not strong; he is conquered either by vanity or by the passion of daring. He cannot sustain injury or opprobrium, preferring a death for which men might praise him. The truly strong man contemns not only death but even shame. Christ, *who for the joy set before him, endured a cross, despising shame.*⁵⁷ The desire of honor is removed from the heart of man only with the greatest difficulty. No one is strong who is conquered by such a desire, even though he bears bodily trials. The Gift of Fortitude conquers exterior evils, but especially it strengthens the interior powers of the soul.

38. Moreover, its ordination to a supernatural end does not make the infused virtue of Fortitude all-sufficient. It suffices in its own order, but not absolutely nor in all matters. For it is in an essentially human manner, according to the capacity of the subject, that the virtue of Fortitude deals with difficulties and dangers. Hence it frequently fails, not by reason of the virtue (which has no inclination to failure) but because of the weakness of the subject which it cannot strengthen perfectly.

On the other hand, a supernatural command and motion of the Holy Ghost directs the Gift of Fortitude to these difficulties. This Gift takes away all weakness and strengthens all infirmity. In the case of Samson, *the spirit of the Lord came strongly upon him: and as the flax is wont to be consumed at the approach of fire, so*

⁵⁷ *Hebrews*, xii, 2.

*the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed.*⁵⁸ Therefore, by the power of the Spirit coming upon him, Samson overcame all difficulties and impediments.

39. Furthermore, the impulse of the Holy Ghost upon which the Gift of Fortitude is founded does not consist merely in a new precept or a new relation, light or knowledge. It is rather a new constancy and firmness of soul infused by the ministration of the Holy Ghost strengthening human powers and preparing human infirmity to conquer all difficulties. The examples cited to confirm the objection under discussion⁵⁹ do not prove anything. Abraham, it is right to believe, besides the divine precept had the Gift of Piety by which he faithfully obeyed God even in so extraordinary an action. But he had the Gift of Fortitude to dispel all fear and hesitation arising from the tenderness of his fatherly love. Those who receive private revelations receive also a special light for understanding them and assenting to them. This is beyond theological Faith, at least according to many theologians. The conquest of weakness and fear, which is the function of Fortitude, requires a power of spirit higher than the virtue of Fortitude, which allows imperfections to remain.

40. The object of Fortitude: Some distinguish the object of the Gift of Fortitude from that of the virtue and others connected with it by maintaining that the former is entirely extraordinary and requires a special impulse of the Holy Ghost to see it through. They give the examples of the martyrs who threw themselves into the fire, Jonathan who with only one arm attacked a whole army, and Samson who killed a thousand men.

41. St. Thomas, however, expressly states otherwise. "Although the Gift of Fortitude is principally concerned with works of supererogation, nevertheless it is concerned with other difficulties, just as the virtues, but not in the same way, as has been said."⁶⁰ St. Thomas had already mentioned⁶¹ that the Gift is concerned with both the special matter of the virtue of Fortitude, namely death, and other adjoined matters such as magnanimity, magnificence, patience, and perseverance. "The one Gift of Fortitude extends to all difficulties which can occur in human affairs, even

⁵⁸ *Judges*, xv, 14.

⁵⁹ Cf. *supra*, no. 34.

⁶⁰ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiu. 2 ad 1.

⁶¹ Cf. *ibid.*, corpus.

those beyond human ability, for according to the Apostle,⁶² *I can do all things in him who strengthens me.*"⁶³ Consequently, the act of the Gift is concerned with the same objects as the virtue. Of the virtue of Fortitude St. Thomas writes: "Since it is founded upon human capability, it does not embrace all difficulties but only the greatest possible for men. To the other difficulties there are ordained other virtues which are as new capabilities."⁶⁴ For example, the sensitive powers in man are multiplied because of the limitation and narrowness of each faculty. From the fact that sight can apprehend a more excellent object, it does not follow that it is ordered to other inferior objects, to smell or to taste. In the same way, the virtues, founded upon a human manner of acting, are multiplied because each is concerned with a limited object. Therefore, although the virtue of Fortitude is concerned with the most difficult object, it does not follow that it can function with regard to lesser objects.

However, one and the same intellect, since it is superior to the senses, is concerned with the diverse objects of the senses but in a higher way. Likewise, one and the same Gift of Fortitude is concerned with all difficulties with which the virtues deal.

42. This doctrine can be proved *a priori*. The formal motive upon which the Gift of Fortitude is founded is more universal and higher than any motive of virtues concerned with arduous things. Hence, it should embrace more objects than other virtues. The inference is clear, since the more universal and efficacious the motive, the more it can embrace. Therefore, the more extensive matter should correspond to the higher motive. Since the motive power of the Gift of Fortitude is founded upon divine power and the strength of the Spirit, which can extend to all things, the Gift can embrace all matters of the virtue of Fortitude. *I can do all things in Him who strengthens me.*⁶⁵

43. Moreover, this doctrine can be proved *a posteriori*. If the Gift of Fortitude were reserved for extraordinary actions, which seldom occur, it would not be necessary for salvation, nor would it be found in all who are in the state of grace. It is evident that these extraordinary actions are not necessary for salvation and are not to be found in all the just. Therefore, if the Gift of Fortitude

⁶² *Philippians*, iv, 13.

⁶³ St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 3, a. 1, quaestiuunc. 2.

⁶⁵ St. Paul, *loc. cit.*

is found in all the just and is necessary for salvation as are the other Gifts,⁶⁶ it must perform ordinary actions.

The truth of the matter is that in conquering the difficulties and in surmounting the dangers and perils which surround the pursuit of eternal life, virtues founded on human standards would fail because of the weakness of the individual. Accordingly, the Gift of Fortitude is necessary for acting in a higher way and for using divine power as one's own. Because of its infinity, such power can extend to all things, and provide strength and confidence to the individual. The one Gift of Fortitude, then, extends to all matters of the diverse virtues concerned with difficulties, just as Hope is intent upon all things which can be hoped for as leading to eternal life.

44. However, the gift of Fortitude cannot correct the weakness of the subject so that it would have a conjoined efficacious help, as the Gift of Perseverance. For even if it is as a motion of the Holy Ghost strengthening all infirmity, the Gift cannot always have its proper effect because of the mutability of the human will.

The Gift of Fear

45. It will not be the burden of this treatise to examine the Gift of Fear in its relationship with the virtue of Hope, for that is proper to the treatment of Hope.⁶⁷ The chief concern at present, then, is the correspondence between Fear and Temperance.

46. Although not all of the diverse types of Fear pertain to the Gift of the Holy Ghost, it might be well to recall St. Thomas' comprehensive treatment of them in his tract on Hope.⁶⁸ There is worldly fear, servile fear, initial fear, and filial fear or reverence. According to St. Thomas,⁶⁹ this division arises from the fact that fear, generally speaking, is a flight from evil. Evil is of two kinds, the evil of punishment and the evil of sin. Moreover, fear can be divided on the basis of its motives. One type of fear flees the evil of punishment, which cannot be avoided without sin. This is the case of one who denies the Faith for fear of punishment, or

⁶⁶ Cf. *I-II*, Q. 68, a. 2.

⁶⁷ Cf. *II-II*, Q. 19. See the Appendix for treatment by John of St. Thomas.

⁶⁸ St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*

⁶⁹ *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1, quaestiu. 2.

loses virtue, or is afraid to reprimand anyone lest he lose his reputation. Such a fear is worldly, human, and evil.

There is another type of fear which dreads the punishment due to sin, especially eternal punishment. But in fleeing punishment it also avoids sin, which is the cause of punishment. Such a fear is servile but good. It begins in a fear of punishment, common to servants, but it does not remain there. Unlike worldly fear which flees punishment but commits sin, servile fear goes further by fleeing sin as the cause of punishment.

Moreover, the fear which primarily and essentially flees sin, not because of punishment, but because it is an offense against God and because the soul fears to be separated from Him, is filial fear. For it is characteristic of sons to dread the loss of their father or separation from him. Filial fear is sometimes imperfect—called initial fear—since it admits of an admixture of the fear of punishment. Sometimes it avoids the evil of sin because it fears the punishment, but principally it is moved by the fact that sins are an offense against God. More often filial fear is perfect, since it does not involve any admixture of the fear of punishment, for perfect charity drives out such fear. Dreading sin for the sole reason that it is an offense against God, perfect filial fear is that of a son, reverential, chaste, remaining forever.

47. Of these different kinds of fear, neither worldly nor servile fear constitutes the Gift of Fear. It cannot be worldly fear, because such fear is evil and sinful. For fear is called worldly because it dreads to lose the world and the things of the world rather than God, whom it prefers to abandon for temporal things.

Moreover, the Gift cannot be based on servile fear which, although in itself it is not evil, can be found in a sinner. The useful fear of punishment may concur in the disposition of a sinner to justification through attrition. The Council of Trent,⁷⁰ treating of attrition born of the fear of punishment or hell, teaches that servile fear is a Gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Ghost, not yet indeed as dwelling within the soul but merely as moving it. Consequently, as St. Thomas teaches,⁷¹ servile fear, as well as worldly fear, is excluded from the gifts which are Gifts of the Holy Ghost dwelling within the soul.

⁷⁰ Session 14, c. 4, Denz. 898.

⁷¹ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 9, and *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 2.

It follows, then, that the Gift of Fear is that fear which is filial and chaste, since it is founded upon Charity, reveres God as Father and dreads to be separated from Him by sin. According to St. Thomas,⁷² this fear does not differ substantially or specifically from initial fear, but only according to its state and manner. Initial fear belongs to imperfect charity and the state of beginners in whom there remains some servile fear insofar as fear of punishment operates in them. However, fear of sin and separation from God, which is filial fear in substance, is the principal motive of even the imperfect.⁷³ With an increase of Charity servile fear is driven out. For fear befitting a slave leaves when a perfect soul ceases to fear in a servile way and fears only sin and separation from God as the most bitter evil. Jeremias warned: *Know thou and see that it is an evil and a bitter thing for thee to have left the Lord thy God, and that my fear is not with thee.*⁷⁴ Knowing what a great evil sin is, the soul is filled with bitterness. It cannot esteem or value any created good, since it sees that it may be deprived of the Eternal Good. Unmindful of created goods, it contemns even punishment. Consequently, the very magnitude of the bitterness of anyone who fears sin excludes all servile fear of punishment. According to Jeremias, *He has filled me with bitterness, he has inebriated me with wormwood. And he has broken my teeth one by one, he has fed me with ashes. And my soul is removed far off from peace, I have forgotten good things. And I said: My end and my hope is perished from the Lord.*⁷⁵ Whoever judges rightly how bitter it is to lose his final goal and hopes in the Lord, is unmindful of other goods, feeling neither the loss of good things nor the evil of punishment.

48. Therefore, the Gift of Fear corresponds to Temperance, and yet it produces its effect in a way far greater than Temperance. There are no difficulties about the fact that the formal aspect of fear is distinct from that of Temperance. From a reverence for God and a flight from sin Fear proceeds to repress the rising passions which deviate from reason, especially licentiousness.

The virtue of Temperance, on the other hand, does not act so much by flight or from reverence for God. But it represses the concupiscible appetite from the love of integrity.

⁷² II-II, Q. 19, a. 8.

⁷⁴ Jeremias, ii, 19.

⁷³ Cf. *ibid.*, ad 2.

⁷⁵ Lamentations, iii, 15-18.

Moreover, despite apparent resemblances, the Gift of Fear is distinguished from the virtue of Humility. Even though humility subjugates the passions of daring, presumption, and pride through subjection and submission to God,⁷⁶ yet formally and directly it does not produce the same flight and reverence proper to Fear. Only by a participation of the Gift can humility subjugate and moderate presumptive hope. It is thus, according to St. Thomas,⁷⁷ that the passion of hope, a movement of the soul toward things above its capacity, is directly moderated by humility. Not directly but through its reverential attitude towards God, the Gift of Fear recoils within itself from the divine eminence—not so much divine benignity (the object of religion), but the divine power to annihilate.

49. In its relationship with Temperance, the Gift of Fear extends to all matters which need moderation or subjection. In a way all its own it restrains the soul from evil: *By fear of the Lord every one declines from evil*,⁷⁸ and *With bit and bridle bind fast their jaws*,⁷⁹ and *Pierce thou my flesh with thy fear*.⁸⁰ Having the most universal motive of subjection and reverence for God in all things, Fear can embrace all matters which require restraint of the soul and a moderation of the passions. Within its sphere is the whole scope of Temperance, either in its principal matter, the delights of touch, or in allied matters, such as the moderation of wrath, daring, hope, presumption, and so forth. All these passions, then, are carefully restrained through Fear of the Lord.

50. Objection: Pursuing the notion of its universal motive, it may be alleged that Fear touches the matter of every other virtue besides Temperance. Fear can restrain from all sin: *By fear of the Lord every one declines from evil*.⁸¹ But if Fear extends to the other virtues as well as Temperance, it would seem to have no special correspondence with Temperance.

51. Reply: According to St. Thomas,⁸² "The Gift of Fear is principally concerned with God and with how to avoid offending Him, and according to this it corresponds to the virtue of Hope, as has been said."⁸³ Secondarily, however, it can be concerned with

⁷⁶ Cf. II-II, Q. 161, a. 2 ad 3.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

⁷⁸ *Proverbs*, xv, 27.

⁷⁹ *Psalm* xxxi, 9.

⁸⁰ *Psalm* cxviii, 120.

⁸¹ *Proverbs*, xv, 27.

⁸² II-II, Q. 141, a. 1 ad 3.

⁸³ II-II, Q. 19, a. 9 ad 1.

whatever anyone flees in order to avoid offending God. Man needs this divine Fear to flee what is especially enticing, the matter of Temperance. Hence, the Gift of Fear likewise corresponds to the virtue of Temperance." In its universality, then, Fear is concerned with God through reverence and subjection by withdrawing from His greatness into its own littleness. Secondly, it is concerned with any separation from God through sin, which it flees. Finally, it produces an effect in the soul by restraining it from exuberance and from wantonness of concupiscence and delectation. According to St. Thomas,⁸⁴ Fear brings about a restraint in the appetite itself, restricted by a weakening of its strength arising from an awareness of an oppressing imminent evil. Fear has the same effect in the body, which is chilled, restrained or dissolved, by the retreat of the vital spirits. *Therefore shall all hands be faint, and every heart of man shall melt,*⁸⁵ and there shall be *men fainting for fear and for expectation of the things that are coming on the world.*⁸⁶ On the other hand, the proper effect of delight is to dilate the soul.⁸⁷ For, according to Isaias, *You shall see, and abound, and thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged.*⁸⁸ In its relationship with the passions, then, Fear is opposed to delectation, since it suppresses dilation and exuberance.

52. Therefore, because of its reverence for God and its subjection to Him, the Gift of Fear corresponds to the theological virtue of Hope, and it represses presumption opposed to Hope. But because Fear flees from and avoids all offenses against God it is related to every virtue, for it can avoid every evil of sin. However, its peculiar effect upon the soul gives it a special relationship with Temperance, for delectation, which Temperance seeks to restrain, causes a dilation of spirit which Fear strives to counteract in both soul and body. It pierces the flesh, dries the bones, and puts lasciviousness to flight.

53. Objection: In virtue of this effect on the appetite, the Gift of Fear can repress only the passion of delight, which pertains to the cardinal virtue of Temperance. It cannot repress the passions related to the virtues surrounding Temperance, since clemency and meekness restrain wrath, and humility restrains presumption

⁸⁴ *I-II, Q. 44, a. 1.*

⁸⁵ *Isaias, xiii. 7.*

⁸⁶ *Luke, xxi, 26.*

⁸⁷ *Cf. I-II, Q. 33, a. 1.*

⁸⁸ *Isaias, lx, 5.*

and pride. Unlike delectation, these passions are not assuaged through any restraint of the soul.

Reply: By its restraining effects, the Gift of Fear directly and essentially represses delectation, and consequently every other passion which needs to be restrained. Furthermore, it keeps within bounds every other passion, whether it is wrath or presumption or vanity, for these have some delight connected with them. For example, curiosity or the pleasure arising in too great an interest in clothing have a sensible delight attached to them. Vengeance, which is aroused by wrath, is a self-gratification to the one seeking vengeance. And vanity is a great self-indulgence. All pleasure, then, whether of the flesh and natural, or apprehensive and animal, can be kept within bounds by Fear. Causing a restraint of both body and spirit, Fear has for its effect both poverty of spirit, the first beatitude mentioned by Christ, *Blessed are the poor in spirit*,⁸⁹ and the beatitude of mourning, *Blessed are those who mourn*.⁹⁰ Recognizing its own poverty and nothingness, the soul is restrained and without presumption. It mourns and weeps at the piercing of its carnal desires through Fear.

54. Through what act does Fear achieve its end in the matter of Temperance? Is it only through flight from sin? Or through some more positive motion does it humble the heart, subject it to God, and repress the exaltation of pride? After all, this exaltation, as St. Thomas teaches,⁹¹ is a difficult obstacle directly opposed to Fear, while pleasure does not involve the notion of difficulty.

55. Father Suarez, following Richard of St. Victor and Duns Scotus,⁹² is of the opinion that Fear is an act of humility and that all Temperance should be understood under humility, similar to piety with respect to justice. He also claims that it is consonant with the words of St. Augustine: "The Fear of the Lord is befitting the humble,"⁹³ and "Who is humble except one who fears God?"⁹⁴ Moreover, St. Gregory⁹⁵ opposes fear to pride, an opposition which is proper to humility. However, since humility is not formally an

⁸⁹ *Matthew*, v, 3.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, v, 5.

⁹¹ *II-II*, Q. 141, a. 1.

⁹² *II de Gratia*, c. 21, n. 22.

⁹³ *I de Sermone Domini*, c. 9. *P. L.* xxxiv, 1234.

⁹⁴ *27 de Sanctis*, c. 1, *P. L.* xxxix, 1525.

⁹⁵ *II Moralium*, c. 26. *P. L.* lxxv, 593.

act of flight but an act of pursuit through which an excessive confidence of spirit is moderated, according to Suarez Fear must repress delectation through an act of pursuit.

56. Nevertheless, formally and specifically divine Fear is not an act of humility. It always produces the effect of Temperance, either in a general way through flight from sin or through a special effect in the concupiscible appetite, the restraint of wantonness.

Suarez cannot deny that the Gift of Fear is distinct from the virtue of humility, since he admits the principle that the Gifts are distinct from the virtues. If the Gift differs from the virtue, its act should also be different, since acts are spoken of in relation to habits and habits produce acts specifically similar to themselves. Therefore, if the habit of the Gift is diverse from the virtue its act cannot be the same. The answer should be sufficient for Suarez.

57. Against Scotus and others who deny that the Gifts are distinct from the virtues, there is at hand a valid argument to prove that the act of Fear cannot adequately and precisely be identified with the act of humility. According to St. Thomas,⁹⁶ Fear is concerned with a twofold object, namely, the evil which it fears and seeks to avoid and the person or principle from which that evil can proceed or by whom it is permitted. Reverencing this person, in its proper formality, Fear does not love the evil which it fears nor the person from whom it may incur evil. Fear is not love, nor is it concerned with good. Although through Fear the soul has reverence for God, who is essentially good, essentially it looks upon Him as inflicting, or capable of inflicting, evil. Yet, at the same time presuppositively and concomitantly it can admit of love for such a person.

Humility, however, does not seek to avoid evil nor it is concerned with a superior capable of inflicting evil. In its act it neither flees nor trembles at the power of that superior nor does it have reverence for him. Humility is, rather, an orderly subjection to the superior, because of the individual's defects and the superior's excellence. It does not proceed through any consideration of evil which can be inflicted by the superior. For even when the consideration of evil is not present, a humble person knows what he is and what his superior is. Moreover, men can humble themselves before equals or inferiors from whom they have nothing to fear.

⁹⁶ II-II, Q. 19, a. 1.

For example, Christ humbled Himself before his own disciples by washing their feet, and St. Peter advised, *Be subject to every human creature for God's sake.*⁹⁷

Therefore, the act of Fear is not formally the same as the act of humility, although humility can flow from fear and be regulated by it as an effect. From the very fact that a person has reverence for God and is subject to Him as one capable of inflicting evil, he is constrained to seek the glory of God rather than his own aggrandizement. Even without any consideration of punishment, humility causes the soul to cast aside its pride and the notion of its own greatness. For this reason St. Augustine⁹⁸ attributes humility—which he understands as poverty of spirit—to the Gift of Fear in which, according to St. Thomas,⁹⁹ God is revered. Humility, then, is an effect of Fear rather than its proper act, and poverty of spirit corresponds to the Gift of Fear as an effect. In the words of St. Thomas,¹⁰⁰ “Since showing reverence to God and being subject to Him belongs to filial fear, whatever follows from this subjection belongs to the Gift of Fear. From the fact that anyone subjects himself to God he ceases to seek to exalt himself. Hence, if anyone perfectly fears God, he will not exalt himself through pride.” Therefore, humility, or poverty of spirit, and the casting out of pride are the consequences of the act of reverence for God. It is an effect following upon Fear and regulated by it, but it is not its proper act. Therefore, both fear and humility subject men to God but under different formalities. Fear is concerned with the power God has of inflicting evil. Humility abstracts from the notion of inflicting evil, and subordinates its worthlessness to God. Moreover, it even subordinates self to men whom it does not fear and from whom it does not expect evil.

58. Therefore, Fear has only one formal act. From that act, however, many effects are derived. These effects are attributed to Fear as following from it or as imparted or regulated by it. Among these results are matters of temperance, humility for example. Since, then, in its own virtual and eminent manner Fear produces effects similar to the acts of Temperance and Humility, it has a

⁹⁷ *I Peter*, ii, 13.

⁹⁸ Cf. *I de Sermone Domini*, c. 9. *P. L.* xxxiv, 1234.

⁹⁹ *II-II*, Q. 141, a. 2 ad 3.

¹⁰⁰ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 12.

special relationship with them. However, the proper act elicited by the Gift of Fear is both reverence for God as a principle capable of inflicting evil and flight from imminent evil. This second effect is not necessarily found in Christ and in the Blessed, since no evil is imminent to them. They experience only the first part, reverence for God as one having the power to inflict evil, which is to be concerned with a Good capable of inflicting evil. Hence, according to St. Augustine,¹⁰¹ "Fear is chaste remaining forever." If Fear is to remain in heaven, it cannot arise from evil, which cannot occur there, but it must grow strong in the good which cannot be lost. That act which universally flees any evil that might separate the soul from God, and subjects the soul to Him as the highest and infinite Eminence, takes away all elation of spirit and pride—the first beatitude of the poor in spirit. Secondly, it represses all bodily delectation and introduces sadness and mourning—the third beatitude: *Blessed are those who mourn.*¹⁰²

59. In the doctrine of St. Thomas,¹⁰³ both of these beatitudes correspond to the Gift of Fear, the first directly, the second as an effect. The soul conceives in itself that magnitude to which all things are subject in complete servitude and dependence—in motion, in life, and in being: *Since in Him we live and move and are.*¹⁰⁴ Even while it knows that God has voluntarily and freely given all things to men, the soul is aware that by an act of His will God can deprive or not deprive, concede or take away, all His blessings. The soul, struck with a great fear, becomes terrified before His face. It casts aside all its own greatness which in its own estimation was raised up as mountains. For, *His lightening shone forth* (that is, the splendor of his avenging power) *to the world: the earth saw and trembled. The mountains melted like wax at the presence of the Lord, at the presence of the Lord of all the earth.*¹⁰⁵ Whatever is high or exalted in worldly affairs (that is, all the earth) melts at the divine presence and is dissolved by fear, as wax in the presence of fire. God alone is elevated by being feared, and all that is exalted in men evanesces and is brought to nothing. *And the loftiness of men shall be bowed down, and the haughtiness of men shall be humbled, and the Lord alone shall be*

¹⁰¹ XIV De Trinitate, c. 9. P. L., xlii, 1045.

¹⁰² Matthew, v, 5.

¹⁰⁴ Acts, xvii, 28.

¹⁰³ II-II, Q. 19, a. 12 ad 2.

¹⁰⁵ Psalm xcvi, 4.

*exalted in that day. And idols shall be utterly destroyed. And they shall go into the holes of rocks and into caves of the earth from the face of the fear of the Lord, and from the glory of his majesty when he shall rise up to strike the earth.*¹⁰⁶ Causing interior desolation like a devastating fire, Fear of the Lord scorches all exaltation of spirit. The soul would prefer to go into the rocks and caves of the earth rather than look upon the face of Him Who is able to inflict such evil. It dreads any contemplation of the glory of His wrathful majesty. In an interior poverty of spirit, truly despoiled of all pride and exaltation, the soul flees naked from the face of a wrathful Lord into the rocks and caves of the earth. It returns to the nothingness and the misery of earthly things.

60. Of this return to the misery of temporal things is born the second effect of Fear—sadness in temporalities and cessation of carnal delights. For how can the soul be wanton in sensual delights when all exaltation of spirit has been destroyed through Fear of the Lord? *Blessed are those who mourn.*¹⁰⁷ Dead at heart, a person would feel himself thrown into a ditch and buried through Fear of the Lord. *And he shall go into the clefts of the rocks and into the holes of stones from the face of the fear of the Lord, and from the glory of his majesty.*¹⁰⁸ When the flesh is pierced by the arrow of fear, all strength, all desire, and all lust grow weak and decay. Delight of the flesh is weakened and disturbed as a result of poverty of spirit in the soul—*My strength is weakened through poverty and my bones are disturbed:*¹⁰⁹ . . . *for thy arrows are fastened in me: and thy hand has been strong upon me. There is no health in my flesh because of thy wrath: there is no peace for my bones, because of my sins.*¹¹⁰ By the nails of Fear of the Lord and poverty of spirit, the soul is pierced, the flesh wastes away and desires are repressed lest they burst forth into lust, just as *The grass is withered and the flower (of the flesh) is fallen, because the spirit of the Lord has breathen upon it.*¹¹¹

61. The nature of the effect of Fear should now be evident. First, Fear generates Humility in an eminent way through poverty of spirit which takes away pride. Understood in this way, the

¹⁰⁶ *Isaias*, ii, 17-19.

¹⁰⁷ *Matthew*, v, 5.

¹⁰⁸ *Isaias*, ii, 21.

¹⁰⁹ *Psalms* xxx, 11.

¹¹⁰ *Psalms* xxxvii, 3.

¹¹¹ *Isaias*, xl, 7.

authorities cited above by Suarez attribute Humility to Fear as an effect, not as its formal act. Secondly, Fear has an effect similar to chastity and the other virtues belonging to Temperance, since it suppresses delectation. Moreover, through dread of divine justice and power, Fear causes mourning and sadness over miserable temporalities. While it does not flee delectation as something difficult in itself, it causes an aversion and separation from delectation, which involves great difficulty—as is evident in the overcoming of temptations.

APPENDIX: THE GIFT OF FEAR *

CHAPTER I. The Essential Distinction between the Gift of Fear and the Habit of Hope and the Other Virtues **

1. There is a controversy in this matter which should be noted at the outset. In general there is the difficulty of whether all the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are distinct from all the virtues, both acquired and infused. There is a special question concerning fear, namely what sort of habit it is and what formality it has which is distinct from the other virtues. The controversy concerning the distinction between the Gifts and the virtues in general is between

* This Appendix is taken from the *Cursus Theologicus* of John of St. Thomas. T. VII, Q. XVII, Disp. VI, articles 1 and 2. Vives Edition 1885. pp. 373-389.

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OUTLINE OF CHAPTER I OF APPENDIX

I. PREFATORY REMARKS ON THE GIFTS IN GENERAL

- A. The fundamental controversy on the distinction between the Gifts and the virtues (1)
- B. The Thomistic position
 - 1) The basis of the Thomistic doctrine (2)
 - 2) A precis of St. Thomas' argument (3)
 - 3) An explanation of St. Thomas' argument (4 and 5)
- C. The relation of the Gifts and mystical theology to Faith and Scholastic theology (6)

II. THE NATURE OF THE GIFT OF FEAR

- A. The opinions of theologians outside the Thomistic school (7)
- B. The teaching of St. Thomas (8)
 - 1) The basis of the Thomistic doctrine (9)

St. Thomas and Scotus. St. Thomas¹ judged that the Gifts are habits distinct from all the other virtues, even those of the supernatural order. Scotus,² on the other hand, thought that the Gifts are not distinct from them, since for him whatever a man can do in the supernatural order he can do through the infused virtues. Some of the older theologians follow Scotus, and among the more recent are Vasquez³ and Lorca.⁴ More commonly the opinion of St. Thomas is preferred both among Thomists and those outside the school. Older theologians, such as Alexander of Hales,⁵ Henry,⁶ and Durandus⁷ followed it along with the others. Valentia,⁸ Montesinos,⁹ and Suarez¹⁰ also adhere to this opinion.

2. The teaching of St. Thomas is here presupposed¹¹ as more in conformity with the explanation of Scripture, which enumerates in Christ Our Lord the seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost.¹² It is, moreover, evident that the Gifts cannot be reduced to the cardinal or theological virtues. The Gifts belonging in the intellect, such as Wisdom, Knowledge, and Understanding, cannot be identified with the habit of Faith which is the theological virtue, since the Gifts

2) A conclusion derived from this teaching (10)

3) Another conclusion derived from it (11)

4) A third conclusion (12)

III. THE SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES

A. A difficulty from the opinion of Father Suarez

1) The first part of this difficulty (13)

2) Its confirmation (14)

3) The second part and its confirmation (15)

B. The reply to this difficulty

1) To the first part and its confirmation (16)

2) To the second part and its confirmation (17)

¹ *I-II, Q. 68, a. 1.*

² *In III Sententiarum, d. 34.*

³ *In III Sententiarum, d. 89, c. 1 and 2.*

⁴ *In III Sententiarum, d. 25, men. 2.*

⁵ *Summa Theol., part III, q. 62, t. 2.*

⁶ *Quodlibet. IV, q. 23.*

⁷ *In III Sententiarum, d. 34, q. 1.*

⁸ *Commentariorum Theologicorum, t. 4, cf. Hurter.*

⁹ *Commentaria in I-II, cf. Hurter, op. cit., p. 268.*

¹⁰ *II De Gratia, c. 17, n. 9.*

¹¹ *I-II, Q. 68, a. 1.*

¹² *Isaias, xi, 2.*

were present in Christ, though He did not have the virtue of Faith. Therefore these Gifts are distinguished from Faith and even more so from Hope and Charity, which are not in the intellect.

Furthermore, these Gifts cannot be the cardinal virtues, since of all the cardinal virtues only Prudence belongs to the intellect, and to the practical, not the speculative, intellect at that. Hence Prudence might correspond to the Gift of Counsel, but not to Wisdom, Knowledge and Understanding, which are in the speculative intellect. Likewise, these Gifts cannot be identified with the intellectual virtues, since the intellectual virtues, namely wisdom, knowledge, and the habit of principles are acquired virtues, while the Gifts are infused and supernatural. There are no such things as infused intellectual virtues distinct from the Gifts. There is no infused wisdom, understanding, or knowledge, but there is infused temperance or justice. The intellectual virtues do not treat of the object of natural sciences in a supernatural way, and the infused moral virtues are concerned with the same matters as the acquired virtues only in a supernatural way and regulated by a supernatural rule. It is certain that supernatural types of knowledge are not infused, for the natural truths with which the natural virtues are concerned are known by a natural act and reasoning, not from supernatural principles. Experience testifies to this, for like theology itself these types of knowledge may remain in sinners in whom the Gifts of the Holy Ghost do not reside.

Concerning the matter with which Faith deals there are, of course, the supernatural habits of knowledge, wisdom, and understanding distinct from Faith, but these are the infused Gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently, they are distinct from the intellectual virtues which are concerned with natural objects. It is quite evident then that the three intellectual gifts are distinct from the other virtues. The same type of argumentation may be applied to the other Gifts, since it is not fitting that some Gifts should be distinct while others are not.

3. How the Gifts and virtues, even the infused virtues, are distinct is a more intricate question than can be treated fully here. It has its proper place in the *Summa*,¹³ and is also treated when each Gift is discussed separately. I might briefly state that the best argument for distinguishing the virtues and Gifts is that given

¹³ I-II, Q. 68, a. 1.

by St. Thomas.¹⁴ He teaches that the essence of a Gift of the Holy Ghost should be explained as a divine inspiration, which implies a motion from outside. For this reason Isaias did not speak of the Gifts as gifts but as spirits. Some theologians are deceived on this point, and they find difficulty in the doctrine of St. Thomas, because even for an act of virtue a divine impulse is required, and even a supernatural motion in the case of infused virtues. It is not clear to them how the fact of operating from divine inspiration as from an exterior mover is sufficient to constitute the difference between the Gifts and virtues, however rare and excellent the acts to which that motion might be directed. For them such a motion would not diversify the species of the action, but it would give it a greater perfection within the same species. Consequently, it would not necessitate different habits but the same habit more perfectly conformed to God and moved by Him in a more excellent way.

4. Moreover, St. Thomas did not speak of inspiration and divine motion as merely helping, for it is evident that the acts of virtue are brought about with divine help and inspiration. He spoke rather of a divine inspiration and motion which regulates and supplements what reason alone cannot do, even when it is supernaturally elevated by the infused virtues. A man is moved by reason as by a connatural rule for his actions. In the natural and acquired virtues he moves toward a natural end; in the supernatural toward a supernatural end. In the latter case, however, the supernatural virtues are received according to the limited manner of their subject. The fact that God elevates a man to a supernatural end through the infused virtues can give rise to a twofold consideration. First, the virtues are drawn into the manner of acting of the subject into which they are received. They move only imperfectly, and they regulate a man, even one acting for a supernatural end, according to the way of acting customary to reason. Secondly, these infused virtues come down from God, being poured upon us to lead us to a supernatural end. It is fitting, then, that God by His inspiration and impulse should regulate us by supplying those things to which reason cannot move.

The proper act of a virtue is an operation regulated according to the manner the virtue has from the subject it is in and the reason that governs it. The operation of the Gift, however, is

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

governed by the divine way of acting, which comes from the inspiration and impulse of God regulating the soul to its end according to His power and not our human limitation. This latter is essentially different from the operation of the virtues, since in virtues the nature of each is taken from its object as regulated. According to the different manners of regulating objects, therefore, there will be an essential difference. For a man to perform works governed by a higher principle and rule, there are required habits by which the soul is made easily movable by divine governance and obedient to it. Such habits are the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.

These Gifts presuppose grace for a twofold reason. First, the Gifts make a man easily disposed toward eternal happiness. Secondly, in order to be easily and firmly movable by the mover, a man should be securely conjoined to Him; this can be accomplished only through grace. A man in sin is not joined to God by union which is required in order to be easily and firmly movable by Him.

This case is parallel to that of the moral virtues. They are placed in the will to follow and to incline to objects regulated by reason and prudence. If they are directed by reason to a natural end they are the acquired virtues, if to a supernatural end, they are infused. Likewise, there are habits—the Gifts—to follow the lead and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, regulating as a higher moving principle in the place of reason and acquired or infused prudence. The Holy Ghost then forms the dictates for moving the will and illuminating the intellect to form judgments of things divine. For example, wisdom derived through natural reasoning indicates something of divine things as they are manifested from effects in nature. The Wisdom of the Gifts enlightens the mind to judge of things divine from a certain experience and taste of them arising from charity toward God. According to St. Thomas,¹⁵ "The way con-natural to human nature is that it should perceive divine things only through the mirror of creatures and the enigma of likenesses. The virtue of faith acts in this way, but the Gift of Understanding enlightens the mind concerning things heard so that even in this life a man might receive a foretaste of the manifestation to come." For this reason, from the diverse manner of operating belonging to the different moving power and essential formality by which the

¹⁵ II-II, Q. 45, and *In III Sententiarum*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1.

object it attained, habits are differentiated and the Gifts placed in either the intellect or the will.

5. Certain it is, then, that these diverse ways of acting belong to different formal motives and essences. In intellectual matters whenever there are judgments from diverse principles and through a different kind of argumentation, such a diversity belongs to an essentially distinct formality. For the formal and specific reason for a conclusion and a judgment is taken from its being reduced to diverse principles. Certainly a judgment of divine things is resolved to diverse principles when there is a reasoning process from revealed principles, as in the case of wisdom, which is acquired through work such as theology, and when such a judgment, proceeding from a union of love, is, as it were, experienced and makes the soul connatural with divine things. This latter case is that of the Gift of Wisdom. For a divine thing as revealed through faith is a formally distinct principle from the same divine thing as made connatural to the soul through love.

In the will, moreover, wherever the motive regulating free acts is changed, the specific essence of the human act, which is taken from the object, as regulated by reason, is varied. Hence, the act of the will regulated by the impulse of the Holy Ghost moving according to the scope of His power, and not according to the manner of human investigation and reason, is concerned with a rule of action far different from that by which human acts are governed according to their own manner of investigating, even in the supernatural order. These acts, then, are necessarily distinguished by the diverse motives regulating them. Consequently the acts which are diverse require specifically different habits.

6. It should be noted in passing that the judgment of divine things given through the Gift of Wisdom has for its principle of judging a connaturality and union with divine things. In this union of charity is founded every consideration of mystical theology, that is, affective wisdom uniting the soul to God. Such wisdom is essentially higher than the theological wisdom which is acquired by human acts. However, because of human imperfection in participating in the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, especially those which are related to the intellect, which in this life is subordinated to faith as a virtue more excellent than the Gifts,¹⁶ it is fitting

¹⁶ *I-II, Q. 68, a. 8.*

for the Gift of Wisdom and the judgments of mystical theology to be founded upon the judgment of acquired and Scholastic theology and to be judged by it. The opposite course is very dangerous and subject to many errors.

The reason for this situation can be gathered from what has already been written. The principles upon which Scholastic theology is founded are the truths of the faith themselves, and through a reasoning process, which necessarily follows from these principles, acquired theology draws its judgments. The principles of the Gift of Wisdom and of mystical theology are the union of love for divine things through charity. From this there results in the intellect a certain adherence, a connaturality, and, as it were, an experience of divine truths. For this reason, the one who experiences such a union is considered to undergo divine things, not because the intellect does not truly and properly act in experiencing them and in feeling the divine sweetness, but because this union of the intellect does not originate in its own effort but from the experience of love. Such things should be regulated by the determinations of Faith as by a higher virtue and by acquired theology as by a judgment founded on a necessary and evident reasoning process. This latter is more certain for the human mind than a mystical judgment. Hence it is necessary that those acts of the Gift of Wisdom should be regulated through acquired wisdom so that they may be more certain to the human intellect, and this for a twofold reason. First, because the Gift is subordinated to the virtue of Faith, which is higher than the Gift, and contains truths more certainly. Secondly, because of the greater evidence in the reasoning processes of acquired wisdom, since the Gift of Wisdom is essentially lacking in any discursive reasoning.¹⁷

7. With these introductory remarks presupposed, the peculiar burden of this treatise on the habit of the Gift of Fear is whether it is a species distinct from the other virtues. The authors are divided on this point. Those who are of the opinion that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits distinct from the virtues, reduce filial fear to charity. On the other hand, they reduce servile fear, which is good and worthwhile, to the habit of hope. Lorca¹⁸ and Torres¹⁹ are of this opinion. Those who think that the Gifts are

¹⁷ Cf. *II-II*, q. 9, a. 1.

¹⁸ *Commentaria in II-II*, q. 19, d. 14.

¹⁹ *Commentaria in II-II*, q. 19, a. 9, d. 53.

habits distinct from the virtues are divided in assigning the specific and formal nature of this habit of fear. Suarez ²⁰ distinguishes between filial fear and the fear which is the Gift of the Holy Ghost. He remarks that filial fear is an act elicited by charity, and is consequently not an act of a Gift (presupposing, of course, that even in his opinion the Gifts are distinguished from the virtues). The fear which is a Gift, he asserts, is not a special habit which is concerned immediately with God by fearing Him. It is rather concerned with the matter of temperance, although in a higher and specifically different way than the virtue of temperance either infused or acquired. This he alleges to be the doctrine of St. Thomas ²¹ although the Holy Doctor has nothing on this point in the place cited by Suarez. St. Thomas, however, does seem to favor this opinion elsewhere ²² when he remarks that "there is something of temperance that corresponds to a Gift, namely, fear," by which anyone is restrained from the delights of the flesh, according to the Psalm, *Pierce thou my flesh with fear.*²³ This, therefore, is the Gift, the habit of fear, that is concerned with the matter of temperance. The Master Cabrera ²⁴ considers this opinion probable because the act of reverential fear is not distinguished from the act of humility which is a part of temperance.

8. Nevertheless, the expressed doctrine of St. Thomas is that the Gift of Fear is a habit distinct from charity and from humility. It is concerned not only with the matter of temperance but even filial fear belongs to it. For this reason, the aforementioned opinions are quite opposed to St. Thomas and to reason. That the Gift of Fear is a habit distinct from charity is manifest, since St. Thomas ²⁵ distinguishes the Gift of Fear from every theological virtue and especially from the habit of charity. Moreover, he also distinguishes it from humility.

That filial fear is not an act elicited by charity but an act of a Gift of the Holy Ghost, St. Thomas expressly states: ²⁶ "Hence

²⁰ *I de Spe*, sect. 4, num. 13 and 14.

²¹ *I-II*, Q. 65, a. 4.

²² *II-II*, Q. 141, a. 1, ad 3.

²³ *Psalm* cxviii, 120.

²⁴ *Commentaria et disputationes in III Summae d. Thomae*, q. 7, Corduba, 1602; cf. Hurter, *op. cit.*, p. 148 and Quetif-Eschard, *op. cit.*, II, p. 322.

²⁵ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 9, ad 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

it follows that the fear of God which is enumerated among the seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost is filial or chaste fear." He contradicts, therefore, the opinion of Father Suarez in this connection. Finally, the fact that fear is not concerned with the matter of temperance alone is certain from the doctrine of St. Thomas.²⁷ The Gift of Fear is concerned principally with God, Whom it tries to avoid offending, and in this it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as has been said above.²⁸ Secondarily, however, it can be concerned with whatever anyone would flee to avoid offending God. Man especially needs divine fear to avoid what seduce him most—and with these temperance is concerned. Hence, the Gift of Fear is also related to temperance.

From this it is evident that the doctrine of St. Thomas does not restrict the Gift of Fear to the matter of temperance. It is rather concerned with avoiding any offense against God out of reverence for Him. Only secondarily and inadequately does it look to avoiding those things which can lead to an offense against God, among which are the delights of the senses, since they are especially seductive. With these temperance is concerned and hence fear has a special reason to be concerned with them.

9. The basis of the doctrine of St. Thomas supposes that all the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits distinct from the other virtues, even theological, as has been explained. Moreover, against the aforementioned authors St. Thomas' ²⁹ twofold conclusion in this question is to be examined in the case of the Gift of Fear. The first part of the conclusion is in the body of the article, the second is in his reply to the second and third objections. In the body of the article he proves that filial fear can be raised to the essence of a Gift. In the solutions to the objections he shows that fear does not primarily and essentially assume the nature of a virtue, like love or hope. From this there is a third conclusion, namely, that fear, like joy, can be an act following upon charity. Nevertheless, so that it can exercise the function of a Gift of the Holy Ghost, it should not only be an act consequent upon charity but it should have a habit distinct from charity and following from it. From this habit, then, fear would be directly elicited.

10. The first conclusion consists in this: that the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits by which a man is made easily movable

²⁷ *II-II*, Q. 141, a. 1.

²⁸ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 9.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

by the Holy Ghost, and as a matter of fact, fear is numbered among them, *And He shall be filled with the spirit of fear.*³⁰ Therefore, fear realizes the essence of a Gift of the Holy Ghost since it makes a man easily movable by the impulse and regulation of the Holy Ghost. A man is made easily movable by the Holy Ghost inasmuch as he is subject to Him, fears the commandments of God, and directs himself according to them. *But to whom shall I have respect, but to him that is poor and little, and of a contrite spirit, and that trembleth at my words?*³¹ *The eyes of the Lord are on them that fear him.*³² This then belongs to the formal essence of filial fear, to fear God as a Father and to fear being separated from Him through sin. By reason of this effect and essential formality of filial fear it is elevated to the status of a Gift, since because of this a man is made easily movable by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, filial fear as such is an act of a gift and proceeds from a habit distinct from charity (even in the opinion of Suarez). This is confirmed by the fact that fear is concerned with the matter of temperance only in so far as it strikes terror into a man and presents God to him as someone to be feared very much. *Pierce thou my flesh with fear, for I am afraid of thy judgments.*³³ Therefore, the consideration of fear is rather to look upon God and His judgments as things to be feared than to be concerned with the delights of sense as things to be moderated—the matter of temperance. Hence fear is only partially concerned with this matter. For from fear of God anyone can repress not only delights but even wrath and whatever is connected with the irascible appetite. Therefore, Fear as a Gift has a wider scope than temperance. Under the formality by which it touches upon the matter of temperance, namely, terrifying and causing a fear of offending God, it can touch upon other matters by fearing in them any offense against God. Fear of God, then, can avoid every sin in all matters: *The fear of the Lord expels sin.*³⁴ However, under a special formality it is opposed to sensual delight, since fear drives out rejoicing and delight.

11. The second conclusion is proved by St. Thomas from the fact that it is of the nature of love to go out to good and of the nature of fear to fly from evil. It is of the essence of virtue, how-

³⁰ *Isaias*, xi, 3.

³¹ *Isaias*, xxvi, 2.

³² *Psalms* xxxii, 18.

³³ *Psalms* cxviii, 120.

³⁴ *Ecclesiasticus*, i, 27.

ever, to be ordered to good and consequently fear cannot take upon itself the notion of a virtue, like love. The difficulty is based on the proposition: It is of the nature of fear to fly from evil, yet this is not of the essence of the Gift of Fear. Nevertheless, the force of this consequence may be explained in this way: although fear is elevated to the nature of a Gift it does not have for its principal act any flight from evil but a reverence for God by whom evil can be inflicted.³⁵ However, fear never is concerned with attaining a good but with taking refuge from the eminence of such a good and in withdrawing into its own nothingness, since it sees in that good the power and the eminence which can inflict evil. Virtue, on the other hand, is ordered to making a man correctly disposed concerning good by following it. Hence, fear, however elevated it may be in the notion of a Gift, is not cleansed of the notion of flight. Even when fear looks upon the Good it is concerned with it as capable of inflicting evil and under the common notion of fleeing from it and not trying to attain it. Hence it never attains the notion of a virtue strictly so called. Why it is said to look upon evil as its principal object when in the Gift of Fear the principal act is not to flee evil but to be concerned with a good is the burden of the following chapter.³⁶

12. Finally, from these conclusions there follows a third. Fear and hate and any sort of flight from evil opposed to the divine good can be considered in a twofold way. First, it can be looked upon as a simple motion of flight, inasmuch as from the pursuit of a good that is loved there follows a departure from the opposite evil either through disgust or hate or through fear. Secondly, the flight can be considered as it takes on a special motive by reason of which it is drawn into a special formality and distinct habit. For example, detestation of sin, insofar as it is a simple disgust and hate of sin, is elicited by charity. When this detestation is expiatory and in satisfaction for sin it is drawn into the special formality of penance.³⁷ Likewise, it is said of fear that insofar as it is a simple effect of fleeing any possible fault, it is an act of charity. On the other hand, it takes on a special essential motive, namely, it makes a man obedient to the motion of the Holy Ghost and

³⁵ III, Q. 7, a. 6, ad 1.

³⁶ Cf. Joannis a Sancto Thoma, *Cursus Theologicus*, tomus VII, q. 17, a. 2, n. 2.

³⁷ III, Q. 45, a. 2, ad 1.

subject to Him through reverence. It considers God Himself as someone to be feared as a father in a sort of duty and not as a friend as in charity. Hence, it assumes a special formality and requires a special habit inasmuch as it is filial fear distinct from charity. Hence, it is a Gift of the Holy Ghost.

Solution of the Difficulties

13. The opinion of Father Suarez concerning the first part on filial fear is in agreement with the first opinion³⁸ and is established upon the same basis. He asserts that it belongs to the same motive and formality to love a good and to flee the opposite evil. For example, by the same motion by which a thing tends downward it flies from its place on high. By the same judgment in which the intellect assents to one proposition it resists the contrary. Therefore, it belongs to love by which anyone loves the divine good to flee from the opposite evil which is sin, and this is done through filial fear. Moreover, it is proper to desire or hope, by which anyone loves a supernatural good for himself, to flee from the evil of punishment which is contrary to it.

14. This is confirmed by the fact that there is no special habit for filial fear. It is not made a virtue or a gift but is reduced to a supernatural desire. Therefore, there is no special habit besides charity necessary for filial fear. The same notion is realized in servile fear which is good and worthwhile and is supernatural like filial fear. Finally, this is confirmed by the words of St. Thomas,³⁹ "For the same reason a man desires his good and fears to be deprived of it." Therefore, filial fear and the love of God belong to the same motive and formality as the love of desire and the fear of penalty.

15. Concerning the second part of the opinion of Father Suarez, in which it is not in agreement with the first opinion,⁴⁰ besides the authority of St. Thomas adduced, there is the following line of argumentation. Just as some Gifts correspond to every other moral virtue, there should be one for temperance. The Gift of Counsel corresponds to prudence, the Gift of Piety to justice, and the Gift of Fortitude to fortitude. Therefore, some Gift should correspond to temperance and there is no other besides Fear.

³⁸ Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

³⁹ II-II, Q. 19, a. 6.

⁴⁰ Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

Further confirmation for this is had from the fact that no habit can primarily and essentially be directed to fleeing from evil but it must be for pursuing some good. Consequently, there cannot be an habitual gift whose primary and essential act is to fear God. It must pursue some good. Finally, it is confirmed because the proper act of the Gift of Fear is poverty of spirit, as is evident from both St. Augustine⁴¹ and St. Thomas.⁴² Poverty of spirit is nothing other than an act of humility which is a kind of temperance. Therefore, the Gift of Fear is a habit which is concerned with the matter of temperance.

16. In reply to the first opinion proposed it should be noted that there follows upon the motion of love a flight from the opposite evil after the manner of a simple departure, either of hate or fear commonly so called. However, there does not follow that flight according to a special formality of fear which belongs to the Gift of the Holy Ghost, as has already been explained.⁴³ Likewise, there does not follow the detestation of sin under that formality which belongs to penance unless through the medium of the habit of penance, which is distinct from charity.

To the first confirmation it may be replied that servile fear, although it is from the Holy Ghost as something good and worthwhile, does not take upon itself a special formality like filial fear, when it is elevated to the status of a Gift. Hence, since servile fear is a simple motion of fear concerning the evil of punishment or the loss of the divine good—looked upon as one's own—it is sufficient to assign as its principle a supernatural desire or hope pursuing the divine good. This is not applicable in the case of filial fear, since it takes upon itself the special notion of duty or reverence toward God as one to be feared as a father. Moreover, this fear makes a man easily movable by the Holy Ghost.

In reply to the second confirmation it should be noted that in the place cited⁴⁴ St. Thomas is referring to the simple motion of fear. He treats of servile fear, not of the fear that takes on the special formality of reverence toward God and of mobility by the Holy Ghost and subjection to Him.

17. Reply to the arguments for the opinion of Father Suárez:

⁴¹ *V De Serm. Dom. in Monte*, c. 4; M. P. L. xxxiv, 1234.

⁴² *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 12.

⁴³ *I-II*, Q. 141, a. 4.

⁴⁴ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 6.

St. Thomas⁴⁵ teaches that the Gift of Fear corresponds to the virtue of temperance secondarily and partially, inasmuch as it is concerned with avoiding what can lead to offending God. Primarily, however, and principally, it corresponds to hope, according to which it both fears God and fears being separated from Him. Hence, in reply to Father Suarez' objection, it can be stated simply that there is a Gift corresponding to temperance, namely Fear. This is not the complete office of fear but only partial, and a secondary part at that, since for a special reason it is opposed to the delights of the flesh.

It may be noted in reply to the first confirmation that no virtue or Gift flees from evil as its first act. Consequently, the primary act of the Gift of Fear is not to flee from evil but to have reverence for the good which is capable of inflicting evil, as will be evident from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the following chapter.⁴⁶

The second confirmation is answered by the reply that poverty of spirit as an act of the Gift of Fear is distinguished from an act of humility commonly so called. The act of humility is a sort of a modest restraining of the excessive passion of hope tending toward undue honors. It does this according to the ordinary rules of reason. On the other hand, poverty of spirit is from a higher rule, namely from a consideration of the divine eminence, so that it withdraws into its own littleness and considers neither its own nor any other excellence as anything in comparison with the divine excellence. Hence the spirit is totally void of its own magnificence by subjecting itself to God. Thus it remains poor in spirit and not merely humble.

⁴⁵ II-II, Q. 141, a. 4.

⁴⁶ Cf. *infra*, n. 2.

CHAPTER II. THE PROPER ACT OF THE GIFT OF FEAR *

1. In order to explain the proper act of the Gift of Fear, upon which the description of its nature depends so much, some consideration should be given to the complete scope of the Gift. The Gift of Fear can be concerned with God, whom it fears as an object capable of inflicting evil; or it can be concerned with the evil which it flees or the passions, either in the irascible or in the concupiscible appetite, which fear represses. The Gift of Fear, looking upon the person or good whom it fears, elicits an act of reverence. When it is concerned with an imminent evil it has an act of flight. When it bears upon the passions of the irascible appetite, that is, magnificence and the self-exaltation which it represses, it has for its act poverty of spirit. When it refers to the passions of the

* OUTLINE OF CHAPTER II OF APPENDIX

- I. THE PROBLEM (1)
- II. THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTION: THE PRIMARY ACT OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (2)
- III. THE SECOND PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTION: A FURTHER DETERMINATION OF THE PRIMARY ACT OF FEAR
 - A. The opinion of certain theologians
 - 1) Fostered by citation from Sacred Scripture and St. Thomas (3)
 - 2) Based on an argument from reason (4)
 - B. The Thomistic solution
 - C. A refutation of the other opinion
 - 1) By an explanation of the citations from St. Thomas (6)
 - 2) By an analysis of the principles of its argumentation (7)
- IV. THE THIRD PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTION: THE SECONDARY ACT OF FEAR
 - A. The nature of the act of flight (8)
 - 1) Three difficulties (9)
 - 2) A possible solution (10)
 - 3) The proper solution
 - a) To the first difficulty (11)
 - b) To the second difficulty (12)
 - c) To the third difficulty (13)
- V. THE FOURTH PRINCIPLE OF SOLUTION: ACCESSORY ACTS OF FEAR
 - A. Poverty of spirit (15)
 - B. The destruction of elation (16)
 - C. The relation of these acts to the principal act of fear (17)
- VI. THE SUMMATION OF THE DOCTRINE (18)

concupiscible appetites by restraining their delights, it has for its act the beatitude of mourning.¹

Fear, therefore, has the widest scope among all the Gifts of the Holy Ghost; as St. Thomas notes,² "Fear of God is compared to the whole human life regulated by the wisdom of God as the root to a tree: the root of wisdom is to fear the Lord."³ Hence, fear does not correspond to one virtue, for example temperance or humility, but to hope as well, as is evident from the doctrine of St. Thomas adduced in the preceding chapter. The objective of the present treatise, then, is to assign the primary and secondary acts of the Gift of Fear among so many acts and in so extensive a range.

2. I say first of all: the principal act of fear as a Gift is not flight and an outlook upon evil but a reverential act toward Good, that is toward the divine eminence, which is a provocative cause of evil. This conclusion seems to be certain according to the mind of St. Thomas.

There are not lacking, however, authors who place even in the Gift of Fear, as part of its act, a flight from evil, at least as possible in the power of God. Under this aspect, they admit the presence of Fear in Christ or the blessed. Others explain this flight from evil in the Gift of Fear as regarding a past evil which the blessed have avoided. In either case they miss the point on the formal object of fear. Fear is not just any flight from evil but flight from evil as future and imminent. Concerning past evils one does not fear, he rejoices. Concerning evil which is not about to come upon him no one fears since there is no cause for fear unless there is some disposition that will bring about the evil. Otherwise, a man would fear that the heavens would fall, since this can happen through the absolute power of God.

Our conclusion is based upon St. Thomas,⁴ namely, that filial fear has two acts, to have reverence for God and to fear evil. The first remains in heaven, the second does not. St. Thomas asserts⁵ that "the habits of virtues and the Gifts properly and essentially are concerned with a good and only derivatively with an evil. Hence the evil with which it is concerned is not of the

¹ II-II, Q. 29, a. 12, ad 2.

⁴ I-II, Q. 67, a. 4, ad 2.

² II-II, Q. 19, a. 1, ad 2.

⁵ III, Q. 7, a. 6, ad 1.

³ *Ecclesiasticus* i, 25.

essence of the Gift of Fear. but rather the eminence of that divine Good whose power can inflict evil. St. Thomas⁶ had already touched the root of this when he considered how sadness differs from fear: "Sadness is concerned with evil as present and hence with the evil as it is in itself. Fear is concerned with evil and future and hence not in itself but in its causes." For this reason St. Thomas infers that fear does not look upon evil except through the cause from which it can arise and in whose power it remains as a future possibility. Fear, then, not only has a simple flight from evil like sadness, it can have a reverential striving toward good. It is concerned with the cause from which evil comes, for whatever has the power to inflict evil merits reverence and a sort of honor. When, therefore, fear is elevated to the level of a gift there should be a corresponding elevation in the essence of its act which looks upon the cause capable of inflicting evil, the divine eminence. This is true for a twofold reason. First, the act of a gift or a virtue should be concerned with some good, and not primarily and essentially with an evil. Secondly, fear is elevated to the notion of a gift inasmuch as it makes a man easily movable by the Holy Ghost, for this is the common notion of a Gift. However, anything is made easily movable by another through the relationship of the thing moved to the mover. That act, therefore, by which fear looks upon the divine eminence is its principal act when it is elevated to the notion of a Gift, since then it is concerned with its mover and is easily moved by Him.

3. I say secondly: This principal act of the Gift of Fear is concerned with the notion of good in the divine eminence and indirectly with the notion of evil, that is, the divine eminence as it has the power to inflict evil. This conclusion is contrary to that of many recent theologians who wish to save that act without any contact with evil. Its most recent defender is Father Grenados⁷ who cites St. Thomas⁸ in his statement that to have reverence for God is the act of fear. Reverence, this theologian argues, is concerned with good and not with evil. In Sacred Scripture fear of God is solely because of His excellence and not because of any evil which He can inflict: *Who shall not fear thee, O King of*

⁶ *III ad Annibaldum*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1.

⁷ *II De Spe*, tract 3, d. 1.

⁸ *II-II*, Q. 81, a. 2; ad 1; Q. 130, a. 2, ad 1; *I-II*, Q. 67, a. 3, ad 2.

nations? *For thine is the glory . . .*⁹ When St. Luke¹⁰ records of Zachary and Elizabeth that *fear came upon all their neighbors*, such a fear could arise only from the excellence of the divine majesty working so many wonderful things at the birth of John the Baptist.

4. His reasoning continues thus: if fear looks upon evil indirectly, it is concerned with it as possible either for the one fearing or for someone else or for no one. If it is concerned with it as possible to the one fearing then fear can have no place in Christ or in the blessed, who fear no evil. If the evil is considered possible for someone else then it is not the concern of fear since fear is not troubled about the evil that happens to some one else but only its own, so that it can flee from it, just as hope is concerned with one's own good. Furthermore, if it sufficed for fear that one look upon the cause which can provoke the evil of another, there is no reason why one divine person would not fear another, since each looks upon that divine eminence as capable of inflicting evil on creatures. If, finally, fear were concerned with evil such that it could happen to no one it is an impossible evil and consequently not evil at all and not to be feared.

5. Nevertheless, our conclusion is held by Cajetan¹¹ and I think that it is surely the mind of St. Thomas. The latter has said¹² that the evil with which fear is concerned is not essential to the notion of the Gift of Fear, but the eminence of that Good in whose power it is to inflict evil. "God is feared by man inasmuch as He can inflict punishment." Moreover, he affirms¹³ that "God can be the object of fear inasmuch as from Him and in relation to Him some evil can overshadow us." The Holy Doctor, therefore, always explains the nature of fear through its order to the divine eminence connoting something of evil, inasmuch as this power is ordered to bestowing good or coercing or punishing evil.

The basis for this is that if the divine eminence were looked upon only according to the excellence of its good and its power to bestow good, it would not be regarded differently by fear than by charity or even religion or hope. Charity looks upon the divine eminence under the aspect of the most excellent good, and hope

⁹ *Jeremias*, x, 7.

¹⁰ *Luke*, i, 65

¹¹ *Commentaria in III*, Q. 7, a. 6.

¹² *I-II*, Q. 42, a. 2.

¹³ *II-II*, Q. 16, a. 1.

under the aspect of the supreme good which is the last end. Religion offers God worship as the author of creation and the supreme benefactor. According to St. Thomas, however,¹⁴ "Fear implies in a way a separation, since it does not presume to make itself equal to God but subjects itself to Him. This same separation is found in charity inasmuch as it loves God above itself and above all things." Therefore, to be concerned with the divine goodness precisely as excelling in the essence of goodness belongs to charity. Hence, if fear did not look upon the same divine eminence as capable of inflicting evil it would not be distinguished from charity, hope, or religion. The reason for this is that good under the concept of good is that which all things desire. Of itself it is attractive and draws the will. Hence the eminence and magnitude of good, if it increases within the concept of good, increases in the concept of attracting and drawing. Commonly, therefore, by virtue of such eminence there is the basis for love and honor alone, which is due to an object loved and a benefactor. Charity gives love; religion, honor. Therefore, for God to be looked upon with reverence and a sort of terror it is not sufficient that that eminence of good should remain in the precise concept of good and beneficence. It should rather take on the notion of a terrible power capable of inflicting injury and not merely causing good. Thus God is not only sought and worshiped, the soul even withdraws from Him to its own littleness—and this is to fear His majesty. If the soul considered God only as capable of doing good it would not withdraw from Him. It would be united to Him in worship and love. Finally, this is confirmed since in heaven there remains only the act of fear which is to have reverence for God, as St. Thomas noted.¹⁵ Moreover, the blessed look upon that evil through fear as possible to nature and impossible in beatitude.¹⁶ Therefore, the Holy Doctor thinks that the act of fear is not purified of every connotation of an evil effect.

6. A reply may now be made to the citations adduced in favor of the opposite opinion. The citations from St. Thomas can be answered by noting that the Holy Doctor only affirms that to have reverence is an act of fear. He does not deny that in this act there is a concern for good with some connotation of the evil which it

¹⁴ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 10, ad 3. ¹⁵ *I-II*, Q. 67, a. 4, ad 2. ¹⁶ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 11.

can inflict at least indirectly. On the other hand, in other places he explains this latter part quite lucidly.

As far as the Scriptural citations are concerned it should be noted that if the word "glory" in the citation from Jeremias¹⁷ is taken for beauty it is not alleged as a cause of fear. The cause of fear is the power of the Lord of which the prophet spoke before: ¹⁸ *great is thy name in might. Who shall not fear thee. . .* When the prophet adds "for thine is the glory," according to St. Thomas,¹⁹ he goes on to show the unique knowledge that is in God, not to show the cause why God is feared. According to the interpretation of St. Jerome,²⁰ however, the meaning of the word *decus* (glory) is truth, "since in lying there is always baseness." This is a special cause for fearing God, namely, the glory of truth with which He is clothed for judging, since there is no chance of subterfuge where truth itself becomes the judge. When St. Luke says "Fear came upon all" either he means by fear admiration, which all conceived at the birth of John the Baptist, or he took fear properly for a reverence for the divine power, considered as being capable of inflicting evil. From the unusualness of a miracle anyone can judge that God can do something similar to all the powers of nature.

7. In reply to the arguments adduced several things should be noted. For the motion of reverential fear which looks upon the person as capable of inflicting evil it is not required that it be concerned with an impending evil to itself as is required for the act of flight distinct from the act of reverence, since the former looks to the evil alone and not to the person. If I should flee from an evil I must think that it is evil for me. For reverence for a person there are required only two conditions. First, the person concerned must be superior, as an outstanding personage. Because this is lacking in the Trinity one Divine Person does not fear the others since He does not look upon either as superior but upon both as equal to Himself. Christ, however, in the nature He assumed looked upon God as superior in the divine nature. The second condition is that the power of that person be considered not only as capable of doing good, but also as capable of inflicting evil upon some inferior, without any consideration whether he

¹⁷ *Jeremias*, x, 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, x, 6.

¹⁹ *Commentaria in Jeremias*, x, 6

²⁰ *Commentaria in Jeremias*, x, 6; *P. L.* 24, column 747.

inflicts the evil on me or someone else, in this life or later. Cajetan has explained this well in his commentary on the *Summa*.²¹ Consequently, for the act of fear, which is flight from evil, it is not sufficient that one look upon evil abstractly in some possible way; it must be imminent. Otherwise I should flee without a cause if the thing from which I fled were not pressing upon me. On the other hand, for the act of fear which is a reverence for a person it is not required that one look upon an imminent evil, but rather an eminent person with the absolute power of inflicting evil. Through this latter act the soul reveres a power: it does not flee from the imminence of evil.

8. I say thirdly, that the act of flight from evil is a secondary act of the Gift of Fear, although it does not belong to it in every state. This conclusion is asserted by St. Thomas,²² when he attributes to filial fear a flight from evil, that is the evil of an offense against God. Especially worthy of note is the article in which he explains that this act of flight belongs to the Gift of Fear, as well as the passage⁴⁵ in which he distinguishes the two acts of filial fear. These acts are to have reverence for God—and this remains in heaven—and to fear separation from Him, and this does not remain in heaven.

The reason for this is that filial fear so reveres the father that it avoids offending him and being separated from him, which without doubt can happen in this life. In like manner servile fear flees from punishment. Therefore, it belongs to filial fear to consider the offense as an evil to be avoided and consequently the act of flight is contained under the Gift of Fear. In heaven such an evil is no longer imminent or possible, and consequently there is no efficacious act of flight. In heaven is fulfilled the saying,²⁴ *He that shall hear me, shall rest without terror, and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils.*

9. There remains the difficulty that the act of flight is a simple withdrawal from a previous state, that is, from sin. This act is elicited by charity. According to St. Thomas,²⁵ "filial fear which fears a separation is virtually included in a motion of love." Therefore, such an act cannot be elicited by the Gift of Fear, since it would then proceed from two specifically distinct principles.

²¹ *Commentaria in III, Q. 7, a. 6 in fine.*

²² *II-II, Q. 19, a. 12.*

²⁴ *Proverbs i, 23.*

²³ *I-II, Q. 67, a. 4, ad 2.*

²⁵ *De Ver., q. 17, a. 4, ad 3.*

Secondly, there is the difficulty that filial and servile fear are both elicited by substantially the same habit, as St. Thomas has pointed out.²⁶ Therefore, this act of flight is not distinguished from the flight of servile fear. Consequently, it cannot be alleged that according to their diverse natures they belong to diverse species, since they proceed substantially from the same habit.

Thirdly, there is presented the more serious difficulty that St. Thomas²⁷ places this act of flight as the principal act of the Gift of Fear. Therefore, it is false to consider it secondary. St. Thomas has noted²⁸ that the proper and principal object of fear is evil which someone flees and²⁹ that "fear principally is concerned with evil and implies a flight from it."

10. It cannot be alleged that St. Thomas is speaking of a secondary act to which it belongs in a special way to be concerned with evil which it flees. If this were so, St. Thomas would not have solved the difficulty. He is replying to the objection that the Gift of Fear is a theological virtue, since it is directly concerned with God. He denies, however, that it is a theological virtue since the principal object with which it is concerned is evil which it flees. Therefore, if he were speaking only of a secondary act he would not have solved the difficulty since it would remain necessary to manifest why by reason of its primary act it is not a theological virtue, since it would not be concerned with evil but with God. It is not against the notion of a theological virtue to have as its secondary act a flight from evil; charity, for example, secondarily elicits an act of hatred of sin.

11. The flight from evil, it should be noted in reply to the first difficulty, belongs to diverse principles according as it belongs to different motives. For example, according to St. Thomas,³⁰ joy follows upon charity in one way and upon hope in another. Since, therefore, the flight from evil does not of itself have a motive which constitutes a habit, except because of some good sought, it follows that fear precisely under the notion of flight can be the secondary act of different habits according as they follow upon different motives, of charity, for example, inasmuch as it flees sin as an evil opposed to the friendship of God. It can also follow upon the Gift

²⁶ *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, ad 3.

²⁷ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 9, ad 2 et 3.

³⁰ *II-II*, Q. 28, a. 1, ad 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

of Fear as an evil opposed to divine reverence in which the power of God is feared. However, in both cases it flows from charity as its source and prompter. Because of this, filial fear is virtually included in the motion of love, although through the medium of a different habit, as St. Thomas expressly teaches.³¹

12. In response to the second difficulty it should be noted that St. Thomas does not say that servile fear is elicited by the Gift of Fear. Rather he says that "it is substantially one habit."³² This should be understood generically and not specifically, or that it is one through imperation or coordination not that it is absolutely one.

The Gift of Fear forms and commands servile fear when it has eliminated the imperfection of servility. This is proved by the words which follow in the text of St. Thomas: "it is substantially one habit; but one fear is perfect, namely, filial, and the other is imperfect, namely, servile." He presupposes therefore that there are two habits when he says,³³ "when charity comes it does not take away the substance of the habit of fear, but it forms what was previously unformed." Therefore that habit remains even without charity, and consequently such fear is not one of the seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost, as St. Thomas states expressly, since the gifts do not remain without charity. Nevertheless that fear is from the Holy Ghost just as faith and hope. For this reason it is sometimes broadly called a gift.³⁴

13. The reply to the third is as follows: That solution is advanced by some, which, however, it seems to me could never satisfy the reply. Hence it seems to me easier to say that when St. Thomas says that fear principally looks upon the evil which it flees, he means that it looks upon the evil principally in its cause. Hence it flees by withdrawing into its own littleness. It does not directly flee from the evil in itself but by having reverence for the cause of the evil. Hence it only connotatively and indirectly looks upon the evil. On the other hand, through its secondary act, which is directly and properly flight, it is concerned directly with the evil in itself, which in a former act it looked upon only connotatively. This suffices to prove that fear is not a theological virtue even by reason of its primary act, since virtue is concerned with good under

³¹ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 9, ad 3.

³² *Ibid.*, a. 2.

³³ *In III Sententiarum*, d. 34, q. 2, a. 1.

³⁴ *De Ver.*, Q. 14, a. 7, ad 2.

the notion and in the line of good. In no way does it withdraw from it, but simply seeks it. The Gift of Fear even in its primary act is concerned with the good as the cause and the power of evil. It does not simply seek that good but also withdraws from it.

14. The question might arise whether the Gift of Fear differs from the theological virtues solely for the reason that in looking upon God immediately it is not concerned with Him precisely under the aspect of a good to be sought but to be revered. The response is that the Gift of Fear also differs from the theological virtues by reason of the proximate matter with which it is concerned, something created, namely, the subjection of oneself to God through reverence. Since the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to make a man easily movable by the Holy Ghost, it is impossible that their proximate matter should be God Himself. It must rather be something movable by God. Especially in the Gift of Fear a man is made mobile by belittling himself in the sight of such great majesty. St. Thomas explained it thus:⁸⁵ "Filial fear does not imply a separation from God but rather a subjection to Him. Yet in a way it does imply a separation insofar as one does not presume to make oneself equal to Him, but subjects oneself to Him." This is how the proximate matter of the reverential act is the subjection of oneself to God. It is made through a separation, not presuming to equal oneself to God but rather making oneself small in His sight. In this Fear is distinguished from the virtue of religion, which also subjects one to God through worship. Religion performs this subjection as a duty and offers its goods to God in recognition of the fact that He is the first principle of all; it is a sort of paying tribute to Him as the supreme Lord. Fear, on the other hand, does not bring about subjection through a motive of duty, as a sort of worship and tribute offered to God. Rather from a consideration of the divine majesty as something to be feared, one subjects oneself by making oneself of no account, and by considering oneself as nothing in comparison with the divine majesty. Hence Fear proceeds from exactly the opposite motive as religion, which offers worship, while fear sweeps away one's own magnificence.

15. I say finally: the act of poverty of spirit and the act of the

⁸⁵ II-II, Q. 19, a. 10, ad 3.

beatitude of mourning are secondary in the Gift of Fear. They belong to the will, although they have their effect in the irascible appetite, as moved by the will. This conclusion is that of St. Thomas.³⁶ The explanation of this conclusion depends upon that notion that the Gift of Fear, although it has an ample and diffused scope, is nevertheless the least among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost. This too is the teaching of St. Thomas based on the doctrine of St. Augustine.³⁷ The reason for this is that fear is a sort of source for the other Gifts of the Holy Ghost: *the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom*.³⁸ Of its very nature fear prepares the way for wisdom, in which is the bond of perfection. For this reason fear is a sort of disposition in the motion of the Holy Ghost, since it disposes the heart by purging and removing whatever impediments may prevent union with the Holy Ghost. Through this notion of removing impediments it has a notion of universality over all human acts. It does not bring about these acts, but it does dispose towards them.

This act is called poverty of spirit, since, according to St. Thomas,³⁹ it empties and despoils the spirit of everything that might be thought magnificence, either in itself or in exterior goods. It performs this act because it is a sort of spirit and impulse descending from a consideration of the Highest Majesty as something to be feared and in comparison to which all things are as nothing: *All nations are before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to him as nothing and vanity*.⁴⁰ Consequently, from such an impulse and instinct of the Holy Ghost all that seems great in the eyes of man, either in himself or of him, remains as nothing. In this the spirit is said to be despoiled to such an extent *that man may not presume to magnify himself upon earth*.⁴¹ This is the greatest disposition that the spirit thus made void of all created greatness should tend to divine magnificence alone.

16. Likewise, it belongs to fear to wean the will away from every delight in creatures, both because of the magnitude of the divine majesty and because of the nothingness of every creature that can cause delight. It is motivated to this by the magnitude of the divine majesty since it is especially destructive of all elation and created beauty from which can arise harmful delight. This is true,

³⁶ II-II, Q. 19, a. 12, ad 2; Q. 141, a. 1, ad 3.

³⁷ I-II, Q. 68, a. 7, ad 1; II-II, Q. 121, a. 2.

³⁸ Psalm cx, 10, and Ecclesiasticus, i, 16.

³⁹ II-II, Q. 19, a. 12.

⁴⁰ Isaias, xl, 17.

⁴¹ Psalm ix, 18.

according to *Isaias*,⁴² because *the day of the Lord of hosts shall be upon every one that is proud and highminded, and upon every one that is arrogant and he shall be humbled; and according to Jeremias: 43 He hath fixed his right hand as an adversary; and he hath killed all that was fair to behold . . . Divine woefulness dissolves all eternal beauty that lures the eye. Because of the smallness of the creature, all perishable and transient things are considered insipid, as dust which is blown away with the wind, and as a thin froth which is dispersed by the storm, and a smoke that is scattered abroad by the wind.*⁴⁴ Such a consideration of creatures in relation to the divine magnitude draws tears rather than rejoicing; especially since in the end it leaves such bitterness, according to *Job: 45 When evil shall be sweet in his mouth, he will hide it under his tongue . . . His bread in his belly shall be turned into the gall of asps within him . . . and the viper's tongue shall kill him.* This bitterness is especially keen at the moment of the separation of the body and soul, according to *Job: 46 When the sword is drawn out and cometh forth from its scabbard (that is the soul from the body), and glittereth in his bitterness; the terrible one shall go and come upon him. All darkness is hid in his secret places: a fire that is not kindled shall devour him.* This is why the act which looks upon the delights of sense in this way is called the beatitude of mourning. It considers creatures as they turn the soul from God causing bitterness. Certainly this is deserving of mourning. For this reason such an act corresponds to two Gifts, namely, the Gift of Knowledge as directing it⁴⁷ and the Gift of Fear as carrying it through.⁴⁸

17. St. Thomas teaches⁴⁹ that poverty of spirit and the beatitude of mourning are secondary acts in the Gift of Fear because of the very fact that if anyone perfectly fears God it follows that he does not seek to make himself great. This act then is consequent upon that previous act by which the soul holds in reverence the divine majesty. From this previous act is taken the motive for repressing these passions of magnificence and boasting. This is fulfilled according to the Psalmist⁵⁰ *the mountains melted like*

⁴² *Isaias*, ii, 12.

⁴³ *Lamentations*, ii, 4.

⁴⁴ *Wisdom*, v, 15.

⁴⁵ *Job*, xx, 12.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, xx, 25.

⁴⁷ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 4.

⁴⁸ *II-II*, Q. 19, a. 12.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Psalm xcvi*, 5.

wax at the presence of the Lord, since first the divine eminence is feared, then the created exaltation is dissolved. Among these secondary acts poverty of spirit belongs directly to fear rather than the beatitude of mourning, since delight does not have the same notion of difficulty as magnificence. It belongs to fear directly to destroy a difficult thing, to humiliate it and to make it small, since it descends from a comparison of the divine majesty in respect to which all things are small.

That these acts are in the will is evident, since the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are in the rational appetite, not in the sensible. The rational mind is moved directly by the Holy Ghost, but He moves the lower appetite indirectly. Moreover, the proper excellence and magnificence is radicated more in the rational part which is of a superior nature. Hence such is more difficult to conquer and more resistant to examination. Those who made much of themselves in spiritual things and according to their rational will whose spirit is not empty and despoiled but puffed up, in a hidden way put up strong resistance to divine motion.

18. From what has been already noted it is easy to gather how fear remains in the blessed and was present in Christ. Of the two acts of fear, to have reverence for God and to flee from an imminent evil, this second alone cannot be found in them efficaciously. No evil threatens them because of their state and in Christ not even the evil of sin because of His Person. It could be in them inefficaciously, that is, if they were in a state wherein evil could be inflicted on them.

The first act, however, that of having reverence for God, they have most perfectly. They consider the divine power as capable of inflicting evil. This is in an absolute sense possible. Even for Christ, as far as the nature He assumed in concerned, annihilation is possible, just as death which, as a matter of fact, He feared. The possibility and imminence of evil is not of so great importance to filial fear as the evaluation of the power that can inflict it. The evaluation increases in Christ and in the blessed, although the possibility of evil grows less. On this point Cajetan⁵¹ has shown how filial fear increases with the growth of Charity, since the evaluation of God increases, although the evil is made less possible, the greater the increase in charity.

(To be Continued.)

⁵¹ *Commentaria in II-II, Q. 19, a. 10.*

BOOK REVIEWS

John Henry Newman: An Expository and Critical Study of His Mind, Thought and Art. By CHARLES FREDERICK HARROLD. New York: Longmans, Green, 1945. Pp. xv-472. \$3.50.

Any effort to examine, much less evaluate, the material that has appeared during the year just past to commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of Newman's conversion to the Catholic Church must appear to be an ambitious if not impossible undertaking. However, we cannot go far wrong in choosing this work, which professes to be a serious study, and by a consideration of it bringing to the fore the importance and value of the great Oratorian Cardinal.

In the five parts into which this book is divided, the author begins with "Newman and His World," and concludes with "Newman and Our World." In Part II he considers "Three Great Labors," discussing *The Development of Christian Doctrine* under the heading "Life in Ideas"; *The Idea of a University* under "Intellectual Excellence"; and *The Grammar of Assent* under "The Logical Cogency of Faith." In Part III under "Excursions in Criticism and Controversy," he deals with Newman's attitude toward Liberalism and Anglicanism—a rather sketchy if not inadequate treatment; Newman's "Defense of Rome"; his work in history and biography, noting his limitations as well as his abilities; and under "Literature" considers his preferences and his viewpoint, as well as his role as critic. In Part IV, considering "Newman and His Art," the author is perhaps at his best, or at least on familiar ground. He treats of Newman as a literary artist—Poet and Novelist; discusses his autobiography (the *Apologia*), not hesitating to take on all the critics, and appraising Newman's ability and sincerity in contrast to Kingsley; and also appraises his methods and his art. In another chapter he deals with the sermons, concluding with a note on Newman's style, written with judgment, insight, regard, and affection. In the final part (Part V) he treats of Newman's legacy to us, disposes of the charge of Modernism, and defends and upholds Newman's integrity. Chapter Fifteen contains the final word under the title "Cor ad cor loquitur," Newman's motto, in which is summed up his power and appeal, his life and his work, the enigma and the mystery.

All this is prefaced by what the author subtitles "*Mémoire justificatif*," designed, it would appear, to forestall almost all criticism with its reservations and distinctions, explanations and apologies. He asserts that he has "tried to observe an intelligent neutrality on controversial issues," suggests chapters that might be skipped or postponed by certain readers, resorting

finally to Newman's own words in defense of *The Grammar of Assent*—"It is what it is, and is not what it isn't." His "purpose" is "to attempt to understand his (Newman's) mind and character, by which he sought to reach the intellect of modern man." (p. 2.)

Professor Harrold gets off to a good start in the two chapters that make up the first part of his five-part study. We find Newman's career unfolded before our eyes as if on a screen, each step of the way of his life leading imperceptibly, though inevitably, to the next in the process that will evolve a leader of men. Here we seem to be under a spell, much as those early disciples of that gentle character and powerful mind must have been in those early years of the last century. Importance is given to events and aspects other than the traditional ones cited in other biographical notes on Newman. Harrold has succeeded in investing an old and familiar subject with new significance. He tries to lay his finger on the source of Newman's power, the secret of his attraction, the heart of the man. The first chapter covers the period up to the eve of the Oxford Movement; the second takes him from there through the exciting days of that upheaval and its aftermath, his conversion, and his long career in the Catholic Church, with its failures and successes, heartaches and consolations, to his death. Harrold, meanwhile, takes time to note in passing that "a carefully balanced and complete account of the Newman-Manning relationship has yet to appear"; speaks of Strachey's exaggerated monograph, labelling the latter's reference to Newman as a "dove" a misnomer. In a word, altogether a sympathetic summary, and a reliable foundation on which to build.

In Part II Professor Harrold devotes perhaps his most thoughtful and most thorough chapters to what he calls Newman's "Three Great Labors," namely, *The Development of Christian Doctrine*, *The Idea of a University*, and *The Grammar of Assent*. In evaluating the author's treatment of the first and last of these three we can do no better than refer the reader to Father Benard's *Introduction to Newman's Theology*, wherein both are subjected to a searching analysis. Harrold himself has taken pains to refer to this study, quoting it at length, and recommending the rules evolved by Father Benard for a true interpretation of Newman. Harrold, however, is to be congratulated for his painstaking review of the origin and progress of the *Essay on Development*, and for the recommendations he makes in the matter of passages for perusal. His limitations are evident in his efforts to understand the *Grammar*, which seems to have exercised an attraction amounting almost to fascination for the professor, whose earlier background has failed to supply him with the nourishment of a systematic course in a definite philosophical system, such as Scholasticism. He acknowledges his debt to those whose aid he has sought in this phase of his study.

Harrold's own career as a professor has enabled him to make an appreciative study of Newman's *Idea*, and his position outside the orbit that

involved Newman and his contemporaries gives him some distinct advantages, particularly in dealing with what Newman himself called his *Campaign in Ireland*. One cannot easily dwell on this episode in the Catholic career of the great Oratorian without arousing emotions that have their roots in national feeling. So much has already been written around the content of *The Idea of a University* that little is left. Harrold, however, has not hesitated to call attention to much that is familiar, and has, in fact, written some comment on the "Gentleman," quoting it *in extenso*, without incurring any charge of triteness. He has succeeded in bringing forth something that will appeal to the old as well as to the new disciple of Newman.

Part III is concerned with "Excursions in Criticism and Controversy." The opening chapter is entitled "The Anti-Dogmatic Principle: Liberalism in Religion," and here one senses Harrold's vagueness on solid, doctrinal issues—the outcome, apparently, of his resolve to "maintain an intelligent neutrality." He is to be credited with a brave effort to keep his balance on a question that he is not in the best position to sum up and decide. He accumulates the correct definitions from as many sides as he can discover, cites Newman's own remarks, opinions and position, but fails to produce the effect most satisfactory to the Catholic sense.

In his efforts to wrest from Newman some of his secrets, Professor Harrold continues his exhaustive mining in another of his works, the *Via Media*, "the doctrine that the English Church stood safely free from both the 'corruptions' of Romanism and the 'errors' of popular Protestantism," (p. 33), which (quoting Dawson, a Catholic) "still remains the best justification for the essential Anglican position." (p. 386, n. 6.) Harrold considers the *Via Media* in detail in two separate sections, one devoted to its definition and explanation, another to a consideration of Newman's footnotes and preface to the third edition, which Newman addressed to his dead Anglican self, and regarding which Harrold rather ruefully remarks: "In them one observes how Newman treats his old Anglican self the way a rather short-tempered schoolmaster corrects a pupil's essay." (p. 222.) It would seem he almost regrets Newman's severity in taking himself to task for sideswipes at the Church of Rome, whereas the Anglicans must sit and smart under the blows of the "master of the unexpected, deftly aimed sideswipe at an opponent's tenderest spot," (p. 219), implying that Newman could have shown a little more charity toward the members of the Church he left. It was to forestall any attempt to reprint them eventually as a defense of a position he no longer held that Newman undertook to write a preface and notes that would leave no doubt whatever in the minds of his readers about what he thought of the statements and arguments he favored in his Anglican days. To say they are the "best justification" of that position even to this day does not mean they can be regarded as a solution or an adequate answer to the question—"What is the true religion?" It is not a refuge. It is at best a milestone.

When we consider the few pages given to *The Present Position of Catholics in England*, which Newman himself regarded as "the best written of all his work" (Ward, *Life*, I, p. 264), the treatment seems much too short and unsatisfactory. While acknowledging many of its good points, Harrold does say the Lectures "make little effort to be fair or objective," concluding with, "Newman was hardly a statistician or social historian, and we cannot scold him for not doing what he did not intend to do" (p. 197), a remark which may have been written with the best of intentions yet connotes an attitude far from sympathetic to the tenor of the lectures as a whole, namely, a defense of the Church against the Protestant tradition.

"Newman as Historian and Biographer" makes pleasant reading, culminating with a remark on the *Historical Sketches* that after reading them "we have the feeling of having moved among great personalities; we know little of their outward garments, but we know what they thought, how they suffered, and what they wrote to their friends, how they struggled, and how they died" (p. 245), which may well serve us in making an estimate of Newman in the capacity of historian and biographer.

Before coming to the large section devoted to Newman as writer, we have a chapter entitled "Literature," which is concerned with his attitude toward reading, his preferences, his ability as critic, all of which have come in for their share of attention from writers on Newman before. Harrold marshals the evidence, and as usual in such a sphere as this, makes a sober judgment and draws a fair if unspectacular conclusion.

We like to think that Part IV on "Newman and His Art," containing three chapters entitled in order "Newman as Literary Artist," "Autobiography: the *Apologia*," and "Insight and Eloquence: the Sermons," was written with care to be sure, but also under the inspiration of the master himself. He opens with an appreciation of Newman's aesthetic temperament, and continues with Newman as poet, subscribing to the opinion that Newman's best poetry is in his best prose (cf. the familiar last paragraph of the *Apologia*). He comes up with the observation that Newman's "readers, including his most careful critics, have failed to recognize in him an astonishing gift for 'light verse'" (p. 275).

In speaking of Newman as a novelist Harrold brings out the fact that as early as 1853 Charles Kingsley's *Hypatia*, "by its sympathetic treatment of pagan life and thought, and by its attack on Monasticism among the early Christians" (p. 283) had offended Catholics. *Callista* may have owed its origin to some such misrepresentation of life in early Christian times.

Harrold gives a solid, sober, and succinct account of the genesis of the *Apologia*, describes its plan, noting that "Persuasion with as little argument as possible . . . was his daring strategy; self-revelation—his method . . ." (p. 310). He recognizes the existence of "a certain persisting opinion cur-

rent in Newman criticism, namely, that Newman is simply an intellectually seductive, self-deluded, self-centered, and dangerously unscrupulous user of the English language" (p. 313). He disposes of Leslie Cross' charge, as being representative of the opponents' camp, that the account in the *Apologia* is misleading, and concludes this chapter with a word of encouragement and consolation to those who approach the *Apologia* beset by doubts and misgivings engendered by such controversialists: "... one may read the *Apologia* without suspicion, without any perplexity as to motives, integrity, or objectives . . ." (p. 317). He sums up with advice on what to look for and what to expect.

Newman's own remark that "definiteness is the life of preaching" (p. 324) is corroborated by Harrold in speaking of Newman's own preaching. He draws on the vast riches at hand in the volumes of sermons, noting Newman's various powers and talents, and showing by specific examples how he brought out this capacity. He regards the sermon entitled "Parting of Friends" as best, illustrating how he touched men's hearts and minds and souls, was never mawkish, or silly, or trite, and was possessed always of utter sincerity. In appraising Newman's style Harrold employs a series of descriptive words and phrases that touch and impress us, for example, "phrasal felicity," "utter transparency," "austerity of expression," "prose is always supple and sinuous," "scholarly and urbane," "unites ease with strength, fullness of feeling with strictness of control." "Its genius lies in its rhythm." "The source of that power is the writer's mastery of the phrase." (pp. 346-347-348.)

In the fifth and final part of this book we have two chapters, in the first of which "Newman's Legacy," his relation to Modernism, and his integrity are considered in that order. The continued circulation and reading of his works, the persistent mention of his name, and the noticeable effect of his example and influence down to our own day should be sufficient evidence of the existence of his "legacy." The taint of Modernism has been forever cleared from his name by Father Benard's most recent book already referred to. All great men have a depth that cannot be easily sounded by lesser men, and therefore demand patience and sympathy for a just estimate of their complex character. As Harrold concludes: "We shall probably never be able to resolve all the paradoxes in Newman's character and mind. But there are no valid grounds for questioning his sincerity and integrity" (p. 373).

A final chapter entitled "Cor ad Cor Loquitur: A Conclusion and a Beginning" ends the book. As the author says: "... we have surveyed Newman in the rich variety of his mind and work . . ." and "... we come to the conclusion of our study, but not, we feel confident, to the end of our knowledge of the man. The character of Newman is as perpetually discoverable as a great book . . ." (p. 374.) A certain warmth characterizes

these last few lines, and well it might since he now deals with Newman's appeal. He speaks to the hearts of men, and they who listen accordingly will learn much from that great man, but they must keep in tune with his motto: "Cor ad Cor Loquitur."

The book well bears out its subtitle—An Expository and Critical Study. The author seems to have fulfilled his purpose and his aim. He is, for the most part, an observer, refraining from taking sides, yet pointing out exaggerations wherever they appear. He avoids extremes. His judgments seem considered, honest, sincere. He is enlightening in the manner of his treatment; thoughtful, even refreshing at times. We have here the fruit of persistent, patient, painstaking effort, research and study; much labor, if not enthusiasm; caution in place of fire and inspiration; a careful, controlled appreciation; restrained, not eager. This book is remarkable for what it contains. It is full, replete. It has a wealth, an abundance of matter on Newman and by Newman, in tune with his times and his temper. There is almost as much to be gathered from the notes, so illuminating, so well arranged, and documented, as from the text itself. This is a truly comprehensive study. When we consider the ground covered, the quantity of material and the care with which it has been accumulated, sifted, appraised, selected, while maintaining a high quality of critical and appreciative writing, its shortcomings and defects are almost negligible. It calls for high praise and sincere thanks from readers of Newman, new and old. The author, among other things, succeeds in corroborating findings and conclusions of others regarding Newman (in the matter of his style particularly) without seeming to be repetitious. It is a good, and as far as it goes, a definitive work on Newman. It may well be the best over-all work of the centenary year. As the culminating point, the peak, in a long line of works on Newman it has the advantage of all former studies. The author has made good use of those preceding him in the field of Newman scholarship, has made judicious and wise selections of criticism, and has given careful attention to all worthwhile contributions, not omitting to issue wise warnings to the unwary.

The work is not without its blemishes, however. Among such are inaccuracies in referring to certain Catholic terms. For example (p. 206) the Blessed Virgin was not only "born" without the stain of original sin, but also "conceived." Reference to the "Legend of St. Denis," implying belief in it as an article of faith, is incorrect to say the least (p. 363). Remarks on pages 211-212 on Ultramontaniam show a lack of appreciation of the whole story. The use of "Romanist," and "Defense of Rome" as such carries an unpleasant connotation. The word "exuberant" in referring to devotion to the Blessed Virgin by certain people is not a fortunate choice (p. 207). His attitude toward the "syllabus" expressed on pages 216-217 is simply a reflection typical of one who does not quite grasp its significance.

On a point of fact—Renan was not an ordained priest, according to records available.

We have been impressed by the arrangement, the plan, treatment, completeness, and coverage. In the five parts we have fifteen chapters with over fifty subdivisions. In addition to 377 pages of text, there are a preface, 62 pages of notes, separated from the body of the book, a select bibliography covering 13 pages and an index of 20 pages. It has been well planned and executed. It is to be regretted that the physical aspect of the book does not match its contents. The paper and binding are poor indeed, and the blurb may as well never have been written. In fact, it is a definite liability.

In conclusion, it would not be amiss to quote a few words from Wilfrid Ward, adopted by Professor Harrold for use on the page facing his Preface. Here they are—"Newman, of all men, needs students of active and original and penetrating minds to detect and elaborate the pregnant suggestions of a poetic thinker who had not the habit of scientific statement. Like the slave of Midas, it has been said, he often whispered his secret to the reeds."

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New York City,
New York.

A Catholic Looks at the World. By FRANCIS E. McMAHON, New York: Vanguard Press, 1945. Pp. x + 334 with bibliography and index. \$2.75.

There is nothing misleading in Dr. McMahon's title. He literally takes the world in his grasp and ranges far and wide over both the speculative and practical field. Combining personal reminiscence with philosophical disquisition, he looks at the world as he finds it, pointing out what is wrong with it and suggesting what needs to be done to make it right. So wide a range inevitably leads to a certain diffuseness, and the personal anecdote is used so sparingly and incidentally that it has no marked effect on the structure of the book. Here perhaps it should be noted that those who turn to the book expecting denunciations will be disappointed. The tone throughout is mild, and the author has scrupulously abided by his intention, announced in the preface, that he did not want to offend anyone.

This does not mean, however, that the book is without a central purpose and unifying theme. The book faithfully mirrors the position that Dr. McMahon has staked out for himself in public opinion in recent years, and its "message" has been on the whole faithfully reflected in the reception given it by the secular papers. The *New Republic* reviewer, for instance, characterized it as "the credo of an American Catholic liberal," and this pretty well "hits the nail on the head." For the deepest purpose of the

book is to unite and integrate the meaning and ideals summed up in the three words, "Catholic," "American," and "liberal." Dr. McMahon's contention is that there is no necessary contradiction among them, and his hope for the future lies in the possibility of their fruitful union.

It is the joining of "Catholic" and "liberal" that has aroused the controversy about Dr. McMahon. Yet it would help immeasurably to clarify the issues in this controversy if its "American" character were emphasized before either the "Catholic" or "liberal." For in America the conflict between Catholicism and liberalism never reached the point that it did in Europe. There are many reasons for this, but certainly one of the most important is that liberalism in America has never obtained any clear-cut definition. This is very evident from Dr. McMahon's treatment of liberalism. The closest he comes to defining it, in its present American form, is in describing it as "a grand passion for the welfare of humanity" which entails "mass-education," "anti-slavery movements," "penal reform, health programs and trade-union legislation," etc. (p. 112). No American "liberal," so far as I am aware, has made the slightest objection to this characterization of liberalism, and, indeed, it is typical.

Now the position of the Catholic Church towards liberalism, in so far as it has been defined in Papal statements against it, always has reference to a sharply defined position, whether in the economic, political, or ethico-religious field or in a philosophical position combining all three. And in Europe, at least prior to the First World War, there were men and organized groups fighting on a "liberal" platform for ends that almost inevitably became anti-clerical and anti-religious. The Catholic teaching against liberalism met a real object of attack in those conditions. Too often, however, American Catholics have applied those same arguments against American liberals, and the result has been confusion rather than enlightenment.

Dr. McMahon in analyzing the faults of the liberals (in the American sense) reveals the source of this confusion. Modern American liberalism is fundamentally without moorings in any philosophical or religious principle, and is living off the heritage of a Christian past. And its great shortcoming is that it sees no need for any such principles.

The essential achievement of Dr. McMahon's book is that it is one long plea for the necessity of principle, and Christian principle, in our political, social, and economic life. One sign of its success is afforded by the fact that many of the secular reviewers frankly admitted his charge that liberalism does not have any basic reason for the ideals it holds dear. These ideals for economic, social, and political democracy, which Dr. McMahon shares to a great extent with the American liberals, he expounds in terms of their hidden principles, especially and often quite literally as they are analyzed in the Papal encyclicals. In this aspect of his work, he is contributing to

the work already begun by others (notably Prof. William Aylott Orton of Smith College in his book, *The Liberal Tradition*) of bringing liberalism back to its source in the Christian tradition.

The other main aspect of his work, for which Dr. McMahon is obviously valued by the liberals, is his effort to enlist Catholics on the side of the liberals in their fight for reform. By expounding the liberal theses in terms of the Papal encyclicals, he shows there is no inherent contradiction on this level between Catholic and liberal teaching. His main criticism of American Catholics is, consequently, not in the realm of principle but in that of practice, fundamentally in the refusal to join with others to the full extent of their powers to realize a better life for man.

Dr. McMahon's book is in itself a contribution to the eventual overcoming of that weakness. It is one more effort to make Christianity real in the market-place, another addition to the growing number of Catholics, both here and in Europe, who are engaging in fighting for the Christian cause on terms the modern world can understand.

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